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ABSTRACT
FAMILY STRUCTURE, STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP) AND CHILD OUTCOMES
By
Minghua Li
University of New Hampshire, September, 2006
This dissertation consists of three separate but interrelated essays that investigate 
how family structure and public policy are linked to children’s health and developmental 
outcomes. Each essay employs two or three waves of the National Survey of America’s 
Families (NSAF) as the primary data source. The first essay broadly investigates how 
family structure, including the less typical non-traditional families such as single father 
and grandparent households, are related to a wide array of child outcomes with a focus on 
the interplay o f parent-child gender. The results from this study show that children in 
single-father families have better health status than children living in all other non- 
traditional families. Adding economic resources and inputs appears to mitigate the 
adverse effect of poverty associated with non-traditional families, but does not eliminate 
such negative impact.
The second essay investigates how the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Programs (SCHIP), which are designed to provide coverage for uninsured children with 
family income too high to qualify for Medicaid but not high enough to secure private
- xi -
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insurance, affect coverage, medical care utilization and child health outcomes. I find 
strong and consistent evidence that the number o f publicly insured children increases; 
however, the number o f privately insured children also declines suggesting significant 
crowd-out. As a result, there are no consistent findings that SCHIP increased the overall 
number of insured children. The results also indicate that SCHIP programs encourage 
medical care utilization such as well-child care visits and doctor visits. Nevertheless, 
there is little evidence on the effectiveness of SCHIP with respect to improving children’s 
health outcomes.
The third essay contributes to the sparse existing literature on two different fronts. 
First, it empirically investigates the impact of welfare reform on the formation of 
grandparent-headed households, while at the same time taking into account the interplay 
of other contemporary public programs such as state kinship care policies and SCHIP. 
Second, this essay explores the motivations underlying grandparent caregiving behaviors 
and offers insights to such behaviors from an economist’s perspective. I do not find 
evidence that welfare reform encourages grandparent household formation. However, 
there is strong evidence that kinship care policies encourage grandparent caregiving 
behaviors.
-  X l l  -
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INTRODUCTION
There was early and widespread interest in the well-being o f children, as children 
are viewed as America’s most valuable resource for the future. The Children’s Charter, 
as one of the first explicit statements of the national goals for children and youth, was 
provided in 1930, at the onset of the Great Depression. The Children’s Charter lays out 
the national goals for the children of America:1
I. For every child spiritual and moral training to help him to stand firm under the
pressure of life
II. For every child understanding and guarding of his personality as his most
precious right
III. For every child a home and that love and security which a home provides; and
for that child who must receive foster care, the nearest substitutes for his own 
home
IV. For every child full preparation for his birth, his mother receiving prenatal, 
natal, and postnatal care, and the establishment of such protective measures as 
will make childbearing safer
V. For every child health protection from birth through adolescence, including:
periodical health examinations and, where needed, care of specialists and 
hospital treatments; regular dental examination and care of the teeth; 
protective and preventive measures against communicable diseases; the 
insuring of pure food, milk and pure water
VI. For every child from birth through adolescence, promotion of health, 
including health instruction and a health program, wholesome physical and 
mental creation, with teachers and leaders adequately trained
The well-being of American children is also essential to the pursuit of happiness 
by many American families. Most families strive to raise their children in a secure and 
stimulating environment by providing economic and social resources needed for their
1 U.S. Department o f  Health and Human Services (1991), C hild H ealth USA 91.
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children’s success. However, changing demographics and social trends have reshaped 
American families so that they differ not only from the traditional families, but also from 
each other. Along with the decline of traditional families, new types o f families and 
living arrangements have become more prominent, including one-parent families, 
cohabiting couples with children, and grandparent maintained families.
Changing family structure and children’s current and future economic well-being 
are inextricably connected. Greater diversity has meant greater economic inequality 
across households. While the overall U.S child poverty rate is 17 percent, the poverty rate 
is 46 percent for children in no-parent families and 38 percent for children in one-parent 
families.2 Therefore, children in single-parent families and no-parent-present families 
have unusually high poverty rates compared to children in other families. Although the 
exceptionally high poverty rates observed in such households can not be simply reduced 
to a family question especially among the historically disadvantaged groups, the link 
between children’s living arrangements and poverty is strong.
The new and changing American family life coupled with economic deprivation, 
has greatly affected the experience of childhood and young adulthood for many children 
over the past four decades. To understand the interplay of these changes on child 
outcomes, it is thus essential to look at the population of children with a focus on family 
structure and the effectiveness of government programs designed to help children. That is 
the main purpose of this dissertation.
2
Children’s Living Arrangements and Characteristics: March 2002, Current Population Reports, 2003, by 
Jason Fields.
- 2 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The debate over who and what are responsible for the current situation and 
controversy over policy response must not obscure the basic national goal outlined in the 
Children’s Charter. In the midst of the complicated research challenges, complex theories 
of family economics, and wide policy disagreements, I am attempting to address these 
pressing issues.
-3  -
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PART I: A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF FAMILY 
STRUCTURE AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILD OUTCOMES
- 4 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One out of every six children in the United States is growing up in a household 
where the family income is at or below the poverty threshold (2002 U.S. Census Bureau, 
March Current Population Survey). This may be in part due to the dramatic increase in 
births to unmarried women as well as the high divorce rate in the United States, which 
are among the many factors that have changed family structure and affected the economic 
security of children in the country. The rates of divorce and single parenthood are higher 
in the United States than in any other part of the world, with one out of every three births 
occurring outside of marriage (National Center for Health Statistics, 1995); and four out 
of every ten American children are not living with both biological parents. Each year 
more than 1.5 million children under 18 (about 2.5 percent) experience the divorce of 
their parents, about half of all children live with only one parent, and two fifths of all 
children live in a cohabiting family at some point.
Much research has demonstrated that children of unmarried mothers, especially 
teenagers, are at a higher risk of having negative birth outcomes, such as low birth weight 
and infant mortality, and are more likely to live in poverty than children of married 
mothers.3 Growth in female-headed households has been implicated as a major source of 
poverty, in part because many fathers fail to pay child support. Since children can be
3 See Hayes (1987) and Prater (1995) for reviews o f  the literature.
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thought of as collective consumption goods from the point of view o f the father and 
mother, within marriage, proximity and altruism help to relieve the free-rider problem 
associated with the provision of public goods. Upon separation or divorce, however, it 
may not be feasible for the parents to realize a Pareto-optimal allocation of their joint 
resources as the noncustodial parent loses the control to the allocation decisions of the 
custodial parent (Weiss and Willis 1985).
Single-parent families and blended families have received the most attention from 
researchers. Some but not all research finds that children who grow up in single-parent or 
stepparent families usually fare worse than those who grow up with both biological 
parents. Almost all of these studies either treat single-parent families as one category, 
without differentiating between single-father headed and single-mother headed, and 
without identifying whether the single parent is in a cohabiting relationship or alone, or 
these studies simply compare single-mother families to blended families or to intact 
families, leaving out single-father families completely. The gender of the single parent 
may have different intonations for children in the household, and boys and girls are 
different in many aspects; even fewer studies have addressed the gender difference and 
parent-child gender interaction when studying family structures’ impact on child 
outcomes. In addition, few studies have paid attention to outcomes for children living in 
no-parent families, in particular grandparent households.
Furthermore, earlier studies, with a few exceptions such as Brown (2004), usually 
investigate one aspect of child outcomes. In many cases, these studies either investigate 
educational achievement and/or labor force attachment, or outcomes such as early 
childbearing and marriage for adolescents or adults (Manski et al. 1992, Ginther and
- 6 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Poliak 2000, Ginther and Poliak 2004, Biblarz and Gottainer 2000, Havemen and Wolfe, 
1995). All these studies only provide one angle to assess how the well-being of children 
is affected, not a complete picture. However, educational achievements such as high 
school grades and graduations, college attendance and graduation, although serving as a 
good indicator of a child’s chances of economic success in adulthood, do not cover all 
aspects of well-being. First, economic independence and security are not the only 
measures of success, as a person also needs to achieve high self-esteem or a sense of 
control over his/her life (psychological success) and receive the respect of his/her peers 
(social success), which are other indicators of success. Second, the vital importance of 
the early school years has been demonstrated by research in psychology and cognition 
when human abilities and behaviors are mainly cultivated by families and non- 
institutional environments (Chase-Lansdale 1998). Therefore, this essay will analyze the 
relationship between household characteristics and children's well-being, with a focus on 
three aspects of child outcomes: children’s school engagement, behavior problems and 
health status.
The majority of studies investigate the issue by using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) data or data from the National Education Longitudinal Study 
(NELS) which are not up-to-date and are also not big enough to allow for stratifying the 
sample or investigating less common family structures. By using data from the National 
Survey of American Families, it is possible to explore the relationship between family 
structure, or more broadly, family environment and the different aspects of child 
outcomes. This essay comprehensively investigates ten types of family structures: 
grandparent family, other non-parental family, single-mother family, single-father family,
- 7 -
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cohabiting stepfather family, cohabiting stepmother family,4 two biological/adoptive 
parent cohabiting family, married stepfather family, married stepmother family, married 
two biological/adoptive parents family. These detailed definitions facilitate our 
exploration of how the gender o f single parents and stepparents may interact with the 
gender of their children and how race/ethnicity interplay with grandparent caregiving in 
the case where neither parent of the child is present.
4 The use o f  the terms stepmother and stepfather in this essay does not necessarily imply marriage. 
Cohabiting stepmother families are defined as those in which the focal child is living with his or her 
biological/adoptive father and his unmarried female partner. Cohabiting stepfather families are defined as 
those in which the focal child is living with his or her biological/adoptive mother and her unmarried male 
partner.
- 8 -
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we will first survey how past studies define family structure, then 
we will discuss the major challenges encountered by researchers when investigating 
family structure’s impact on child outcomes. Afterwards, we review why gender and 
race/ethnicity may interplay with family structure to have different impacts on child 
outcomes. Finally we discuss how this essay can contribute to the literature.
2.1 Family Structure Revisited
Non-marital fertility and single-parent families have been concerns for policy 
makers since the 1960s. But economists often ignore the diversification of family 
structures by assuming intact families implicitly or explicitly. For example, the 
theoretical and much of the empirical analysis in Becker (1981, 1991) are based on the 
assumption that children are born to two parents who are married and remain married to 
each other. Behrman, Poliak and Taubman (1995), and Mulligan (1997) also make the 
same assumption. Not surprisingly, there are no consistent classification schemes 
regarding family structure.
Despite the lack of theoretical models and consistent measures of family structure 
in economics, researchers from other disciplines have investigated correlations between
- 9 -
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family structure and children’s outcomes empirically, especially between family structure 
and children’s educational and behavioral outcomes. Much of this research uses a 
dichotomous variable to indicate simply whether or not a child lives with a single-parent 
(usually the mother) or whether or not a child lives in an intact family, ignoring the 
diversity of living arrangements. For example, Manski et al. (1992) simply classify 
family structures as intact vs. non intact families, with a non-intact family defined as a 
family that does not have both biological/adoptive parents, such as a family with one 
parent, with a parent and stepparent, or with no parents. Similarly, Lang and Zagorsky 
(2001) roughly divide families into two groups for a simple comparison: two biological 
parents vs. other parental structure.
2.1.1 Cohabitation. One complexity that is just beginning to be explored is 
cohabitation. Cohabitation has expanded the definition of family structure and family 
process in recent decades. Although dramatic increases in unmarried cohabitation began 
in the late 1970’s, it was still considered as a deviant form from the traditional family 
process at that time (only about two percent of all couples living together were 
unmarried) (Glick and Spanierl980). Currently cohabitation among unmarried couples is 
so prevalent that cohabitation is increasingly becoming an alternative to marriage 
(Bumpass and Lu 2000, Manning and Bulanda 2003, Smock and Manning 2004).
Cohabitation has critical implications for child well-being. The birth o f a child 
during cohabitation is much more common as cohabitation is more accepted. Children are 
increasingly likely to begin life with cohabiting parents. A recent study reports that 
approximately half of nonmarital births are to mothers in cohabiting relationships 
(Osborne 2005). Bumpass and Lu (2000) find that the dramatic increase in nonmarital
-  1 0 -
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childbearing between periods 1980-1984 and 1990-1994 was completely associated with 
the increase of births to cohabiting mothers since the births to single mothers remained 
constant during those periods.
A child can also enter into a cohabiting family when the custodial parent 
establishes a cohabiting relationship with her/his partner. This living arrangement is 
similar to the traditional stepfamily but is formed out of cohabitation instead of marriage. 
As a matter of fact, if cohabitation is taken into account, then in addition to marriage 
approximately one-half of all stepfamilies in the U.S. are now formed through 
cohabitation rather than through marriage (Smock and Manning, 2004). Manning and 
Lichter (1996) estimate that 3.5 percent of children in the U.S. live with a parent and their 
unmarried partner (approximately 2.2 million), with a significant proportion (roughly 13 
percent of 2.2 million) living with two cohabiting biological parents instead of one.
Consequently living in a cohabiting family is a common experience for many 
children. Based on data from the 1979-1992 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
mother-child files, Graefe and Lichter (1999) estimate that one in four children will live 
in a cohabiting family sometime during childhood. Estimates from Bumpass and Lu 
(2000) show the trend continues: 40 percent of all children are likely to experience a 
cohabiting household at some point.5 Acs and Nelson (2002) vividly reflect this fast 
change regarding cohabiting households as “inferences drawn from data collected even 
five years ago may present a dated picture of the status and outcomes of children in such 
families.”
5 Their estimates are based on data from the 1987-1988 National Survey o f  Families and Households and 
from the 1995 National Survey o f  Family Growth Cycle 5.
-  11 -
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Due to the ever rising prevalence of cohabitation and its inextricable implication 
for child well-being, research studying the impact of cohabitation on child outcomes 
burgeons (Raley, Frisco, Wildsmith 2005, Acs and Nelson 2002, Dunifon and 
Kowaleski-Jones 2002, Manning and Lamb 2003, Nelson, Clark, and Acs 2001, Manning 
and Bulanda 2003, Brown 2004). Studies examining how children fare in cohabiting 
families usually make comparison to other living arrangements such as married and 
single families. Though various studies use different methodologies and have different 
focuses, one theme that does stand out is that parental cohabitation is associated with less 
favorable outcomes for children living in such families compared to their counterparts 
living with two married biological parent families, and children living in cohabiting 
families fare no better than children living with single parents.
2.1.2 Sinele Fathers. A second trend has been the growing complexity of single­
parent households. As one of the most influential works on the correlation between 
family structure and children’s outcomes, McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) examine and 
compare outcomes o f children who grow up in single-parent or stepparent families to 
those growing up with both biological parents. In particular, they find that high school 
graduation rates, college enrollment, and college graduation rates for children in single­
parent families are lower than those of children in two-parent families. Many other 
studies also either use “single-parent” without specifying whether it is single father or 
single-mother, or include only single-mother families in their investigation (Ginther and 
Pollark 2000, Corman and Kaestner 1992, McLanahan and Sandefur 1994, Painter and 
Levine 2000).
-  1 2 -
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However, there is a large and increasing population of American men confronted 
with single parenthood, and single fathers are one of the fastest-growing demographic 
groups in the U.S. The 2000 Census data shows that there were 2.2 million households 
across the country in which single men were raising children, a 62 percent increase since 
1990. Despite these statistics, research geared specifically to single fathers has been 
limited, although a growing number of studies are coming to recognize and incorporate 
the fact that not all single-parent families are alike and there exist many other different 
family structures as society becomes more diverse. For example, Biblarz and Raftery 
(1999)’s family structure is relatively complete. It consists of: (1-) two-biological-parent 
family; (2) alternative mother-headed families (composed almost fully of single-mother 
families); (3) alternative father-headed families (including both single-father and father- 
stepmother families); (4) mother-stepfather families. They conduct a multivariate study 
and find that children from single-father families and stepfamilies had lower educational 
achievement than children from both two-biological parent and single-mother families. 
Nevertheless, children living in no-parent families such as grandparent-maintained 
families are considered irrelevant and therefore completely left out of their study. Painter 
and Levine (2000) focus on three family structures: 1) Intact family (with both biological 
parents), 2) Mother and stepfather, 3) Single mother. They also look at several other non- 
traditional family structures such as father and stepmother, father alone, mother and live- 
in companion, and no biological parents. But the sample sizes are either too small, or 
because the authors focus on parent involvement, they find it difficult to characterize in 
the case of living without a biological parent. Therefore these family structures are 
subsequently dropped from their main results. While focusing on parental cohabitation,
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Brown (2004) explores seven different family structures using NSAF data such as two- 
biological married family, two-biological cohabiting family, married step family, 
cohabiting stepfamily, single-mother family, single-father family and no-parent family, 
but her study does not use all measures to investigate various aspects of child outcomes 
as we proposed, nor does her study consider inputs. In addition, her study does not 
separate and investigate grandparent-maintained families, or consider differences in 
stepparent families.
2.1.3. Grandparent Households. Grandparent households are also too often 
forgotten when it comes to defining or measuring family structure. Even fewer studies 
focus their attention on child outcomes when investigating grandparent caregiving. 
Dubowitz et al. (1994) is the first comprehensive assessment of the physical and mental 
health and educational status of children in kinship care. It also compares children in 
kinship with children in foster care, children in poverty and children from the general 
population respectively. The study finds that children in kinship care have substantial 
health care needs. Many of those children’s health problems have not been identified, and 
even when they have been, follow-up care was often lacking. In most age categories boys 
were reported to have more health problems than girls. Many children also have 
substantial school-related problems. However, their sample consists of 524 children in 
kinship care under the supervision of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services in 
1989, where 47 percent of caregivers are grandmothers, and therefore their results can not 
be generalized to grandparent caregiving. In addition, this study is simply a descriptive 
analysis and not a multivariate study.
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An important recent exception that investigates child outcomes in grandparent 
households is a study by Casper and Bryson (1998) which focuses on grandparent- 
maintained families. Using 1997 CPS data, they find that children living with 
grandparents do not fare as well economically as their counterparts living in their parents’ 
homes. In particular, they find that grandchildren in both grandparents, no parent present 
families are much more likely to be uninsured. Grandchildren in grandmother-only, no­
parent present families are more likely to be poor and get public receipts.
The NSAF data are ideal for investigating single-father families as well as 
grandparent families because it is the largest and most recent nationally representative 
survey of U.S. children and their families. For example, the 1999 wave alone reveals 771 
grandparent families and 931 single-father families. It also has rich information 
regarding child outcomes and household inputs. However, its cross-sectional nature does 
greatly limit the extent to which we can address two issues that have plagued this 
literature -  the so-called ‘window problem’ and the endogeneity of family structure.
2.2 The Window Problem
A challenge encountered by many studies investigating the relationship between 
child outcomes and family structure, including the current study is the so-called 
“window” problem. Although child outcomes are the “end product” of many years of a 
cumulative household production process, many surveys, including NSAF, measure 
living arrangements at a single point in time. These snapshot measures, i.e. ‘window’ 
variables, overlook the dynamic nature of family structure and the many changes in living 
situations that occur during a child’s life. For example, the snapshot will obscure the
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effect of divorce on child outcomes and attribute the impact to family structure. In order 
to overcome the window problem, panel data have to be employed, or information such 
as “how long the child has been living in the household” has to be available.
Wolfe et al. (1996) examine the reliability of estimated results from studies using 
such "window" variables. They first examine an omitted variables model to diagnose the 
"window" problem technically. Then they study the potential problems associated with 
the use of window variables empirically. Their conclusion is that window variables 
“serve as weak proxies for information describing the entire childhood experience, and 
often lead to inferences o f effects that may be misleading....”
Among the studies on child outcome and development studies that follow parents 
and their children over time, most focus on a narrow comparison of different family 
structures. Wojtkiewicz (1993) estimates the effect o f having a stepfather on children’s 
schooling outcomes by using the National Longitudinal Survey o f Youth. The finding 
indicates that duration of exposure to stepfather families is negatively related to the 
probability of high school graduation. In more recent work, Wojtkiewicz (1998) uses data 
from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey to examine the effect on college entry 
of family structure and changes in family structure. He defines stable family structures as 
those that do not change between 1988 and 1992 and finds that children from stable 
single-parent families are more likely to attend college than those from unstable single­
parent families or stepchildren from blended families. Controlling for duration in a 
single-parent family and economic resources and using the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, Boggess (1998) finds that stepchildren from stepfather families have lower 
rates of high school graduation than children growing up in biological-parents families.
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In particular, he finds a negative and significant effect of living with a stepfather on high 
school graduation rates for white males and females, and black females. Painter and 
Levine (2000) use the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988 (NELS) with a 
focus on the effect of divorce on teenager behaviors. But due to the small sample size, 
other non-traditional family structures such as single-father families have to be left out of 
their analysis.
As discussed earlier, one of our primary interests is to investigate the less typical 
family structures such as single-father families and grandparent families. However, as far 
as we know, there are no data available that would allow us to include such households in 
our study and at the same time to tackle the window problem. Therefore our study is 
subject to the same limitation as many other studies are. Nevertheless using NASF allows 
us to present a fuller picture of family structure and its association with a wide array of 
child outcomes instead. Given the large sample size of NSAF data and its rich 
information on child outcomes and household inputs, we are able to investigate a 
complete list of family structures (refer to Figure 1 for family structures investigated by 
the current study), a wide array of child outcomes and inputs and the direct impact of 
household inputs on child outcomes. NSAF data also allow us to stratify the sample to 
investigate whether racial and gender differences are related to the observed differentials 
in child outcomes associated with different family structures. Therefore we are able to 
investigate several pathways that may contribute to the disparity in child outcomes linked 
with different family structures.
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2.3 The Endogeneity of Family Structure
Despite the prevalence of these family structures and the increasing recognition of 
the dynamic nature of family structure, practically no consensus exists about how and 
why they might be associated with child development outcomes, especially within non- 
traditional families. Previous research examining why children from single-parent 
families fare less well, in general, than children from two-parent families have been 
guided by five theoretical explanations: economic theory, evolutionary psychology, 
socialization, stress and selection bias (Biblarz and Raftery 1999, McLanahan and 
Sandefur 1994). First, the economic perspective proposes that socioeconomic success is 
partly a function of human capital. A household acts as a unit to maximize collective 
utility. The substantial economic difference between single-parent and two-parent 
families produces differences in child outcomes.
Second, the evolutionary perspective on the family gives more weight to the role 
of the mother than that of the father in determining children’s outcomes, and it 
particularly emphasizes biological relationships. The evolutionary view assumes that 
mothers invest more of their resources in children than fathers do and the well-being of a 
given child is of greater interest to the mother than to the father. This theory predicts that 
children from two-biological-parent families will have an advantage over those from 
other kinds of families. In contrast to the economic model, the evolutionary view would 
predict that children from alternative families will fare better raised by a single mother 
than by a single father. Children from single-mother families will also have better 
outcomes over those from biological mother/stepfather families since the stepfather will 
compete with the stepchildren for the mother’s resources. Case, Lin, and McLanahan
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(1999) provide some strong evidence for this argument. They find that the number of 
children in a household with a non-biological parent significantly reduces expenditure on 
food consumed at home. In general, the effects are stronger when the non-biological 
parent is the mother rather than the father. In particular, they find that the presence of 
stepchildren is associated with lower food expenditure for home consumption when those 
children are stepchildren of the mother. In contrast, spending on home food consumption 
does not change depending on the father’s relationship to children (i.e. biological vs. 
step- or adoptive children.) However, food expenditure is lower when a man reports he is 
not married to the child's mother but raises the child.
Third, the socialization perspective argues that two parents are crucial for 
providing important parenting behavior such as monitoring and supervision; it also 
argues that children simply benefit from the presence of a male role model in two parent 
families. In contrast with the evolutionary view, the socialization view predicts that the 
two-adult structure of a coresidential or cohabiting arrangement might benefit children 
given more adults to supervise and monitor. The fourth explanation for observed 
differences among children from different family structures is selection bias. For 
example, people who divorce are less stable or less competent at family life; parents who 
choose different living arrangements might have different characteristics that affect child 
outcomes. To put it another way, there are unobservable processes that jointly determined 
family structure and children’s outcomes, which is known as the endogeneity of family 
structure.
Finally, stress is another variant of the selection hypothesis which argues that the 
main detrimental effect on children is not divorce but family conflict. Divorce is often
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preceded by and sometimes followed by high levels of domestic conflict. Both parental 
death and divorce created sorrow and distress for children in the short run. Changes in 
family structure are hypothesized to increase disequilibrium in family relations and 
disrupt changes in relationships outside the family as well. The accumulation o f these 
changes produces poor developmental outcomes among children.
The selection perspective and stress view both suggest that family structure is 
endogenous in the sense it is determined by various factors such as parents’ 
characteristics and family conflicts, which in turn influence child outcomes. Therefore, 
family structure per se might not be the source of differences in child outcomes but a 
consequence of the influences of the underlying determining factors. There have been 
several strategies for dealing with this endogeneity problem in the economics literature. 
One frequently adopted strategy is to use fixed effects estimates (e.g., Case et al. 1999, 
Painter and Levine 2000, Ginther and Poliak 2002, Ermisch and Francesconi 2001). By 
utilizing longitudinal data one can include child-level or family-level ‘fixed effects’ in the 
regression to capture any unobservable characteristics. Therefore, the endogeneity o f v 
family structure is controlled for if the unobservable characteristics are stable over time.
Lang and Zagorsky (2001) choose a different strategy to deal with the 
endogeneity of family structure by using the impact of parental death as a natural 
experiment. After controlling for a variety of background variables their results show 
little evidence that a parent's presence during childhood affects economic well-being in 
adulthood; using parental death as an exogenous cause of absence provides similar 
results. The two exceptions are that living without a mother adversely affects girls' 
cognitive performance while having a father die decreases sons' chances of marriage.
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Similarly, Biblarz and Gottainer (2000) compare the attainments o f children from 
widowed single-mother families to those from two-biological-parent families. Their 
results show that the children are roughly the same, and the attainments of children from 
widowed single-mother families are substantially higher than those of children from 
divorced single-mother families. The family structure model—that the same structure 
should lead to the same outcome regardless o f cause-is rejected by the evidence 
presented by Biblarz and Gottainer.
Also adopting the natural experiment approach to deal with endogeneity of family 
structures, Ginther and Poliak (2000) examine the effect of family structure on children’s 
educational outcomes by exploiting the sibling structure in the NLSY and NLSY-Child to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across families and individuals. They compare 
outcomes for children within the same family— stepchildren with their half-siblings in the 
same blended family who are the biological children of both parents. Controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity across families by using panel data, they find that family 
structure effects are statistically insignificant. Finally, comparing half-siblings in the data, 
they find no difference in educational outcomes as a function of family structure. Ginther 
and Poliak (2004) adopt a similar approach and find stepchildren and their half-siblings, 
who are the biological children of both parents, have similar educational outcomes to 
each other, but are considerably worse off then their counterparts from traditional two 
parent families.
Some research involves using instrumental variables to control for the 
endogeneity o f family structure. For example, Gruber (2000) uses changes in divorce law 
as an exogenous source of variation in family structure. He finds that family structure has
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a negative and significant effect on socio-economic outcomes. However, the validity and 
reliability of such instrumental variables are questioned by others.
Manski et al. (1992) use a trivariate probit model with structural shift assuming 
that family structure and children’s outcomes may be jointly determined by unobservable 
processes. They also employ a nonparametric model estimating bounds on the high 
school graduation probabilities. They find no evidence to reject that family structure is 
exogenous, and they find that living with intact families increases the probability of 
graduating from high school.
2.4 How Gender Matters
Gender pervades all levels of society, and it plays a key role in many dimensions 
of family life such as marital relationships, child development, parenting and 
intergenerational relationships (Warner and Steel 1999). Economic models, however, are 
typically used to analyze the household as one unit, rather than treating the individuals 
within a household separately. However, new theoretical work is currently underway. 
Willis (2000) outlines some ways in which individuals within a household are treated as 
separate economic actors, each with their own interests and resources, particularly in the 
context of fathers' involvement in their children's lives. Research on gender effects within 
family life is relatively replete in the sociological and psychological literatures.
Much research focuses on how the effects of having children on parents vary for 
mothers and fathers. For example, there is some evidence that marital satisfaction is more 
strongly related to fathers’ reports of parental satisfaction than to mothers’ (Rogers and 
White 1998). Fine et al. (1992) detect a gender difference in depression: women report
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higher levels of depression than men. (But this effect is no longer present when 
demographic controls are included, suggesting that the depression in gender difference is 
partly accounted for by demographic factors such as women's younger age.) As a 
commonsense understanding, having children is more demanding for women’s lives— 
what is referred to as “asymmetrically permeable boundaries” (Bielby and Bielby 1989).
On the other hand, in the child development literature much research emphasizes 
that parent gender has a great influence on child outcomes, which, more often than not, is 
also contingent upon the sex of children. Much of this research has focused on how 
fathers affect child outcomes in the context of diversified family structures due to ever 
increasing divorce rates and childbirth out of marriage. One branch investigates the 
influence of fathers’ involvement on child outcomes (Salem, Zimmerman and 
Notaro 1998, Blair, Wenk and Hardesty 1994, Nord, Brimhall and West 1997, King 1994, 
Cooksey and Fondell 1996); the other explores the effect of father absence on child 
outcomes (Mott 1990, Mott 1993, Mott, Kowaleski-Jonesand Menaghanl997).
The importance of fathers’ involvement is expressed in a 1997 Current Population
Report:
It is undisputed among researchers and policy pundits alike that fathers’ 
involvement is extremely important for children’s proper social and emotional 
development. Furthermore, fathers interact differently with their children than do 
mothers, and it is fathers’ unique interaction that is said to help promote 
specifically children’s emotional development. (Casper, 1997, p.l)
In line with this claim, a study by Cooksey et al. (1996) concludes that fathers in 
different family settings spend differing amounts of time with their children: single 
fathers are very involved in their children's lives and are more likely to engage in a
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variety of activities (not related to sharing meals) than fathers in more traditional family 
settings; their results also show that stepfathers are significantly less likely to participate 
in activities with their stepchildren than biological fathers do with theirs, while 
stepfathers with both biological children and stepchildren are more likely than stepfathers 
with just stepchildren to behave as other biological fathers.
Also studying paternal involvement, Salem et al. (1998) find that fathers appear to 
have distinct influences on the development of their sons and daughters. In particular, 
they conclude that father involvement may be most relevant for helping sons avoid 
problem behaviors, whereas for daughters it may be more influential in preventing 
psychological distress.
Within the context of studying the effect o f paternal absence, Mott et al. (1997)’s 
study discovers that the effects of a father's absence are generally found to be more 
modest for girls than for boys. In particular, for boys, they have found “clear, systematic 
evidence of associations between a father's absence from the home and less satisfactory 
behavior paths; for girls, the effects of a father's absence appear to be far less pronounced 
and less robust.” However, they further suggest that the notion that boys are at greater 
risk when a father leaves the home than girls are is modest and not always systematic. 
Also, they find modest support for the view that short-term behavioral consequences for 
boys exceed those evidenced by girls.
Distinct from studies mentioned above, Downey et al. (1998) argue against the 
claim that women and men promote different components o f children's well-being and 
suggests that “theorists have overemphasized the role of parent's sex in youths' 
development at the expense of understanding more structural explanations for the
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association between family structure and well-being”. Their investigation yields little 
evidence that offspring are better off or develop particular characteristics in one 
household versus the other. According to Downey et al. (1998) and Risman and Park 
(1988), there are two perspectives on gender-typed parental behaviors: one is 
individualist, the other is structuralist. The individualist perspective of gender views 
preference for gendered parental roles as internalized as personality traits or personalities. 
That is, due to cultural influence on family patterns, parents develop gendered 
personalities for performing gendered roles. Alternatively, the structuralist theory 
suggests that the sources of many sex differences are contextual factors in the everyday 
environment, and sex roles are not internalized as personal traits. Men and women 
behave differently because they encounter different social conditions. To put it another 
way, the structuralist view argues that when necessary men can perform responsibilities 
that are usually conducted by women. Risman and Park (1988) compare the relative 
strength of two different theoretical explanations by comparing children from single­
father families to children from single-mother families. Their findings also support the 
structuralist theory: “sex of the custodial parent per se is not significant in explaining 
parental attachment, household organization, or child's development”. Instead, socially 
structured role demands of single parenthood, the change in family structure following 
divorce, and the socioeconomic status of parents are better explanations for male or 
female parenting behavior.
In addition to the group of studies investigating the effect of parents’ gender on 
child outcomes, there is another body of research exploring how child gender in turn 
could influence their own outcomes, parenting, family life, marital status and parental
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attitudes about policy regarding gender equity. There are strong gender differences in 
child outcomes, suggesting that the effects of living in a non-traditional household may 
be very different for preadolescent girls and boys (Bronstein, Clauson, Stoll and Abrams 
1993). Girls in single-mother households showed poorer social, psychological and 
academic adjustment in comparison with girls in both traditional and father-surrogate 
households. In contrast, boys in father-surrogate households demonstrate significantly 
poor social, psychological and academic adjustment, and ineffective parenting is 
significantly higher than with boys from traditional households. However, boys in single­
mother households are essentially not different from boys from either father-surrogate 
households or traditional households.6
Elder and Bowerman (1963) find that paternal involvement is most frequent when 
all children are boys, and that family size affects paternal involvement most strongly 
among middle-class boys and lower-class girls. In particular, sex composition effects are 
greatest in the rearing of girls in large lower-class families. For example, girls in large 
families are more likely to perceive their fathers as the prominent figure in making child- 
rearing decisions, less communicative and more controlling, and more likely to report 
that parents use physical punishment occasionally and praise infrequently. Looking 
through the lens o f economists, although the study does not address family structure 
specifically, Conway and Houtenville (2002) provide a household production framework 
that clarifies several avenues by which girls may be treated differently and achieve 
different outcomes from boys. For example, parents may input more efforts in their
6 Their study is based on data with a small sample size o f  136 observations which are almost entirely 
Caucasian children aged 9-12 years old. Among these children 79 are from traditional families and only 57 
come from non-traditional families. In addition, their study does not control basic demographic 
characteristics and most o f  the results are based on t-tests o f  means o f  boys and girls across different family 
structures, and some are based on multivariate analysis o f  variance.
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daughters’ schooling because (1) the marginal productivity for girls may be higher; (2) 
parents want to compensate for the lower inputs their daughters received from school, or 
(3) parents derive higher utility from their daughters’ achievements.
There is also evidence about the effects of child gender on marital dissolution 
coming from couples who have experienced divorce. A greater proportion of couples 
with only daughters are found among those who had already divorced (Morgan, Lye and 
Condra 1988). Katzev, Warner and Acock (1994) attempt to isolate its influences before 
divorce occurs. They focus on the pre-divorce process and evaluate the effects of the 
child gender on maternal perceptions of the likelihood that the marriage will end in 
divorce. Their finding is that mothers with at least one boy reported a significantly lower 
propensity to divorce compared to mothers with only girls. They suggest that the 
mechanism may lie in the fact that fathers in families with boys were more involved with 
their children, which was associated with mothers perceiving less disadvantage in the 
marital relationship and a lower likelihood of separation. In economic terms, this may 
suggest fathers may derive higher utility from the well-being of their sons than from their 
daughters, therefore they are more devoted to the involvement with their children when 
they have sons vs. daughters. In addition, as Conway and Houtenville (2002) suggest, 
fathers could view their involvements as more productive inputs for their sons vs. their 
daughters.
Evidence is also found regarding the effect of child gender on parents’ gender 
attitudes. Warner and Steel (1999) discover that both fathers’ and mothers’ support for 
public policies designed to address gender equity increases when parents have daughters
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only. The findings are even stronger for men. When men have sons only, they show the 
least support for public policies promoting gender equity.
Another group of research explores how parent and child gender interact. Some 
child developmental research suggests that fathers are more important in the development 
of sons than daughters (Lamb 1987). However, Amato (1994) finds no evidence to 
support this notion among young adult offspring when comparing children from divorced 
families to those from intact ones. On the contrary, he finds some evidence that closeness 
to mothers was more strongly related to psychological well-being among sons than 
daughters, and that father-child relationships appear to be as closely bound up with the 
well-being of daughters as that of sons. Downey and Powell (1993) and Powell and 
Downey (1997) also do not find evidence of a benefit from living with a same-sex parent. 
Studying children in step-households, Downey (1995) finds that although both boys and 
girls appear to fare better in mother/stepfather families than in father/stepmother 
households, children do not seem to be more disturbed by the entrance of an opposite-sex 
than of a same-sex stepparent.
To sum up, given the extensive literature that studies how both parental and child 
gender may influence the parental styles, practice and child outcomes, and how parental 
gender and child gender may interact, it is imperative for economists to take into account 
the mechanism underpinning the household production function from the gender angle. 
Studies ignoring gender difference may eliminate one possible avenue that could explain 
how dissimilar family structures are associated with different child outcomes. As the 
majority of the reviewed studies are by and large descriptive analysis, we will apply 
econometric analysis to get crisper gender comparisons. Specifically, non-traditional
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families may have different demographic characteristics, fewer economic resources and 
lower levels of inputs. We will first control the basic child, Most Knowledgeable Adult 
(MKA) and family characteristics including family structure, then add economic 
resources and finally further add inputs to see how much the observed difference in child 
outcomes across gender can be explained away by each tier of independent variables. In 
doing so we can differentiate the gender disparities in child outcomes caused by other 
factors from those purely associated with family structure.
2.5 The Importance of Race/Ethnicity in the Context of Grandparent Caregiving
Grandparent caregivers have increased rapidly since 1990. Census 2000 estimated 
that 2.4 million people (or 1.5 percent) aged 30 and over are grandparent caregivers, 
defined in Simmons and Dye (2003) as “people who have primary responsibility for their 
co-resident grandchildren younger than 18.” The percentage of grandparents caregivers 
considerably varies by race and ethnicity: grandparent caregivers account for 
approximately one percent o f non-Hispanic whites, 4.3 percent of people who are African 
American, 4.5 percent of people who are American Indian and Alaska Native, 3 percent 
o f people who are Hispanic and 1.3 percent of people who are Asian (U.S. Census 
Bureau, Census 2000).
These numbers reveal that while the majority of grandparent caregivers are white, 
proportionately, however, African American grandchildren are more likely to live with 
their grandparents without either parent present than children of any other ethnic group in 
the United States (Fields 2003, Fuller-Thomson et al. 1997, Pebley and Rudkin 1999, 
Chalfie 1994, Joslin and Brouard 1995). For instance, Fuller-Thomson, Minkler, and
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Driver (1997) show that blacks are three times and Latinos almost twice as likely as their 
non-Latino white counterparts to be a primary grandparent caregiver.
Not only does the prevalence of performing the role of grandparent caregiver 
differ considerably across race and ethnicity, prior research in sociology, psychology, 
social work and education also found that parenting praxis and cultural norms of 
parenting behaviors vary notably across race and ethnic groups. Studies have determined 
that a person’s ethnicity has implications for their parenting styles (MacPhee et al. 1996, 
Tucker et al. 1996, Fagan 2000, Osborne et al.2003, Osborne et al.2004, Hofferth 2003). 
Fagan (2000) predicts how parenting actions affect children’s behavioral outcomes. 
Osborne et al. (2003) find great differences in mothering behaviors across race and ethnic 
groups. Osborne et al. (2004) find mothering behaviors are linked to family structure for 
white mothers but not for black and Hispanic mothers. Hofferth (2003) examines how 
cultural factors can contribute to explaining racial/ethnic differences in fathering in two- 
parent families. It reports that black children's fathers show less warmth but supervise 
their children more, Hispanic fathers monitor their children less, and both minority 
groups take more responsibility for child rearing than white fathers.
Differences in parenting styles suggest that there may also be variance in 
grandparenting behaviors. Considerable research has reported that African-Americans 
have a long history of caregiving across the generations, and cultural context has 
historically caused the frequent assumption of parenting responsibilities by African- 
American grandparents (Scott 1991, Stack and Burton 1993, Burton and Dilworth- 
Andersonl991, Burton, Dilworth-Anderson and Merriwether-deVries 1995, Thomas, 
Sperry and Yarbrough 2000). As a result, it is not surprising that African-American
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grandparents have been the focus of research studying grandparents raising grandchildren 
(Strom et al. 1996, Minkler and Fuller-Thomson 2005, Whitley et al. 2001, Brown et al. 
2000, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler 2000, Dilworth-Anderson 1994, Caliandro and 
Hughes 1998, Burton 1992).
Although surrogate parenting by African-American grandparents has received the 
most attention from researchers, it should not be viewed as the normative grandparental 
role only among African-Americans. In the existing ethnographic literature the issue of 
grandparents acting as surrogate parents is discussed in the context of cultural family 
norms. For example, among the Navajo and Apache (tribes), the grandmother is the 
central figure o f the family and performs the tasks that modern Americans associate with 
the mother. In such a society the performance of parenting and child care are respected. 
This pattern has been observed for several decades of reservation resident Native- 
Americans (Burton, Dilworth-Anderson and Merriwether-deVries 1995). While little 
research has been done to explore urban resident Native-American family patterns, 
Fuller-Thomson and Minkler (2005) document the prevalence and national profile of 
American Indian/Alaskan Native grandparents who are raising their grandchildren, based 
on data from the American Community Survey/Census 2000 Supplementary Survey, 
which may suggest that these patterns are still valued and practiced to a certain extent.
Like African-American grandmothers, Hispanic grandparents also play important 
roles in rearing their grandchildren by passing along family history and ethnic heritage 
and by providing support of various kinds in times of crisis. In other research, 
acculturation has been identified as an important factor that impacts Hispanic 
grandparents’ relationships with younger family members. Within Hispanic groups,
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Mexican-American grandparents are most likely to be involved with grandchildren in 
their daily life; Cuban-American grandparents are least likely to have such involvement 
(Bengtson 1985). Surrogate parenting by grandparents is also culturally prescribed for 
Puerto Rican-American families. Family interdependence and reciprocity are aspects of 
the Puerto Rican-American communities, and strong kinship bonds are clearly articulated 
as normative values and practices (Burton, Dilworth-Anderson and Merriwether-deVries 
1995). Others have identified similar impacts of acculturation among Asian-American 
samples (Kamo 1998, Tam and Detznerl998). Study by Merle et al. (2004) explores 
grandparent caregiving role in Filipino-American families. They suggest that Filipino- 
American grandparents view the grandparent caregiving role as a normative process 
rather than a burden in which families take on responsibilities as part of cultural beliefs 
and norms such as family unity and closeness, authoritarianism, and mutual reciprocity 
and obligation in relationships.
Within studies of Americans, although there is some work on Native Americans, 
Hispanics and Asians, the strand that links much of the literature is that race and ethnicity 
shape the individual and family lives of African-Americans disproportionately. Besides 
studies that solely focus on African-Americans, most analyses employ a comparative 
framework in which whites are the norm against which blacks and other minorities are 
measured (Goodman and Silverstein 2002, Watson and Koblinsky 1997, Pruchno 1999, 
Pruchno and McKenney 2002, Strom et al. 1996). Thomas et al. (2000) note that African- 
American grandmothers more often act as surrogating parents for grandchildren than do 
non-Hispanic Caucasian grandmothers. As a result, African-American grandparents in 
some research report higher levels of both satisfaction and frustration in relationships
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with grandchildren than do their Caucasian counterparts. Watson and Koblinsky (1997) 
find African-American grandparents perceived themselves to be significantly more 
involved in teaching their grandchildren than Anglo-American grandparents, but were 
also significantly more likely than their Anglo-American counterparts to express 
frustration and need for information about the grandparenting role. Other researchers 
report that African-American grandmothers raising their grandchildren report more peer 
support, and less burden, than do Caucasian grandmothers (Pruchno 1999, Pruchno and 
McKenney 2002). For example, Pruchno’s study (1999) contrasts the experiences of 398 
white and 319 black grandmothers raising their grandchildren without either parent 
present. They found that the two groups shared many similarities such as age, education, 
familial relationship to the grandchild, age of the grandchild being raised, reasons that 
grandmothers are raising their grandchildren, behaviors characteristic of the 
grandchildren, and impacts on the grandmother's work life. Black grandmothers are more 
likely to have peers who also live with their grandchildren, more likely to come from 
families in which multiple generations lived in a household and are more likely to be 
receiving support from formal sources than white grandmothers. White grandmothers 
experienced more burden from their caregiving role than their black counterparts. Strom 
et al. (1997) identify specific issues for consideration in building differentiated education 
programs to support the learning needs of African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic 
grandparents. Comparison of grandparents, parents and grandchildren for the different 
cultures regarding behaviors of grandparents shows that Caucasians spent the least time 
with grandchildren. African-American grandparents who lived with grandchildren were 
viewed as more successful teachers of grandchildren than their counterparts living apart
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from their grandchildren.7 Hispanic grandparents whose grandchildren lived with them 
received lower scores for managing difficulties, coping with frustration, and meeting 
information needs. Caucasians who lived with their grandchildren were observed as 
having greater frustration than grandparents who lived apart (Strom et al. 1997).
Most o f the studies described in this review share some common features: First, of 
all the ethnic groups studied, surrogate parenting among non-Hispanic whites has been 
the least discussed and studied. Many studies implement a comparative model in which 
the white group is used as the norm against which the minority is compared. Second, 
there is a theme running through the existing literature that grandparents often step in to 
help in crisis times. Third, grandparents contribute in meaningful ways to their 
grandchildren's upbringing that are affected by differences in cultural norms. The cultural 
lens through which grandparenthood is viewed has a marked effect on grandparents’ 
congenital impact of its contributions. Fourth, the grandparents have been the focus so 
the outcomes o f grandchildren raised by grandparents have received little attention. This 
paper seeks to identify whether the consequences and costs of living in a grandparent 
family differ by race and ethnicity. We examine grandparenthood not only in highly 
dependent, at risk households, but also in families whose conditions offer alternative 
options for grandparental behaviors. In doing so, we try to uncover some pathways to the 
disparities in child outcomes associated with family structure, especially between 
grandparent and other non-parental families.
7 Their study is based on a sample o f  626 non-consanguineous subjects including 204 grandparents, 128 
parents, and 294 grandchildren. Each generation group completed a separate version o f  the Grandparent 
Strengths and Needs Inventory survey to identify the favorable qualities o f  grandparents and aspects o f  
their relationships in which further improvement was necessary. Each group reports aspects o f  
grandparents’ success and identifies specific aspects o f  learning that grandparents should acquire in order 
to become more effective.
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2.6 Contributions of This Essay
The review presented above helps clarify a number of research gaps and issues 
existing in the literature. This essay attempts to fill in such gaps and address those issues 
identified as much as possible. First, the number of single-father households and 
households headed by grandparents have both grown enormously, especially since 1990. 
The Census 2000 data shows that more than 2.4 million grandparents are primary 
caregivers to a grandchild; there are 2.2 million households across the country in which 
single men are raising children. While there is extensive research on the effects of family 
structure on child outcomes, relatively little attention has been paid to these relatively 
uncommon households. In many cases the paucity of research is due to the limitations of 
data available to investigate such households. This essay investigates ten different family 
structures, as aforementioned, and tries to answer the question: how do children in these 
types o f households fare in comparison to children in other ‘nontraditional’ but 
extensively investigated households, e.g., single-mother households, as well as to 
‘traditional’ households? This essay contributes to the economic literature theoretically 
by extending the current theoretical framework on households to encompass single-father 
households and also by dealing with gender differences and gender interactions in single­
parent and stepparent households.
Second, even less investigated by economists is how the effects of these family 
structures differ by gender. Research by sociologists and psychologists undoubtedly 
expands our knowledge about the role of gender and gender interaction within 
households, but most of the research is limited to simple categorical analysis or bivariate
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analysis, or using data sets that are not up to date or data with very small sample sizes.
For example, Downey et al. (1998) compare outcomes of 15-16-year-old children (such 
as deviance and behavior in school, self-concept and relationships with others) in single­
mother households vs. single-father households using data from the 1990 National 
Education Longitudinal Study. Unlike many other sociological studies, it controls for a 
variety of variables such as family incomes, parents’ education, etc. Their final sample 
consists of 3039 15-16-year-old children, including 456 who lived in single-father 
households and 2583 who lived in single-mother households. But the data set is relatively 
outdated given the surge of single-father households since 1990, and the outcomes 
considered are only behavioral. In addition, stratifying the analyses by gender, this essay 
addresses such questions as: does living with a single father differentially affect sons as 
opposed to daughters regarding their behavioral, developmental and health outcomes? 
Moreover, stratifying the sample by race, we investigate how parenting may differ across 
race/ethnicity paying particular attention to grandparent-caregiver households.
Third, as mentioned above, this essay analyzes the relationship between family 
structure and children's well-being by considering a wide array o f child outcomes. In 
particular, it focuses on three aspects of child outcomes by including health-related 
outcomes as well as the typical behavioral and school outcomes with a view to depict a 
more complete picture of children’s well-being. The closest research to ours is Brown 
(2004) which also uses NSAF data. Two child outcome measures employed by Brown 
(2004) are the same as ours, and as discussed earlier, single-father parent households are 
also examined in her study. However, it does not include health outcomes nor does it 
include grandparent caregiving, and its focus is on parental cohabitation.
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Last but not least, past research tells us little about why living in non-traditional 
families affects children negatively, or what might be done to reverse these patterns. This 
essay investigates the association between family structure and several ‘inputs’ which 
help ‘produce’ child outcomes, such as well-child care visits or parental mental health. In 
so doing, it attempts to answer the question: is the observed lesser well-being o f children 
in ‘nontraditional’ families at least in part due to fewer ‘inputs’? This is a critical 
question as many public programs designed to improve child outcomes such as food 
stamps, SCHIP and TANF, are, in practice, designed to improve access to critical inputs. 
Clarifying the differences between ‘inputs’ and ‘outcomes’ in the production o f child 
well-being helps investigate how much the difference in child outcomes is due to 
differences in inputs, and how much is due to the underlying production process.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we first review the general theoretical framework employed in 
family economics and health economics. Then within that general framework a 
theoretical model that represents a single-parent household is set up to help understand 
and tackle the issues the essay attempts to address. It is the simplest case, but it eases the 
investigation of parental and child gender interaction. Then we talk about the 
complications pertaining to other family structures such as two-parent families.
3.1 A Review of the Household Production Function Model (Becker-Grossman- 
Rosenzweig and Schultz)
The household production function model pioneered by Gary Becker (1965,
1981), treats a family as a quasi-firm engaging in the production of household 
commodities. The household combines its time and market purchased commodities to 
produce household commodities that ultimately enter its utility function. In Becker’s 
model, consumers often gain utility not only directly from the goods that they purchase, 
but also they transform the market purchased into commodities goods via a household 
production function that cannot be directly purchased from the market. Such commodities 
include “children, prestige and esteem, health, altruism, envy and pleasure of the 
sense.”(p24, Becker 1981).
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The household production model has been used to analyze a variety of household 
issues, and it lends itself well to the field of health economics. Grossman (1972) first 
developes a health production model investigating how individuals allocate their 
resources to produce health. According to Grossman, demand for health care is derived 
from a demand for health, and demand for health is also a derived demand from the 
demand for utility. Individuals are not passive consumers of health but active producers 
who combine time and money to produce health. Health demand consists of two 
elements: consumption effects (health yields direct utility, i.e. you are more energetic 
when you are healthier) and investment effects (health increases the number of days 
available to participate in market and non-market activities -  the novel part o f the model). 
Therefore, in Grossman’s model health is also a capital good. A person is bom with an 
initial endowment of H, which they add to by investment. The rate of H production will 
depend on the efficiency of investment in H. There will be depreciation in the value of 
the stock of H through age, accident, carelessness, sudden disease, etc.
The health production function in Grossman’s original notation is written as 
I , = I i{Mi, T H - E i)
The consumption good is produced according to
Z ,= Z ,.(X „^ ;£ ,.)
where /, = investment in health
A/, = market health care inputs 
THi = time spent on improving health 
Z( = composite consumption goods
- 3 9 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
X,  = market produced goods
Tt = time spent on composite consumption good
Et = stock of human capital
Just like a firm using inputs to produce goods, the individual makes decisions 
according to production functions. He allocates time subject to total time available among 
labor time, leisure time and ill time. Within leisure time, he allocates health producing 
time vs. non-health producing time. He also allocates resources between health care 
inputs and other consumption, subject to a budget constraint.
The model goes beyond traditional demand analysis and has been extremely 
influential in health economics. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) can be viewed as an 
application and extension of Grossman’s model. In their model the household has the 
following utility function:
U = U( X, ,7 . ,H) ,  i= l,...n ; j=n+l, . . . ,m
where H = child health;
X t = market-purchased goods (not health related);
Y = market-purchased goods that affect child health.
Child health can not be purchased directly from the market but is produced by the 
household by the production function:
H = f ( 7 . , / i ,p);
where I k = health inputs that do not affect utility other than indirectly through 
their effects on H, such as medical care, k = m + l,.. ..r;
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|i = family specific health endowments such as genetic traits or 
environmental factors.
The household’s reduced-form demand function for the market-purchased goods 
is derived from maximizing its utility function subject to the child health production 
function and budget constraint. Rosenzweig and Schultz’s household model is 
characterized by joint production since a subset of goods Y both influences child health 
and affects utility directly. In their model child health is produced and valued by the 
household in a process in which the household as one identity makes the choice. The 
household only faces resource allocation. Time allocation is not considered explicitly.
The household production function models reviewed above especially the model 
provided by Rosenzweig and Schultz, furnish the cornerstone for the theoretical 
framework developed in this analysis, because one measure adopted by this study for 
child quality is child health status, and also because time is not available in the data set 
used. I set up the next theoretical model to facilitate investigating the issues o f interest 
described earlier and will discuss other complications afterwards.
3.2 Single-parent Households Model
Since a single-parent household consists of one parent and one child, it represents 
the simplest scenario among all parent-child families. This framework is particularly 
appropriate for better understanding the possible role that gender plays in a family, and, 
as discussed later, this setup is also consistent with information available from the data 
for empirical investigation because the NSAF only has information on the MKAs (Most 
Knowledgeable Adult). However, in most cases the MKAs are the focal children’s 
parents.
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In this economic model of the household, the objective o f the household is 
assumed to be maximizing the utility that it derives from consuming the various 
commodities that it produces using inputs of market-purchased goods. Child Quality is 
one particular good from which the parent derives utility. Greater investment in children 
is expected to be associated with higher achievement, which is represented by the child 
quality. Our interest, therefore, is on understanding the factors that affect the family’s 
production of child quality, denoted as CQ, and why CQ may differ by gender. 
Therefore, the family’s utility function is defined as
U(C,CQy) (1)
where CQy is child quality and C is composite market-purchased goods.
Households derive utility directly from Child Quality, which cannot be purchased 
in the marketplace but is produced using market purchased commodities and various 
environmental inputs.
Child Quality is produced according to the production function
CQ,  = f 0 (x, G, E, N F ) /= b, g; j  =m, f  (2)
where x  = market purchased inputs;
G= child’s genetic endowment;
E househo ld ’s efficiency of combining x, other family environmental 
variables, proxied by parental education, etc;
NF= nonfamilial influences such as social climate on CQ.
The subindex m stands for the mother and / stands for the father, subindex b 
stands for boy (son), g  stands for girl (daughter).
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Self-produced commodities like Child Quality do not have market prices, but each 
does have a shadow price equal to the cost of production:
PCQ= P xx /C Q  (3)
Given market prices for x and C, parent utility is maximized subject to the income 
constraint:
where Px is the price for good x, Pc is the market price for consumption
good C, I is the household income. Normalizing the price of the market purchased 
consumption goods C to 1, the budget constraint can be expressed as
The parent’s problem becomes
max U (ftj (x; G, E, NF), C) 
subject to the income constraint (Eq. (5)).
The parent chooses the level of consumption C for herselfThimself, and the level 
of consumption x to produce the desired level of child quality subject to the income
Pxx+Pc C = I (4)
Pxx + C=l (5)
budget.
L = U( f0 (x; G, E, NF), C) -  A(Pxx + C - 1)
FOCs:
dx d f  y dx
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The equilibrium condition from maximizing the utility function therefore yields 
the following equation (suppressing the subscripts for simplicity)
(6)MUC
In equilibrium, the marginal rate o f substitution between x and C equals Px. The 
first order condition reveals that C affects the parental utility directly, while x only 
contributes to utility indirectly through Child Quality.
The parent optimal demand for his/her own consumption is
C* = C (P ,,I ,G ,E ,N F ) (7)
And the optimal level of x to produce the optimal level of Child Quality is
x * = x ( P i , I , G ! E , N F )  (8)
A parental demand function for Child Quality, the optimal level of Child 
Quality, denoted as CQ*, can be written analogously as:
CQ* = f v {x* (Px ,l ,  G, E, NF), G, E, NF} (9)
What factors contribute to the observed difference in Child Quality in single­
parent household, such as boys in single-father households vs. boys in single-mother 
households? A general analysis of Child Quality demand equation (9) offers a few 
possible explanations. First, input x may be different due to different budget constraints, 
which can produce different child outcomes. For example, single-father households may 
have more income than single-mother households. This possibility can be easily checked 
by comparing resources of these two households and by controlling for family incomes 
when regressions are estimated. Moreover, inputs (x) are not exogenous to the model,
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but are an ensuing result o f parental choices of their own consumption and child quality 
subject to the family budget constraint. Higher investment in the child leads to higher 
child quality, therefore families valuing child quality more dearly may invest more. 
Second, even with the same preferences and inputs, different families could produce 
divergent CQ due to the underlying production process ( f 0) because of gender
differences. For example, a single father may have a comparative advantage in raising a 
son than a single mother, as a father may serve as a role model more easily. The third 
avenue could be traced to the difference in factors which are exogenous to the model, 
such as E, G and NF. For example, E indicates parental efficiency of combining all other 
factors. This effect is subtly different from the aforementioned production efficiency. Its 
overall effect on CQ can be expressed as:
dCQL _VL _dx_+ VL
dEij dx ' dEj 9E0 
What Equation (10) demonstrates is that E can affect the whole production
process directly ( — L  ) as wen as indirectly through the selected inputs ). In
dEtj dx dEy
practice, E refers to parental education level, age and experience in childbearing. Child 
genetic traits (G) and non-familial factors (NF) can similarly affect CQ. For example, the 
gender difference could be traced to social environment (NF). There are many 
sociological studies documenting that society still values males more than it values 
females. Therefore, for example, it is possible that a single father-son pair has some 
advantage over a single mother-daughter combination, or mother-son single-parent 
households may be less disadvantaged than mother-daughter single-parent families. We 
use regional indicators to roughly proxy for those societal inputs.
-45 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Last but not least, following the point mentioned above, the parent may have a 
different preference (U) for CQ contingent on the gender of the child as well as the 
gender of the parent. For example, a father could value the quality of a son more than that 
of a daughter, or a mother may value the quality of a daughter more than that of a son. In 
other words, following the first point, all else being equal, different inputs may be due to 
parental preference for CQ. In addition, the parent may determine the level o f inputs 
according to the inputs’ productivity in producing CQ. In other words, he/she may choose 
to provide fewer of certain inputs when they are not very productive in producing CQ and 
allocate resources to where they could be more productive. In practices, we need to hold 
the coefficients constant, which is hard to do. Therefore it is difficult to isolate this effect 
directly. Hence, differences in CQ could be attributed indirectly to variation in parental 
preference for CQ. This possibility can be tested by looking at whether there is a 
difference in inputs across different family structures when family income is held 
constant.
All in all, the issue this essay attempts to address is more empirical than 
theoretical. Therefore, empirical evidence is provided that helps tease out which factor(s) 
is(are) accountable for the observed difference in child quality. Three groups of child 
quality measures will be used here: health outcomes, school engagement index, and 
behavior problem index. The first argument in the CQ demand function in equation (9) is 
family inputs into the production of CQ. The difference in CQ that can be attributed to 
family inputs is evaluated in a structural form  equation.
Unlike reduced form  equations, which only contain exogenous variables, 
structural form  equations include variables that are endogenous such as inputs, which are
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determined by various other factors. Although we encounter the endogeneity issue when 
estimating structural form  equations, the advantage of using them is that we can know 
immediately whether family structures are associated with the same child outcomes once 
inputs are controlled for. For example, if it is found that boys fare better with single 
fathers than boys with single mothers, then the difference could be attributed either to 
family resources, preference or production process, or any combination of these factors. 
Since data on family incomes are available, it can be more evident whether there is a 
difference in the earning power between fathers and mothers by comparing incomes 
between single-father households vs. single-mother households. The budget constraint 
can be easily controlled for in estimation. On the other hand, if it is found that boys and 
girls fare equally well within the same type of family structure once inputs are controlled 
for, then the difference in observable child outcomes can be due to preference and 
production process.
The single-parent household model could be easily adapted to analyzing other 
households. For example, for grandparent households and other non-parental households, 
the utility function still is U(C, CQlt),  but the Child Quality production becomes
CQ, = f ,  (x, G, E, NF) /= Gd, Np ; j  =w, b, h, o
where the subindex Gd stands for the grandparent household and Np stands for all other 
non-parental households, subindex w stands for non-Hispanic white, b stands for non- 
Hispanic black, h for Hispanic and o for all other race/ethnicity. In this case, different 
cultures associated with different ethnicities could be another source of differences 
observed in child outcomes.
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3.3 Other Extending Issues
3.3.1 The Role o f  Family Structure When Two Parents are Present. It is much 
more complicated to construct a universal framework for a two-parent household since 
there are many different types of two-parent households such as two-biological parent 
families, two-adoptive parent families, step-father families and step-mother families and 
cohabiting partnership families. Moreover, a division of labor within the family makes it 
more important to bring in time allocation. We review some theories to show why two- 
parent households may perform better for producing child outcomes as well as present 
some complexities in modeling two-parent families. As there is much literature devoted 
to each of the cases, we only summarize the findings here.
1) Division o f  Labor within the Family
Consider a household consisting of two persons, say the husband and the wife. 
The objective of the partnership is to increase utility by producing children and by 
increasing total resources by division of labor and coordination of investments in human 
capital (Becker 1981). Division of labor and allocation of time is critical in modeling a 
two-parent household. Therefore, time is added and plays an essential role in such 
framework.
Suppose the wife has a comparative advantage in household production, while the 
husband has a comparative advantage in market work. If  they do not cooperate, the 
husband and the wife individually choose consumption and time allocated between 
market work and household work. But the household will be better off if the wife
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specializes in household production while the husband specializes in market work. By 
division of labor, productivity and total resources available to the household are increased 
through specialization as well as through economies of scale.
2) Children as a Public Good within the Family
The household can also be modeled8 as such that one parent, for example the 
husband, dominates the household production and utility maximizing process in which 
the fact that child quality is essentially a public good in a two-parent household is 
emphasized. This framework is especially useful for analyzing the effect of divorce on 
children and marriage. Within marriage, both child quality and the wife’s utility, which 
also includes child quality as a parameter, enter into the husband utility function. 
Therefore the husband is altruistic to both the child and the wife, and vice versa. Under 
such circumstances, children are a collective consumption good from the point of view of 
the father and mother. Proximity and altruism help to relieve the free-rider problem 
associated with the provision of public goods. Upon divorce, however, it is not feasible 
for the former couple to realize a Pareto-optimal allocation of their joint resources as the 
noncustodial parent loses the control over the allocation decision o f the custodial parent 
(Weiss and Willis 1985). The child is still a public good to the mother and the father. 
However, like all other public goods, the free rider problem arises, and the noncustodial 
parent may invest much less. For the custodial parent, as fewer resources are available to 
the household, the investment by the custodial parent into child quality production will 
also decrease.
8 This analysis is conducted in line with the framework developed by Weiss and W illis (1985).
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In addition, fertility decisions (Becker 1960, Ben-Porath 1973, Schultz 1973, 
Willis 1973 or see Robsinson 1997 for a recent review), the trade-off between quantity 
and quality of children (Becker 1965, Becker and Lewis 1973, Becker and Tomes 1976, 
Willis 1973) and bargaining in marriage (Manser and Brown 1980, Chiappori 1991, 
Lundberg and Poliak 1996, Lundberg and Poliak 1994, Marchant 1997) are other 
important issues in the economics of families. Given the focus o f this study and the 
existing extensive literature for each issue, I will not discuss them here.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
In this chapter we first discuss the data and variables used in the study. In 
particular we explain why we choose the data sets and discuss why we select the 
measures of child outcomes to proxy for child quality and well-being. Then we explain 
the empirical strategies for testing the hypothesis with a view to provide possible causes 
of disparities in observable child outcomes across family structures.
4.1 Data and Variables
This essay investigates a number of child outcomes across a complete spectrum of 
family structures using the 1999 and 2002 waves of the National Survey of American 
Families (NSAF). Despite its cross-sectional nature, the NSAF provides the best 
opportunity to undertake this analysis with its large sample size (over 30,000 sampled 
children in each wave), its over-sampling of low income households, its rich set of child 
outcomes and ‘inputs’, and its detailed information of child living arrangements. For 
example, the data from the 1999 NSAF provides information on all 35,938 sampled 
children under 18 years old, as well as information relating to their family settings and 
the adults who care for them. Although the survey provides estimates for targeted states 
as well as for the nation as a whole, it focuses on the experiences of low-income families 
(about $33,000 in 1998 currency for a family of two parents and two children). The
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survey was carried out from February 1999 through October 1999 and from February 
2002 through November 2002 for the Urban Institute and Child Trends by Westat. Some 
questions covered the families’ circumstances at the time of the survey; others refer to the 
previous 12 months prior to the interview (Abi-Habib et al. 2004).
This analysis uses only a subset o f data including children between 6 and 17 years 
old because developmental child outcomes such as school engagement and behavioral 
problems are inapplicable to children aged 0-5 years. In doing so, this also eliminates the 
possible correlation when two children come from the same households because NSAF 
samples only up to two children from the same household to reduce respondent burden: 
one randomly from the age 0-5 group, the other from the age 6-17 group if there is more 
then one child in each age group in the household.9 Once focal children are selected, the 
NASF questionnaire asks for the name of the parent or guardian who knows the most 
about the selected child’s health and education, and this person is referred to as the Most 
Knowledgeable Adult or MKA. The MKA is the selected respondent who answers 
questions about his or her focal child(ren), his or her spouse/partner (if there is one), and 
the family and household. In almost all cases, the MKA is a parent of the selected child.10 
The data used are created by combining (1) the Focal Child data set with (2) the Person 
data set, which includes all adults covered in the survey, (3) Family Respondent and (4) 
Household data sets to obtain additional information on the MKA and the household so 
that the analyses on the individual child can be conducted in the context of intra­
household resource allocation.
9 When a household contained exactly one child, that child was always selected.
10 See Wang et al. 1999 for the actual questionnaire: question SC7, and Cunningham et al. for a in-depth 
discussion o f in-person survey methods.
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The analysis uses information about the MKA to proxy parents’ characteristics for 
the following reasons: First, if we use parents’ characteristics, which are not directly 
available in the Focal Child data set, then a greater proportion of observations will be 
dropped due to missing values, especially for nonparent households. Second, in most 
cases, the MKA is the child’s parent. Third, the MKA’s information may shed more light 
for the purpose o f the current study in the case that the MKA is not a parent. This is 
because the current study is exploring how child outcomes are associated with different 
types of family structures. For example, if a child has never lived with his/her parents 
after he/she was born, then information about his/her biological parents should have a 
different effect. Instead, using information on the MKA can capture household dynamics 
and should be more appropriate for predicting the child’s outcomes for the purpose of this 
study. In addition, using the information on the MKA allows us to measure the 
characteristics of the adult with the greatest influence on the child. Last but not least, 
because of the diversity of family structures examined in the study, not all children have 
two co-resident parents. That makes it it is impossible to include the characteristics of 
each parent separately in a regression model directly comparing single parent, cohabiting 
and married two-parent families, cohabiting and married two-parent families, and non- 
parental families in particular. Although this measure may not fully reflect the potential 
benefit associated with having two parents instead of one, by using the characteristics of 
the MKA, it does allow for a comparison across the complete spectrum of family 
structures.
In the current study, family structure is determined according to a detailed 
variable “ULIVARR” provided by NSAF. It describes the type of parents/caretakers that
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each focal child is living with. All of the possible combinations of caretakers are coded, 
and 45 different living arrangements are available in the data sets. The variable identifies 
whether the focal child is living with married, unmarried but cohabiting, or unmarried 
and not cohabiting caretakers and whether the caretakers are single parents, stepparents, 
non-parents or adoptive/biological parents. In addition, the relationship o f each focal 
child to the MKA with whom he/she was living is used when determining a grandparent 
household.
Married two-parent families11 are married couple families in which the focal child 
is the biological or adoptive child of both parents. Married stepmother families are 
married couple families in which the father is the biological father and the mother is the 
stepmother. Married stepfather families are defined in a parallel manner. Cohabiting 
two-parent families are non-married couple families in which both parents are biological 
or adoptive parents. Cohabiting stepmother families are those non-married couple 
families in which the focal child is living with biological/adoptive father and his female 
partner. Again, cohabiting stepfather families are defined in a parallel manner. Single­
father families and single-mother families are those single parents living without partners. 
Grandparent families are defined as children living with grandparent(s) who are the 
MKAs and without either parent present. To complete the universe, any other living 
arrangements are classified as other, which includes households in which uncles, aunts or 
siblings are the MKAs. Ginther and Poliak (2004) argue against using a child-based 
classification scheme in which the same family could be classified as a stepfamily for the
11 Because we can not separate married two-biological parent families from married two-adoptive parent 
families in the data, the traditional families therefore include married two-biological parent families as well 
as married two-adoptive parent families. For the rest o f  the paper we use married two-parent families and 
traditional families interchangeably, referring to both married two-biological parent families and married 
two-adoptive parent families.
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stepchild but as a two-biological-parent family for the joint child. Instead, Ginther and 
Poliak propose using a family based scheme so that children raised in traditional nuclear 
families will be distinguished from joint children in blended families. However, the 
NSAF data is not well-suited to address this issue. In order to identify the children living 
in blended families according to the classification scheme proposed by Ginther and 
Poliak (2004), we first choose households with two sampled children. (10,962 
observations are retained for both years). Second, one child's relationship to one of the 
MKAs has to be a biological child and the other child has to be a step child. We have 
only 35 observations that fall into this subgroup. Third, the child has to be 6-17 years old, 
and only 28 observations qualify for the child-based definition o f blended family. But it 
is likely to underestimate the children living in such households for the following 
reasons:
1) It is possible that both sampled focal children are joint biological children of 
the parents and the step child is not sampled.
2) It is also likely that in some stepparent households the stepparent is not the 
MKA but the biological parent is the MKA.
Hence the number of observations is so small that it is not suitable for 
comparison with biological children defined as family-based.
As discussed above, in order to incorporate the dynamic nature of family structure 
as well as to employ the fixed-effect strategy to deal with the endogenous nature of 
family structure, longitudinal data is essential. At the present time, however, there is no 
longitudinal data set available that is large enough to provide the opportunity to closely 
examine children from all family structures over time. As discussed earlier, this essay
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uses data from the 1999 and 2002 waves of the National Survey o f American Families 
(NSAF). The 1997 wave ofNSAF data is also available, and it contains partial overlaps 
of sampling units used on the 1999 NSAF (there is no overlap with the 2002 wave of 
data). However, a flag to identify matched persons in NSAF 1997 and 1999 is not 
provided on the public use files for confidentiality reasons (Safir et al. 2000). Thus we 
could not identify the overlaps and could not use it as panel data. Most importantly, the 
key information on the focal child’s detailed living arrangement, which is used to classify 
different family structures, is not available in the 1997 data. Therefore, only the 1999 and 
2002 waves ofNSAF data are used in the current study.
4.1.1 Dependent Outcomes Variables. There is one caveat about the outcomes 
measures. As all outcome measures are reported by the MKA, it may be subject to self- 
reporting errors, and such errors may be associated with income and family structure. For 
example, some studies find evidence of self-reported health outcomes measurement 
errors (Butler et al. 1987, Bound 1991) and such measurement errors are correlated with 
family income (Marra et al. 2004). With respect to academic performance, Bird and 
Berman (1985) found that mothers’ perceptions o f their children’s performance on a new 
task are more accurate than fathers’ are. Nevertheless, it is much more difficult to obtain 
objective measures, and most surveys use self-reported measures.
The primary health outcome is the focal child’s current health status reported by 
the MKA. It is similar to the measures of overall health used in many studies that 
correlate to mortality, morbidity, physical fitness, and health care utilization (Ren and 
Amick 1996, Denton and Walters 1999, Idler and Benyamini 1997, Matthews et al.
1999). Compared health status and physical and mental functionality of the focal child
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are also included to supplement the analysis. The importance of health is well- 
documented in the vast literature examining the linkage between health and economic 
status, labor market outcomes and educational attainment.12 A life course perspective 
was employed by the medical, sociological and economic literatures to address 
occurrence of events across entire life spans as well as to explain intergenerational 
influences. The importance of health status in one’s early life was highlighted. For 
example, studying health with the life course approach sheds light on the existence of 
wide disparities in adult morbidity and mortality rates across socio-economic classes 
(Bartley and Blane 1997, Blane et al. 1999, Davey Smith et al. 1997, Kuh and Ben- 
Shlomo 1997, Mare 1990, Martyn 1991, Van de Mheen 1998, Wadsworth 1997, Wunsch 
et al. 1996). Case et al. (2002) suggest that the well-known positive association between 
health and income in adulthood is anteceded by a similar association in childhood. They 
found that children from lower-income households with chronic conditions are less 
healthy than those from higher-income households. Moreover, the adverse effects of 
lower income on health accumulate over children's lives. They further suggest that the 
impact of parents' income on children's health may be a pathway through which the 
intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status takes place. Case et al. (2005) 
also find that childhood health and economic circumstances have a long-lasting effect on 
health status, educational attainment and social status into adulthood. Specifically, they 
suggest that health may be a potential mechanism through which intergenerational 
transmission of economic status occurs. Given the enduring impact of childhood health, it 
is important for studies to include health outcomes in addition to educational and 
behavioral outcomes when investigating child well-being.
12 See Currie and Madrian (1999) and Currie and Hyson (1999) for an extensive review.
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Current Health Status
This variable concerns the MKA’s perception about the current health status of 
the children. The MKA is asked:






This question applies to all children. There were no special interviewer 
instructions for this question. Basically, the MKA’s answer to this question is used. For 
example, if the answer is excellent, than the variable is assigned a value of 5, etc. 
Current Health Status Compared to 12 months ago -  Health Getting Worse
Similarly, this variable also concerns the MKA’s perception about the current 
health status of the children compared to 12 months ago. The MKA is asked:
Flow is your child’s health in general compared to 12 months ago? Is it:
5 = Much better
4 = Somewhat better
3 = About the same
2 = Somewhat worse
1 = Much worse
This question applied to children two years old or older. One difficulty with this 
variable is that no information is available regarding the child’s past health status, and
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there is an upper limit towards which a child’s health could improve. Therefore this 
variable is dichotomized to a new variable indicating whether the child has experienced 
deterioration in his/her health status in the past 12 months, with 1 corresponding to the 
values of 1 and 2, and 0 equals to the values of 3, 4, 5.
Having a Health Condition that Limits Activity
This variable was created by asking the MKA whether the child has a physical, 
learning, or mental health condition that limits (his/her) participation in the usual kinds of 
activities done by most children (his/her) age and/or limits (his/her) ability to do regular 
school work. If needed, the interviewer is to elaborate on the question by defining what is 
meant by a physical learning or mental health condition. For children six years old and 
older, an ongoing or chronic impairment or condition is one that limits the child’s ability 
to participate in routine physical education and learning activities at public, private, 
vocational, or parochial schools. The interviewer is to record ‘YES’ if the child is 
enrolled in a special school for children with physical or mental disabilities (such as a 
school for the hearing-impaired or blind, or children with learning disabilities). It also 
records ‘YES’ if the child is enrolled in a regular school but spends most of the day in 
special education classes. 5318 children or 12.16 percent of the whole sample used in this 
study fall into this category.
School Engagement Scale
A child’s future economic status and work productivity as an adult are determined 
in part by his performance in school and ultimate educational degree obtained (Kuh and 
Wadsworth 1991, Bruno 1995, Bauman and Ryan 2001). Daily participation in school 
such as attending class, making an effort to learn, and completing homework are the
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fabric of the learning process. Due to the tendency of researchers to focus on the 
educational achievement and attainment of children, such non-achievement aspects of the 
educational experience warrant better understanding. School engagement is an 
appropriate measure to use also because for some children in the sample, it is too early to 
measure achievement yet.
Research has documented that school engagement is associated with positive 
academic outcomes including achievement and persistence in school.13 A key outcome of 
engagement is higher achievement. Children who are highly engaged in school perform 
better in terms of grades, test scores, and grade advancement, although the 
operationalizations14 of engagement may differ from one study to another.15 Another 
body of research finds that academically engaged students are less likely to drop out of 
high school and less likely to engage in delinquency (Bryk and Thum 1989, Crosnoe 
2002, Farkas et al. 1990, Jenkins 1995).
The NSAF includes a scale measure of school engagement created by Jim Connell 
and Lisa Bridges at the Institute for Research and Reform in Education in California.
This scale is used to assess the degree to which children aged 6 to 17 are interested in 
doing and willing to do school work.
MKAs are asked:
How often
• Does the child care about doing well in school?
13 See Fredricks et al. (2004) for a rev iew  o f  the growing research literature that addresses school 
engagement.
14 Operationalization refers to the process o f  converting concepts into specific observable behaviors that a 
researcher can measure.
15 See Connell et al. (1994), Finn and Rock (1997), Finn and Voelkl (1993), Lamborn et al. (1992), Lee and 
Smith (1995), Roscigno and Ainsworth-Damell (1999), Skinner et al. (1990), Steinberg et al. (1992); in 
contrast, Newmann et al. (1992) and Smerdo (1999) fail to find such a connection.
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• Does the child only work on schoolwork when forced to?
• Does the child just do enough schoolwork to get by?
• Does the child always do homework?
The response set contains: all o f the time (assigned a value o f 4), most of the time 
(assigned a value of 3), some of the time (assigned a value of 2), and none of the time 
(assigned a value of 1). Responses to questions about how often the child only works on 
schoolwork when forced to and does just enough schoolwork to get by are reverse coded. 
Responses to the above four questions are coded and then totaled to create a scale score 
ranging from 4 to 16 with a higher score indicating greater school engagement. 
Behavioral Problems Index Score
Psychological development and social development are also essential aspects of 
child well-being. Even though family environments and experiences influence these 
developments at all stages, those early in life are thought to have a particularly powerful 
impact, largely because life is a process of cumulative effect, beginning with social and 
family circumstances in early life. Behaviors and attributes that are acquired early in life 
may have a compounding effect into late adolescence and adulthood (Wadsworth 1999, 
Caspi et al. 1995, Pulkkinen and Hamalainen 1995, Friedman et al. 1993, Friedman et al. 
1995).
Two separate scores are used to assess behavior and emotional problems for 
children aged 6 tol 1 and children aged 12-17 due to the distinct characteristics of 
children in each age group. The MKA’s responses to the following questions are used to 
create the scale for age group 6-11:
In the past month,
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• Does she/he feel worthless or inferior
• Has she/he been nervous or tense
• Does she/he act too young for her/his age
• Does she/he have trouble sleeping
• Does she/he lie or cheat
• Does she/he do poorly at school work
The responses to those questions reflect the MKA’s perceptions about the child’s 
behavior in the past month. The response categories include often true (assigned a value 
of 3), sometimes true (assigned a value of 2), and never true (assigned a value of 1). 
Scores for respondents who answered at least five out of the six questions are totaled and 
then standardized to the 18-point scale ranging from 6 to 18. A higher score indicates 
more behavior problems.
Similar to the behavior problem index score for children aged 6-11, the index for 
children aged 12-17 is created by asking the MKA the following six questions:
In the past month,
• Does she/he not get along with other kids?
• Can she/he not concentrate for long?
• Has she/he been sad or depressed?
• Does she/he have trouble sleeping?
• Does she/he lie or cheat?
• Does she/he do poorly at school work?
- 6 2 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4.1.2 Control and Production Function Input Variables. The set of control and 
production function input variables used in the estimations include (1) basic demographic 
characteristics of the child and the household: child’s age, race and gender, MKA’s age, 
family structure as discussed earlier, number of children under age 6, number of children 
between 12 and 17, region; (2) household socioeconomic status such as MKA’s highest 
education level, MKA’s labor force status and family social income level; (3) inputs 
which include health specific inputs, educational and developmental inputs and 
psychological inputs which indicate parental resources:
• Health specific inputs include: whether the child has health insurance at 
the time of the survey, child’s number of dental visits in the past 12 
months, whether the household has a usual source for health care other 
than the emergency room, whether the child received well child care visits 
in the past 12 months;
• Educational and developmental inputs consist of whether the child has 
changed schools in the past 12 months (school stability); whether the 
MKA worries that food would run out (food insecurity), whether the 
household has no phone service, whether the child took lessons (computer, 
music, dance, etc.) after school last year, whether the child was on a sports 
team last year.
• Parental resources: the MKA’s aggravation scale score and MKA’s mental 
health scale score, which are discussed below.
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M KA’s Aggravation Scale Score
This variable is derived by summing the MKA’s responses to four questions— 
how often in the past month the MKA felt the child was much harder to care for than 
most, felt the child did things that really bothered the MKA a lot, felt he or she was 
giving up more of his or her life to meet the child’s needs than he or she ever expected, 
and felt angry with the child. The response categories include all of the time (coded 4), 
most of the time (coded 3), some of the time (coded 2), and none of the time (coded 1). 
Responses are totaled creating a parent aggravation index-a scale score ranging from 4 
to 16. A higher score indicates more aggravation.
M KA’s Mental Health Scale Score
The mental health scale is created by summing the MKA’s responses to five 
questions that ask how often in the past month the respondent had been a very nervous 
person, felt calm or peaceful, felt downhearted and blue, had been a happy person, and 
felt so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer him or her up. The response 
categories include all of the time (coded 1), most o f the time (coded 2), some of the time 
(coded 3), and none of the time (coded 4). Responses to the questions about feeling calm 
or peaceful and being a happy person are reverse coded. Responses are totaled, creating a 
scale score ranging from 5 to 20, then all scores are rescaled to 100 by multiplying by 5. 
A higher score indicates better mental health.
There is a caveat with the measures of parental resources in particular and with 
the measures of all inputs in general. Inputs, similar to family structure, are potentially 
endogenous and could be affected by a variety of factors. For parental resources, reverse
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causality is especially relevant. For instance, a parent caring for a problematic child may 
experience more stress and aggravation than one who is raising a well-behaved child, 
which could in turn adversely affect the child’s outcomes. Nevertheless, controlling for 
the inputs could shed light on such questions as whether differences in inputs lead to the 
disparity in child outcomes across family structures and how much the difference in child 
outcomes persists after inputs are controlled for.
4.2 Estimation Strategies
The theoretical model of a single-parent household and its extension to a 
grandparent household suggests several possible explanations for differences in child 
quality varying by gender and by race. We follow the standard household production 
theory approach in the economics literature to motivate the empirical study. Clarifying 
the differences between ‘inputs’ and ‘outcomes’ in the production o f child well-being 
helps investigate how much the difference in child outcomes is due to differences in 
inputs, and how much is due to the underlying production process. We also employ and 
extend the theoretical framework of Conway and Houtenville (2002) to clarify the 
possible role of gender and gender interaction within households.
To investigate empirically, the equations to be estimated will be the inputs 
equation corresponding to equation (8) and a child quality production function 
corresponding to equation (9) as follows:
X, =  a  7, + (3j Gi +  y  E +  t j  NFi + o,
CQ, = $'X , + 3,1, + yy,Gj + S 'E  + rN F i + e,
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where /represents economic resources such as family income and the MKA’s education, 
etc., G contains child characteristics such as age, gender and race, E  includes parental and 
family characteristics such as parents’ age, number of children in the households and a 
vector of ten family structure dummy variables: (0) married two-parent biological or 
adoptive family (the omitted category), (1) married mother-stepfather family, (2) married 
father-stepmother family, 3) single mother, 4) single father, 5) cohabiting two-parent 
biological or adoptive family, 6) cohabiting mother-stepfather family, 7) cohabiting 
father-stepmother family, 8) grandparent caregiver family and 9) other non-parental 
caregiver family; NF  denotes factors such as living in the south, etc.
The developmental inputs (x) include 1) the parental aggravation and mental 
health status of the ‘most knowledgeable adult’ (assumed to be the primary caregiver), 2) 
how many times the child has changed schools in the past 12 months, 3) taking after- 
school lessons, and 4) being on a sports team. The developmental outcomes (CQ) include 
1) the child’s reported engagement in school, and 2) the Behavioral Problems Index 
score. The health inputs (X) include 1) whether the child has health insurance, 2) number 
of dental visits during the last 12 months, 3) number of well child care visits during the 
last 12 months, 4) whether the child has a usual source for care. The health outcomes 
(CQ) include 1) child’s current health status, 2) child’s current health compared to 12 
months ago (whether the child has experienced deterioration in health status), and 3) 
whether the child has a mental, physical or learning condition limiting activity 
participated in by most children in his/her age group. In addition, we include two general 
inputs that might contribute to both developmental and health outcomes such as food
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insecurity and interrupted phone services in the households. These two measures can 
capture general aspects of the home environment.
First, we perform a descriptive analysis on these various measures to make simple 
comparisons of the various child inputs and outcomes across the different types of family 
structures by gender and by race, as well as to investigate the relative prevalence of these 
family structures.
Second, in order to better identify the associations between family structure and 
child outcomes, the basic demographic characteristics must be controlled for. We 
therefore estimate the following child input and outcome equations:
la) Inputk = <I>(G, E, N F ) ;
2a) Outcomeq = g(G, E, N F ) ;
These equations contain those variables most likely to be considered exogenous (the child 
and MKA’s characteristics), with the exception of family structure itself.
Next, the household’s socioeconomic status is controlled. This helps identify to 
what extent economic resources matter and also test the economic theory regarding 
family structure and child outcomes:
lb) Inputk = 0(G , E, NF, I ) ;
2b) Outcomeq = g(G, E, NF, I)
Finally, the outcome equations will also be estimated including the full vector of 
input variables as explanatory variables:
2c) Outcome = g{G, E, NF, I, Input)
This exercise helps clarify whether the lesser outcomes of children in 
‘nontraditional’ families is due at least in part to receipt o f fewer observable ‘inputs’, and,
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if so, whether the lesser inputs vary within the different nontraditional family structures 
and whether they vary by the child’s gender. Despite the likely endogeneity of these 
inputs, including them in the regressions enables us to investigate how much of the 
outcome differential is due to an observed difference in inputs across family structures. 
For instance, if children in single-mother families receive less medical care than children 
living in other families, then once medical care is controlled for the impact of living in a 
single-mother family on the child’s health may be reduced or even eliminated. We are not 
trying to instrument these inputs because 1) there is the usual difficulty in finding valid 
instruments, and 2) the possible endogeneity of family structure already renders the 
exercise a ‘descriptive regression”.
These equations are first estimated on the entire sample. By providing estimates 
of the overall differences in child well-being across the different family structures, the 
results provide information on how the well-being of children living in single-father and 
grandparent caregiver families differs from children living in other ‘nontraditional’ 
families or in ‘traditional’ families.
Each equation is then estimated on each gender sub-sample and each race sub­
sample separately. These results help to illustrate the difference between the well-being 
of children living in single-father families in comparison to other family structures, 
especially single-mother families and grandparent families, contingent upon the child’s 
gender and race. Specifically, the equality of the estimated coefficients on family 
structure is tested across structures for each sub-sample (e.g., the effects on a girl of 
living with a single father versus a single mother, or the effects on a non-Hispanic white
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child of living with in a grandparent household versus living in an other non-parental 
household).
Results would be biased without adjustments for oversampling, undercoverage 
and nonresponse. Child Weights from the NSAF survey and Stata survey commands are 
used to produce approximately unbiased and representative estimates for the nation (see 
Brick et al. 1999 for a more complete discussion of weights in the NSAF).
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We first perform a descriptive analysis, investigating the relative prevalence of 
various family structures and making simple comparisons o f the various child inputs and 
outcomes across these different family structures. However, to get a crisper measure of 
the associations between family structure and child outcomes, we must control for the 
household’s socioeconomic status and relevant child characteristics. Furthermore, we 
further control for specific inputs in order to answer the question of how much the 
differences in child outcomes between ‘non-traditional’ families and ‘traditional’ families 
could be explained by differences in the receipt of critical inputs.
Due to the completeness of types of family structures we examine, various and 
numerous comparisons can be made when reporting the empirical results. For both 
descriptive and empirical results, we emphasize four major comparisons to keep the 
discussion tractable. First, we make comparisons between traditional and all other 
families to investigate how children from different non-traditional families fare compared 
to traditional families. Second, we make comparisons within single-parent families, 
within married stepparent families and within cohabiting stepfamilies to study how child 
outcomes differ by the gender of the biological parent in these non-traditional families. 
Third, we make comparisons between single mother, married stepfather and cohabiting 
stepfather families as well as between single father, married stepmother and cohabiting
- 7 0 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stepmother families to investigate how the presence of a married or cohabiting stepparent 
may affect child outcomes. Finally, comparisons are made between grandparent families 
and other non-parental families to investigate whether living with grandparent(s) is 
associated with more desirable outcomes for children than other non-parental alternatives 
when living with their parent(s) is not possible (comparison results are listed in Table 
18).
5.1 Descriptive Results
5.1.1 Full Sample. Table 1 delineates the diversity and relative prevalence of 
different family structures investigated by this study (Percentage for each family structure 
is calculated by using the survey weights). Although the traditional family is still the 
majority among family types (56.4 percent), its dominance becomes less prominent when 
compared to the combination of all other family structures. While single-father families 
(3.2 percent) are much less common than single-mother families, which is the second 
dominant family structure (19.8 percent), it is still noteworthy since researchers tend to 
ignore this family type when investigating single-parent households. Grandparent headed 
households with neither parent present (2.0 percent) is another family type that is under­
investigated in studies examining family structure. Finally, cohabiting families are 
another form that emerged as an alternative to families formed by traditional marriage, 
and they together represent 4.8 percent of the whole sample. Among cohabiting couples, 
a mother cohabiting with her partner is the most common arrangement (3.0 percent). This 
group may be otherwise categorized as single-mother households due to the survey 
design or strategies utilized by researchers.
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Table 2 presents the weighted means and adjusted standard deviations for all 
variables used in the current study for the full sample, and Table 3 stratifies the sample 
across ten family structures. The summary statistics show wide variation in child 
outcomes among different family structures. As discussed earlier, comparisons are made 
to test the different hypotheses regarding the relationship between family structure and 
child outcomes. Simple comparisons based on mean values can be misleading sometimes. 
Nevertheless, they can highlight the crude differences of child outcomes and variations in 
inputs associated with various child outcomes.
Several salient results emerge from the descriptive analysis. First, children in 
married two-parent families have more desirable outcomes than children from alternative 
types of families. Married two-parent families also have more inputs in general than any 
other types of families (Table 9 summarizes the comparison between traditional families 
and all other families). However, for current health status, children raised in single-father 
families have the highest mean value (4.397), while children in married two-parent 
families have an average score of 4.391, and the difference is statistically significant ( t = 
7.62).
Second, comparisons are made within single-parent families, within married 
stepfamilies and within cohabiting stepfamilies to investigate how child outcomes differ 
contingent on parent gender (comparison results are presented in Table 10). Within 
single-parent families, children in single-mother families fare worse in terms of all five 
outcomes investigated in the current study than children in single-father families. The 
differences in child outcomes may not be surprising as substantial differences in 
economic resources and inputs within single-parent families exist. In general, Table 3
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suggests that single-mother families have fewer economic resources and fewer inputs 
than single-father families do, with only two exceptions: children from single-mother 
families are more likely to have a usual source for health care and are more likely to 
receive well-child care than children from single-father families. The difference in child 
health outcomes and health related inputs, such as having a usual source of care and 
receiving well-child care, could also be due to selection. In other words, sick children 
might be more likely to be living with their biological single mothers than living with 
their biological single fathers.
When comparisons are made within married stepfamilies, children in married 
stepfather families fare better in terms of current health status, school engagement, and 
behavioral outcomes. Regarding economic resources, married stepfather families have 
fewer economic resources than married stepmother families do. But married stepfather 
families have more developmental inputs than married stepmother families do, such as 
school stability, taking after-school lessons, being on a sports team and having a lower 
parent aggravation scale.
When it comes to comparisons within cohabiting stepfamilies, children in 
cohabiting stepfather families perform worse than their peers from cohabiting stepmother 
families for all outcomes examined except for the behavioral problem index for 12-17 
year olds. Cohabiting stepfather families also tend to have fewer economic resources. 
With respect to inputs, cohabiting stepfather families have much fewer inputs than 
cohabiting stepmother families as well, with a few exceptions: their children have more 
dental visits, have usual source of care and are more likely to receive well-child care.
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Therefore, the simple statistical comparisons reveal that children living in single 
mother and cohabiting stepfather families tend to fare worse and their families tend to 
have fewer economic resources and have fewer inputs than their peers from single father 
and cohabiting stepmother families respectively. However, children from married 
stepfather families tend to have better outcomes than their peers from married stepmother 
families although their families tend to have fewer economic resources and have no 
obvious advantage over married stepmother families.
The third set of comparisons is to compare single-mother families, cohabiting 
stepfather families and married stepfather families to gauge the impact of having a male 
present in the household, who is not biologically related to the child, on child outcomes 
as well as on the levels of the inputs invested to produce such outcomes. (Table 11 
summarizes the differences between these three family structures.) It is an informative 
exercise because such comparisons can be used to evaluate whether the relationship 
constructed on the basis of marriage is equivalent to the relationship formed upon 
cohabitation in terms of producing desirable child outcomes. Table 3 shows that children 
living in married stepfather families have the best outcomes, while children in cohabiting 
stepfather families fare worse than children in single-mother families with respect to all 
outcomes except for current health status. Regarding economic resources and inputs, 
married stepfather families have more economic resources and inputs than the other two 
alternative family types. Single-mother families have a higher level of investment than 
cohabiting stepfather families do for many health inputs and for all developmental inputs 
investigated in the current study.
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These comparisons seem to suggest that living in married stepfather families or 
in single-father families might be linked to more desirable child outcomes than living in 
cohabiting stepfather families. But can such differences in child outcomes be attributed to 
the differences in economic resources and inputs? It is interesting to see that simple 
descriptive statistics suggest that a cohabiting stepfather is associated with worse child 
outcomes than being absent. Differences in economic resources and inputs between these 
types of families also highlight the need to control for economic resources and inputs in 
order to get incisive comparisons among these family structures.
Parallel, simple comparisons are also made among single father, cohabiting 
stepmother families and married stepmother families. (Table 12 summarizes the results of 
these comparisons.) It turns out that children from single-father households in general 
have the highest school engagement level, best current health status, and lowest 
frequency of morbidity and lowest level of behavior problems (both 6-11 and 12-17 age 
groups). No clear pattern emerges when comparing economic resources and inputs.
Single fathers seem to invest more in developmental resources such as taking after-school 
lessons, MKAs have lower parental aggravation, and the households have higher school 
stability than the other two family types. It is surprising that children from single-father 
families, which do not seem to have the most economic resources and inputs among the 
three family types, tend to fare best in general. The presence of a stepmother, no matter in 
the form of marriage or cohabitation, is not associated with better child outcomes than 
being absent. Again, we need to control for both economic resources and inputs in order 
to gauge to what extent such differences in child outcomes are due to differences in 
economic resources and inputs, and to what extent these differences in child outcomes are
-75 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
associated purely with particular family structures. In addition, these comparisons are 
hindered by the smaller number of observations for these household types.
Finally, grandparent families are compared with other non-parental families.
Table 13 outlines the differences between these two family types. Children in 
grandparent families are less likely to have health conditions that limit children’s 
activities, are more likely to have a higher school engagement scale and to have fewer 
behavioral problems for children aged 12-17. Grandparent households tend to have fewer 
economic resources but have more health and developmental inputs than other non- 
parental families do. However, grandparent caregivers tend to have higher aggravation 
and lower mental health than other non-parental caregivers. This corroborates what is 
found in the grandparent literature that grandparents in the skipped generation households 
tend to live isolated and stressful lives.
5.1.2 Stratifying the Sample by Race and Gender. Now we examine how the 
distribution of family structures and child outcomes may differ across race and child 
gender. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics by stratifying the sample across 
race/ethnicity. The relative prevalence of different family structures varies considerably 
across race/ethnicity. It shows that the single-mother family is the most typical family 
structure among non-Hispanic blacks, and the grandparent family is also common among 
non-Hispanic blacks when compared to other racial and ethnic groups. Single-father 
families are highly concentrated in the non-Hispanic white group. Except for non- 
Hispanic blacks, married two-parent families are still the dominant family structure. 
Hispanics have the highest percentage of cohabiting two-parent families among all racial 
groups (2.8 percent).
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Child outcomes also differ by race and ethnicity (refer to Table 4). Non-Hispanic 
black children have the highest percentage of morbidity, highest level of behavior 
problems (for both age groups of 6-11 and 12-17 years old) and have the lowest level of 
school engagement (although the school engagement scores between non-Hispanic black 
and Hispanic children are not statistically different). In contrast, non-Hispanic white 
children have the highest level of school engagement, lowest level of behavior problems 
for age group 6-11, and highest level of current health status. Hispanic children are 
reported to have the lowest level of current health status and most likely to report health 
status has deteriorated in the past 12 months. Children in the “Other” racial/ethic groups, 
which includes all races/ethnicities except Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks and non- 
Hispanic whites, have the lowest occurrence of morbidity, lowest probability of having 
deteriorated health status and lowest level of behavior problems for age group 12-17. A 
similar pattern of differences is also found for inputs. Generally speaking, non-Hispanic 
whites and other racial/ethnic group have more economic resources and inputs than non- 
Hispanic blacks and Hispanics. In particular, Hispanics tends to have the least health 
inputs such as health insurance, dental visits, a usual source for health care and well-child 
care visits, and least developmental inputs such as taking after-school lessons and being 
on a sports team. In contrast, non-Hispanic whites have the highest level of inputs such 
as health insurance, dental visits, usual source for health care, the highest frequency of 
school stability and being on a sports team, the lowest level of food insecurity and the 
lowest percentage of no phone service.
When it comes to gender, girls are more likely to live with single mothers than 
live with single fathers. Conditional upon living with a single parent, a greater fraction of
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boys live with a single father compared to girls. This can be verified from Table 5. 
Differences in child outcomes are quite pronounced by gender. Girls have better 
outcomes across all measures used in this study. However, differences in inputs are not 
as conspicuous and consistent as differences in outcomes by gender. For example, girls 
are found to have higher levels of inputs such as number of dental visits, staying in the 
same school last year, taking lessons after school and lower probability of food 
insecurity, the MKA having lower level of aggravation and a higher level of mental 
health scale. In contrast, boys tend to have more inputs in terms o f having health 
insurance, having a usual source for health care and being on a sports team last year than 
girls do. All the aforementioned differences in means are statistically significant.
Therefore, there are differences in child outcomes by race as well as by gender. 
Next we will also control for economic resources and inputs to examine whether the 
association between family structure and child outcomes differs by race and by gender. 
We will also investigate how inputs are linked to different family structures contingent on 
race and gender. In doing so, we can explore whether (1) racial and gender differences 
observed in child outcomes across family structures can be explained by controlling for 
differences in resources, and (2) different types of families may allocate resources 
differently depending on race and child gender. If so, then channeling more resources 
and/or changing the way resources are utilized for the less advantaged children could be 
an effective solution to eliminate or reduce racial and gender disparities in child 
outcomes.
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5.2 Regression Results
Results presented for outcome equations are estimated by ordered probit models 
and probit models (for dichotomous variables). Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is also 
applied to each o f the outcome equations and the results are similar. Because four out of 
six outcomes are measured with indexes, for which 5 to 6 is not necessarily the same as 6 
to 7, ordered probit models are more appropriate for these variables than OLS models.
We present only Tables 6-9 as examples of a typical regression model due to space 
limitation. Given the large number o f results, we instead report summaries of the four 
major comparisons outlined above in Tables 14-18 for the entire sample, Tables 19-23 
and Tables 24-28 are for the sample stratified by race and gender, respectively.
5.2.1. Full sample. When reporting the regression results, we repeat the same 
comparisons as we present the descriptive results. The results obtained from regressions 
are more informative as we now control for child, the MKA and family characteristics as 
well as control for economic resources and inputs. To keep the discussion focused we 
again emphasize four main comparisons. We first make comparisons between traditional 
and all other types of families to investigate how children from traditional families fare 
compared to other types of families (comparison results are summarized in Table 14). We 
then make comparisons within single-parent families, within married stepparent families 
and within cohabiting stepfamilies to study how parent gender may influence child 
outcomes (comparison results are tabulated in Table 15). Next, in order to see how the 
presence of a stepparent may affect child outcomes, we make comparisons between 
single mother, married stepfather and cohabiting stepfather families as well as between
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single father, married stepmother and cohabiting stepmother families (results from such 
comparisons are reported in Table 16 and Table 17 respectively). Finally, comparisons 
are made between grandparent families and other non-parental families to investigate 
whether living with grandparent(s) is associated with more desirable outcomes for 
children than other non-parental alternatives when living with their parent(s) is not 
possible (comparison results are listed in Table 18).
1) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Families
Generally speaking, results generated from regressions are similar to results 
obtained from simple descriptive statistics. Children from married two-parent families 
have better outcomes than children from all other family types, by and large. This is 
especially true for outcomes such as current health status, school engagement and 
behavioral outcomes. Adding economic resources only mitigates the adverse effect of 
poverty associated with cohabiting two-parent families with respect to children’s current 
health status. Once inputs are controlled for, the negative effect o f living with cohabiting 
two-parent families is eliminated for children in those families regarding school and 
behavioral outcomes.
It is notable that children living with single fathers have better health status and 
are less likely to report that their health status is getting worse in the past 12 months after 
inputs are controlled for, which are similar to the descriptive statistics comparisons. 
Children’s morbidity is associated with certain types of family structure. Again, moving 
from model A to model B reduces the magnitude of the coefficients but in general does 
not change the sign or significance of the coefficients, which suggests that the effect of 
adding economic resources is mitigating but not eliminating the differences. When inputs
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are added in addition to controlling for economic resources, coefficients on married 
stepfather, single mother and cohabiting stepfather families retain their statistical 
significance, which suggests that the causation could also go the other way: children with 
morbidity are more likely to live with a biological mother after some family transition. 
Therefore, we observe that children in these three family types are more likely to have 
morbidity. In addition, estimates on inputs such as having health insurance and received 
well-child care are positive, which also suggests self-selection and possible adverse 
selection. On one hand, if children in these families are healthy and do not have those 
health conditions that limit their normal activities, then obtaining health insurance and 
receiving well-child care should help to produce better health outcomes. On the other 
hand, if sick children tend to live with their biological mother such as living in single­
mother, cohabiting stepfather and married stepfather families (self-selection), they may 
have more health care needs, and we observe they are more likely to have health 
insurance and more likely to seek well-child care (adverse selection).
As for school engagement, children living outside married two-parent families are 
less engaged in school than their peers from married two-parent families, as shown in 
Table 9. Again, economic resources and inputs mediate but do not eliminate the adverse 
effect associated with other family structures except for cohabiting two-parent families. 
Once both economic resources and inputs are controlled for, children living in such 
families are not statistically different from their counterparts in married two-parent 
families. In terms of magnitude, children from other non-parental families, cohabiting 
stepmother families and married stepmother families tend to have less desirable outcomes
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than others; single-mother families tend to be associated with better child outcomes than 
most other non-traditional families.
An overview of regression results for input equations yields the following 
synthesis:
• The raw statistics results show that some families may have more inputs than 
married two-parent families. But almost none is associated with better child 
outcomes than married two-parent families once the basic child, MKA and 
family characteristics are controlled for (the only exception is well-child care 
for grandparent families). By and large, further controlling for economic 
resources reduces the negative effect associated with non-traditional families 
in determining input levels except for MKA aggravation. Moving from Model 
A to Model B  does not mitigate the aggravation level at all: the coefficients are 
almost the same. Therefore parenting is more difficult for non-traditional 
families, and the difficulty can not be reduced or eliminated by increasing 
economic resources.
• Many observed disadvantages in inputs associated with grandparent families 
and single-mother families compared to married two-parent families, 
especially health inputs, can be explained by the difference in economic 
resources.
• In contrast, controlling for economic resources has little or no impact on 
stepfamilies, both married and cohabiting.
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2) Gender o f  the Biological Parent in Single Parent and Stepparent Families
Similar to the descriptive statistics comparisons, children living in single-mother 
families tend to have worse health outcomes across all three health measures than 
children living in single-father families. However, the adverse effects on school 
engagement and behavioral outcomes associated with living with single mothers 
disappear. Once inputs are controlled for, living with a single mother is associated with 
less behavioral problems for 12-17 year-old children than living with a single father. 
Single-mother families also tend to have more health-related inputs but have less parental 
resources than single fathers do. Therefore the results suggest that adverse selection may 
contribute to the adverse health outcomes associated with living in single-mother 
households. In addition, fewer economic resources and a lower level o f inputs might 
explain the disparity in child school and behavioral outcomes between single mother and 
single-father households. The receipt of lesser inputs by children from single-mother 
families could be due to fewer economic resources available to single-mother families. 
Once basic demographic characteristics and economic resources are controlled for, 
single-mother families tend to have more or no less inputs than single-father families do 
with a few exceptions such as parental resources: single mothers still tend to have more 
aggravation and lower mental health score.
Within married stepfamilies, in contrast to descriptive results, children from both 
types of families appear to have similar outcomes except for compared health status: 
children from married stepmother families are still less likely to have deterioration in 
their health status in the past 12 months. In addition, married stepmother families tend to
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have more inputs regarding food security, having phone service in the household, being 
on a sports team and their MKA having better mental health. There are no statistical 
differences between the two types of stepparent families regarding other inputs.
Within cohabiting stepparent families, similarly, children in cohabiting 
stepmother families are also less likely to report deterioration in their health status in the 
past 12 months. Otherwise, children from both types of families appear to have similar 
outcomes. Regarding inputs, cohabiting stepmother families seem to have more inputs 
than cohabiting stepfather families except for dental visits and having a usual source of 
care. These two additional comparisons provide further evidence that children with 
significant health conditions are less likely to reside with their biological fathers.
3) The Presence o f  a Stepparent
First, comparing single-mother families with cohabiting stepfather families reveals 
that children from the two family types have similar outcomes, especially after 
controlling for inputs: there are no statistical differences between the two family 
structures. Regarding inputs, these two family types are also similar with a few 
exceptions: single-mother families tend to have more health inputs than cohabiting 
stepfather families do, which is similar to the descriptive comparisons.
Next, when comparing single-mother families to married stepfather families, the 
results are mixed. But once inputs are controlled for, children from both types of families 
exhibit similar outcomes. Not surprisingly, married stepfather families tend to have more 
inputs than single-mother families in general.
Finally, between married and cohabiting stepfather families, children living in 
married stepfather families are associated with better outcomes than children living in
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cohabiting stepfather families for all measures examined except for compared health 
status. But once inputs are controlled for such distinctions are no longer statistically 
significant. Married stepfather families also tend to have more inputs than cohabiting 
stepfather families such as health insurance, food security, after-school lessons, sports, 
and parental resources, even after economic resources are controlled for. Hence, the 
differences in child outcomes associated with living in married and cohabiting stepfather 
families seem to be explained by differences in inputs. The findings regarding differences 
in inputs between these two types of families reinforce such a conclusion.
Examining the presence of a stepmother in a parallel way reveals several findings. 
First, there are no statistically significant differences between living in single-father 
families and living in cohabiting stepmother families regarding child outcomes examined, 
and there are very few differences regarding the receipt of inputs.
When comparing single-father families with married stepmother families, in 
contrast to the descriptive comparisons, children from both types of families have similar 
outcomes except for current health status: children from single-father families have better 
current health status than their peers from married stepmother families, which could 
again be due to selection. Examining the level of inputs indicates that children from 
married stepmother families tend to receive more health related inputs than children from 
single-father families. This evidence also supports the selection hypothesis.
Comparing married stepmother families to cohabiting stepmother families 
demonstrates no statistical difference in all outcomes investigated between children living 
in these two types of families although there is some evidence that married stepmother
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families tend to have more health inputs such as having dental visits and having a usual 
source for care.
4) Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families
Many differences between grandparents and other non-parental households 
disappear in a regression framework, and for those that remain, the results are the same as 
simple descriptive comparisons. For instance, grandparents and other non-parental 
families have similar results for most child outcomes examined except for morbidity and 
current health status. On one hand, children living in grandparent households are 
associated with a lower possibility of morbidity than children living in other non-parental 
families, after controlling for economic resources and inputs. On the other hand, children 
living in other non-parental families tend to have better current health status, but this 
distinction vanishes after economic resources and inputs are controlled for. With respect 
to inputs, grandparent households tend to have more health inputs after economic 
resources are controlled for, such as having insurance and having a usual source of health 
care. This could be due to the availability of Medicaid or SCHIP programs. Children in 
grandparent households are also more likely to be on a sports team, but grandparents 
have lower mental health scores than other non-parental MKAs. In contrast to descriptive 
comparisons, children from grandparent families are more likely to experience food 
insecurity and are less likely to take after-school lessons, which could be due to a lack of 
economic resources: after economic resources are controlling for, these two types of 
families have similar results with respect to both inputs.
To sum up, some regression results reinforce those obtained from simple 
descriptive statistics comparisons and others do not. Results from regression analyses
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help us not only better understand the existence of differences in child outcomes and 
inputs associated with different family structures, but also help us better understand 
where these differences come from. Again, traditional families are associated with better 
child outcomes and more inputs than most non-traditional families. Within non- 
traditional families, living with the biological father is associated with better health 
outcomes than living with the biological mother. The results also suggest that living in 
married stepfather families is usually associated with better child outcomes than living 
with single mothers. In contrast, children living in cohabiting stepfather families fare no 
better than those living in single-mother families. Economic resources and inputs 
contribute to the differences observed in child outcomes associated with family 
structures: once they are controlled for, non-traditional families are usually less different 
from each other and less different from traditional families as well.
5.2.2. Stratifying the whole sample by race/ethnicitv. Space limitations dictate that 
for outcomes equations, we only estimate model 2b) and 2c) when stratifying the sample 
by race/ethnicity as well as by gender. There is one caveat before going on to discuss the 
results: because non-Hispanic whites are the dominant majority, attempts were made to 
draw a random sample from this group so that its sample size is comparable to the 
Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks. However, estimates from sample to sample vary 
substantially, with including more non-traditional families yielding more similar 
estimates to the results obtained from the entire non-Hispanic whites sample. This may be 
due to the fact that although non-Hispanic whites dominate in absolute number of 
observations, non-traditional families are relatively rare among this group. Given the 
volatile nature of estimates from random sample to random sample, the full sample of
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non-Hispanic whites is retained for stratifying estimation by race/ethnicity. As in the 
previous section that discusses the results for the full sample, here we will also focus on 
the four major comparisons among different family structures.
1) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Families
Generally speaking, the differences in child outcomes associated with living in 
non-traditional families and living in traditional families are biggest for non-Hispanic 
whites, and smallest for Hispanics (refer to Table 19). The same pattern follows 
regarding inputs.
It is notable that living with single fathers is associated with better current health 
status than living in traditional families only for Hispanic children, not for children from 
other racial groups. For compared health status, living with a single father is associated 
with a less likely deterioration in health status only for Hispanic and non-Hispanic white 
children, but not for non-Hispanic black children.
2) Gender o f the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent Families
There are racial differences associated with single-parent families with respect to 
child developmental outcomes but not so much with respect to health outcomes, as shown 
in Table 20. For instance, in contrast to the results for the full sample, 12-17 year old 
Hispanic children living with single fathers tend to have fewer behavioral problems than 
their peers living with single mothers; but for 12-17 year old non-Hispanic black 
children, living with single mothers is not statistically different from living with single 
fathers regarding behavioral problems. There are also racial differences regarding certain 
inputs between single-parent households. Non-Hispanic black children living with single
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mothers tend to receive more health inputs than living with single fathers, which is 
similar to the results obtained from the full sample.
Between the two types of married stepparent families, fewer differences exist 
between these two types of families within each racial group and relatively less 
dissimilarity is found across different racial groups. Although it is hard to detect any 
patterns, generally speaking, stepmother families and stepfather families vary least for 
non-Hispanic black children but vary most for non-Hispanic white children regarding 
both outcomes and inputs.
Comparing cohabiting stepfather with cohabiting stepmother families, the 
distinction between these two family structures is negligible for Hispanics and non- 
Hispanic blacks but is significant for non-Hispanic whites, particularly regarding inputs.
Once all three pairs of comparisons are taken into account, it is noticeable that 
there are no differences in children’s morbidity between the two types of single-parent 
families as well as between the two types of cohabiting stepparent families for non- 
Hispanic whites, but such distinctions exist for both non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics.
If the selection hypothesis we proposed earlier is true, then this finding suggests that such 
selection primarily exists for certain non-Hispanic black and Hispanic households. 
Another observation is about 6-11 year old non-Hispanic white children. It seems that if 
there is a stepparent present, no matter in the form of marriage or cohabitation, then the 
company of a biological mother is associated with better behavioral outcomes than that of 
a biological father. This pertains to neither non-Hispanic blacks nor Hispanics.
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3) The Presence o f  a Stepparent
Between single-mother families and cohabiting stepfather families, once inputs 
are controlled for, there is no distinction for non-Hispanic blacks with respect to all child 
outcomes (see Table 21), which is the same as for the full sample. For Hispanics, 
however, living in cohabiting stepfather families are associated with better health 
outcomes than living in single-mother families.
Comparing single-mother families with married stepfather families shows that 
non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics have similar results to those obtained for the full 
sample, but the results are different for non-Hispanic blacks. For instance, after inputs are 
controlled for, living with single mothers is associated with higher school engagement 
than living in married stepfather families for non-Hispanic black children. With respect to 
inputs, once economic resources are controlled for, living in married stepfather families 
tends to have more inputs than living in single-mother families for Hispanics and non- 
Hispanic whites, which is similar to the whole sample results. But the inputs level 
between single mother and married stepmother families are less different for non- 
Hispanic blacks than for the other two racial groups.
When comparing cohabiting stepfather with married stepfather families, the 
distinction between these two family structures are greatest for non-Hispanic whites, 
which is similar to the full sample results. In contrast, for Hispanics, these two family 
structures are similar except that living in cohabiting stepfather families is associated 
with lower likelihood of experiencing deterioration in health status.
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Therefore, the results suggest that single-mother families are associated with child 
outcomes that are better than or similar to those of married or cohabiting stepfather 
families for non-Hispanic blacks. This finding is of interest given the prevalence of 
single-mother families within this racial group. Married and cohabiting stepfather 
families are very similar to each other for both Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks.
Comparing single-father and cohabiting stepmother families, the two living 
arrangements are not statistically different with respect to child outcomes for non- 
Hispanic black children, which is similar to the comparison results obtained from full 
sample comparisons (refer to Table 22). However, for Hispanic children, living with 
cohabiting stepmother families is associated with lower likelihood of morbidity than 
living with single-father families. When it comes to inputs, these two family structures do 
not make any difference for Hispanics regarding all inputs considered, but they differ 
regarding some inputs for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites.
Comparing single-father families with married stepmother families reveals some 
racial differences in child outcomes associated with living in these two family structures. 
In contrast to the results for the full sample, living in married stepmother families seems 
to be associated with better current health status than living with single fathers for non- 
Hispanic white children. However, no differences in current health status associated with 
these two living arrangements are found for children from the other two racial groups.
No differences exist between living in cohabiting stepmother and living with 
married stepmother families regarding all child outcomes examined, which is similar to 
the full sample comparisons with one exception for non-Hispanic black children. It is 
found that non-Hispanic black children living in cohabiting stepmother families tend to
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have lower probability of morbidity than those living in married stepmother families. The 
causality could go the other way: a biological father with a child having serious health 
problems may be less likely to find a partner and get married again. Few differences 
between living with married stepmother and cohabiting stepmother families are found for 
all racial groups regarding inputs.
There is one caveat about this comparison as well as any comparison involving 
cohabiting stepmother families: the small number o f cohabiting stepmother families in 
the sample suggests that the estimates are not as accurate as for other household types, 
especially after stratifying the sample by race. Therefore we are hesitant to give any 
further interpretation or conclusion based on such results.
4) Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families
Stratified results show that living in grandparent families is occasionally 
associated with better child outcomes for different racial groups than living in other non- 
parental families (see Table 23), but that the improvements involve different kinds of 
outcomes. For example, children living in grandparent households tend to have lower 
likelihood of morbidity than children living in other non-parental households for non- 
Hispanic blacks, which is the same as that for the full sample, but this finding is no 
longer relevant to either non-Hispanic whites or Hispanics. In contrast, living in 
grandparent households is associated with fewer behavioral problems than living in other 
non-parental households for 6-11 year old Hispanic children as well as for 12-17 year old 
non-Hispanic white children.
In terms of inputs, both non-Hispanic black and Hispanic grandparents are more 
likely to have a usual source of care than other non-parental caregivers do, which is the
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same as the result for the full sample. However, no such difference exists between 
grandparent and other non-parental households for non-Hispanic whites. For all other 
inputs, the two living arrangements are similar to each other for both non-Hispanic blacks 
and Hispanics. The results regarding other input differentials obtained from full sample 
comparisons apply only to non-Hispanic whites.
Prior research in sociology, psychology, social work and education has found that 
parenting practices and cultural norms of parenting behaviors vary considerably across 
race and ethnic groups. We stratify the sample to see whether there is disparity in child 
outcomes associated with living in different family structures. The results show that the 
differences in child outcomes associated with living in non-traditional families and living 
in traditional families are greatest for non-Hispanic whites, and smallest for Hispanics. 
Within non-traditional families, if the selection theory we proposed is true, then the 
findings suggest that healthy children are more likely to reside in a biological father 
headed household for Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks, but not necessarily for non- 
Hispanic whites. Moreover, given the prevalence of single-mother families within non- 
Hispanic blacks, it is interesting to see that single-mother families are associated with 
child outcomes that are better than or similar to those of married or cohabiting stepfather 
families for non-Hispanic black children. Finally, despite the large literature from other 
disciplines that describes the differences in grandparent households across racial groups, 
our stratified results show less dissimilarities across race.
5.2.3. Stratifying the whole sample by sender. Here we again focus on the four 
types of comparisons to investigate how the results may differ contingent on the child 
gender, reported in Tables 24-28.
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1) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Families
Although no obvious pattern arises for the outcome equations, boys’ outcomes are 
generally more adversely associated with living outside married two-parent families 
compared to living in married two-parent families than girls are, with a few exceptions 
(refer to Table 24). It is noteworthy that with respect to current health status and 
compared health status, boys living with single fathers tend to have better current health 
status and lower likelihood of health status getting worse in the past 12 months than their 
peers living in traditional families, which is similar to the full sample comparison results. 
However, such a distinction does not exist for girls. If selection into single-father families 
exists, then these findings suggest that selection pertains particularly to boys but not for 
girls: healthy boys are more likely than healthy girls to be living with single fathers.
2) Gender o f the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent Families
First, comparisons are made between single-parent households (see Table 25). 
For girls, there are no differences between living with single fathers and living with 
single mothers regarding all outcomes examined. In contrast, for boys, generally 
speaking, living with single fathers is associated with better outcomes than living with 
single mothers except for 12-17 year old behavioral outcomes. Differences in inputs also 
exist between these two living arrangements when comparing boys with girls. For 
example, boys living with single mothers tend to receive more health inputs such as 
dental visits and well-child care visits than boys living with single fathers. In contrast, we 
do not find such a distinction for girls. These findings together could suggest selection 
depending on the child’s health: healthy boys are more likely to live with single fathers
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than to live with single mothers; single mothers tend to take care of less healthy boys and 
therefore are more likely to invest more health-related inputs for those boys.
When comparing married stepmother to married stepfather families, girls living 
with married stepfather families are more school engaged than those living with married 
stepmother families. For boys, once inputs are controlled for, living in married stepfather 
families is associated with fewer behavioral problems (12-17 year old only) than living in 
stepmother families.
There are no gender differences in boys’ and girls’ outcomes between living in 
cohabiting stepmother and living in cohabiting stepfather families. However, gender 
differences exist with respect to inputs: by and large, girls living in cohabiting stepmother 
families tend to receive more inputs than living in cohabiting stepfather families, which 
does not pertain to boys.
Overall, adolescent boys living in single-mother families tend to have fewer 
behavioral problems than their counterparts living in single-father families, and 
adolescent boys living in married stepfather families are associated with fewer behavioral 
problems than their counterparts living in married stepmother families. These results 
seem suggesting that the presence of the biological mother is associated with better 
behavioral outcomes than the presence of the biological father for adolescent boys.
Again, this could be due to reverse causality; adolescent boys with behavioral problems 
may be more likely to live with their fathers.
3) The Presence o f  a Stepparent
Again, we first make comparisons between single-mother families and cohabiting 
stepfather families. The results obtained from the full sample do not apply equally to
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boys and girls. Living in single-mother families vs. living in cohabiting stepfather 
families are not statistically different from each other for girls with respect to all 
outcomes, but girls living in single-mother families tend to receive more inputs than girls 
living in cohabiting stepfather families. In contrast, boys living in single-mother families 
tend to have better outcomes such as higher school engagement and lower probability of 
morbidity than living in cohabiting stepfather families. Therefore, adding a cohabiting 
stepfather is not associated with better outcomes for girls, and it is associated with worse 
outcomes for boys.
Second, single-mother families are compared with married stepfather families, 
and subtle differences by gender again appear. The comparison shows that living in 
married stepfather families is associated with better child outcomes such as current health 
status and behavioral outcomes for 12-17 year-old girls than living in single-mother 
families. But such differences could be explained by differences in inputs, as girls from 
married stepfather families receive more inputs than girls from single-mother families. 
Once inputs are controlled for, the two family structures are no longer statistically 
different from each other for girls. In contrast, for boys, once inputs are controlled for, 
boys from single-mother families tend to be more school engaged and have fewer 
behavioral problems (12-17 years old) than boys from married stepfather families do. 
Again, adding a married stepfather is not associated with better child outcomes for boys, 
at least once inputs are controlled for.
Third, comparing cohabiting stepfather families with married stepfather families 
shows that married stepfather families are associated with fewer behavioral problems for 
12-17 year old girls than living with cohabiting stepfather families, which could be
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explained by differences in inputs between those two types of families (see Table 26). In 
contrast, these two family structures are not statistically different from each other with 
respect to all outcomes considered for boys. To sum up, for girls, having a married 
stepfather in the household is associated with better child outcomes than without a 
stepfather, probably by improving the inputs available to the household. For boys, 
single-mother families are associated with better school and behavioral outcomes than 
married and cohabiting stepfather families, although adding a male role into the 
household also improves the level of inputs for boys such as lower probability of food 
insecurity and higher likelihood of sports participation. However, the results show that 
boys from both married stepfather families and single-mother families tend to receive 
more well-child care than boys from cohabiting stepfather families. Between married 
stepfather and cohabiting stepfather families, girls living in married stepfather families 
fare better than those living in cohabiting stepfather families. In contrast, comparisons 
between these two family types show no difference in boys’ outcomes.
Turning now to the presence of a stepmother, we compare single-father and 
cohabiting stepmother families. Boys living in single-father families tend to have better 
outcomes, such as being more school engaged (which could be due to differences in 
inputs) and better health status, than boys living in cohabiting stepmother families 
(comparison results are summarized in Table 27). In contrast, these two family structures 
are associated with statistically similar outcomes for girls, which is the same as the 
results from the full sample comparisons. Next, in contrast to the results of full sample 
comparisons between single-father families and married stepmother families, boys living 
in single-father families tend to have better health and behavioral outcomes than those
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living in married stepmother families. Again, no such distinction regarding any child 
outcome investigated exists for girls between these two types o f families.
Finally, comparing married stepmother families to cohabiting stepmother families 
shows no differences between these two family structures for either boys or girls 
regarding outcomes, which is the same as the result from full sample comparisons. 
However, boys from married stepmother families tend to receive more of certain inputs 
than those from cohabiting stepmother families do.
Therefore, the presence of a stepmother, no matter through formal marriage or 
informal cohabitation, is associated with no statistically significant differences for girls 
with respect to child outcomes investigated by the current study. For boys, the presence 
of a stepmother, including both cohabiting and married (which are essentially similar to 
each other) is associated with worse child outcomes than simply living with their single 
fathers. This combined with the results for the presence of a stepfather suggests that 
boys’ outcomes are more strongly associated (negatively) with the presence o f a 
stepparent of either gender.
4) Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families
Again, unlike the results from the full sample comparisons, living in grandparent 
families is not statistically different from living in other non-parental families for girls 
(summarized in Table 28). However, for boys, in addition to the results shown by the full 
sample comparisons, boys living with grandparents have better other outcomes, such as 
higher school engagement and fewer behavioral problems (12-17 years old), than boys 
living in other non-parental families. Regarding inputs, girls from grandparent
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households receive more inputs than their peers from other non-parental households. In 
contrast, for boys the results are mixed.
Hence, these findings add further evidence to literature reviewed earlier that 
documents gender differences in child outcomes. Generally speaking, boys have more 
adverse outcomes when living outside married two-parent families than girls do. Within 
non-traditional families, boys living with single fathers are associated with better school 
and health outcomes than living with single mothers. If selection of healthy children into 
single-father families exists, then our findings suggest that such selection pertains 
particularly to boys and not to girls. However, we find that adolescent boys from single­
mother families tend to have fewer behavioral problems than their counterparts from 
single-father families, and adolescent boys from married stepfather families are 
associated with fewer behavioral problems than their counterparts from married 
stepmother families. These findings seem to suggest that the presence o f the biological 
mother is associated with better behavioral outcomes than the presence of the biological 
father for adolescent boys.
As for adding a male role into a single-mother family, having a married stepfather 
in the household is associated with better child outcomes than without a stepfather for 
girls, probably by improving the inputs available to the household. Nevertheless, for 
boys, single-mother families are associated with better school and behavioral outcomes 
than both married and cohabiting stepfather families, although adding a male role into the 
household also improves the level of certain inputs. By the same token, adding a female 
role into a single-father family, no matter through formal marriage or informal 
cohabitation, makes no difference for girls’ outcomes. In contrast, for boys, the presence
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of a stepmother, including both cohabiting and married, is associated with worse child 
outcomes than simply living with their single fathers.
Overall, these results suggest that the outcomes for boys are much more strongly 
associated with the specific composition of a nontraditional household -  e.g., whether 
there is a stepparent present, whether they live with their biological mother or father, or 
whether they live with their grandparents as opposed to living in some other nonparent 
household. Whether these differences are due to differing causal effects or 
selection/endogeneity mechanisms remains to be seen.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
A rise in the U.S. child poverty rate took place over the same period as an 
increase in divorce rates, an increased rate of single-mother families and other dramatic 
changes to family structure. In this paper, we have examined family structure’s effect on 
child outcomes by controlling for income and education level as well as controlling for 
some inputs’ levels. This analysis is conducted in a theoretical framework that assumes 
parents or caregivers are concerned about the welfare of their children and try to produce 
children’s well-being so as to maximize their own utility. Children’s well-being is 
therefore determined by the interaction of this utility-maximizing behavior with 
investment and consumption opportunities in different family environments subject to 
budget and time constraints. This paper is the first that consolidates data on children and 
their families into a single study and presents a broad picture of different family 
structures in relation to several measures of child well-being.
Given the limited information available in the data sets and the problems 
encountered such as the window problem and the endogeneity o f family structure, it is 
hard for us to draw causal conclusions. Our goal is therefore to introduce some potential 
mechanisms that may help explain why children bom into some types of families fare 
worse than others. Given the difficulty of drawing causal inferences, we proceed in two 
ways. Using data from the NSAF, we first present reduced form models that reveal the
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associations between child outcomes and family environments including family 
structures. We then present more speculative estimates of the pathways through which 
family structure and other family resources affect child health and developmental 
outcomes by adding inputs to the models as well as by stratifying the sample by gender 
and by race. This can help to attribute causal effects to different pathways.
The questions raised in the introduction about the effects o f family background on 
child development outcomes are difficult to answer for several reasons. First, there is the 
question of the long-term effect of family life and economic environments to which 
children are exposed. Second, child development is a complex process, where family 
environment is only one element, though likely quite important, of influencing how 
children learn, grow and develop. Genetic factors, given at birth, vary from child to 
child. The nature o f family life and environment to which children are exposed vary 
substantially even within the same family structure. Third, family structures are often the 
results of selective decisions. It is likely that unobserved personality traits affect both 
parenting skills and marital status. Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that 
child development can affect marital status and adverse child development outcome can 
cause family disruption (Corman and Kaestner 1992). Empirically, it is difficult to 
control for the unobservable selection factors and for unobserved aspects of the home 
environment and parental traits. Despite the aforementioned challenges, some illustrative 
findings are in order.
First, traditional families are associated with better child outcomes than any non- 
traditional families. Children from married two-parent families are doing better than 
those from cohabiting two-parent families regarding all outcomes examined in the current
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study, although differences in observed inputs could explain many of the observed 
differences in child outcomes. This suggests that marriage may be a stronger institution 
for raising children than cohabitation to the extent that it helps increase input levels 
available to children living in the households, when everything else is equal. It also lends 
support to the economic view discussed earlier.
Second, some marriages are not necessarily associated with better child outcomes 
than cohabitation, as the findings suggest that in general cohabiting two-parent families 
are the closest family type to married two-parent families in producing desirable child 
outcomes and are associated with better child outcomes than all other non-traditional 
families including married stepfamilies. Cohabiting two-parent families are also 
associated with better child outcomes than cohabiting stepfamilies. These findings 
support the evolutionary view discussed earlier. Moreover, cohabiting two-biological- 
parent families are also associated with more advantageous child outcomes than single­
parent families. The results support the socialization arguments that two-parent families 
provide more supervision for the children. Nevertheless, cohabiting stepfamilies in many 
cases do not outperform single-parent families. This again supports the evolutionary 
theory.
Third, both parental gender and child gender make a difference. Boys generally 
have more adverse outcomes by living outside married two-parent families than girls do. 
Moreover, their outcomes are more strongly associated with the specific form that the 
nontraditional household takes. Their outcomes differ more depending on whether there 
is a stepparent (married or cohabiting, of either gender), whether they live with their 
biological mother or father, and whether they live with their grandparents as opposed to
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another nonparent caregiver. For example, boys from single-father families enjoy a better 
health status than children from single-mother families. In contrast, boys from single­
father families have worse developmental outcomes than boys from single-mother 
families. For girls, there is no difference between living with a single father or a single 
mother. As discussed earlier in the paper, the evolutionary perspective argues that 
mothers invest more of their resources in children than fathers do and the well-being of a 
given child is of greater interest to the mother than to the father. According to this theory, 
children from two-biological-parent families will have an advantage over those from 
other kinds of families, and children from single-mother families will fare better than 
children from single-father families. The evolutionary theory also predicts that children 
from single-mother families will do better over those from biological mother/stepfather 
families since the stepfather will compete with the stepchildren for the mother’s 
resources. Data from the current study show that boys living with single fathers have 
better current health status than boys living with single mothers, which could not be 
explained by difference in health-related inputs. This could be suggesting that single 
fathers might be more likely to obtain the custody of healthy boys. Similarly, it is 
possible that they are more likely to obtain custody of adolescent boys with behavioral 
problems.
Just as the evolutionary theory predicts, health and school engagement outcomes 
of boys from cohabiting stepmother families are statistically worse than the outcomes of 
boys from single-father families (which could be due to differences in inputs), and 
cohabiting stepfather families are statistically associated with worse school engagement
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outcomes than single-mother families are. All of these results provide evidence 
supporting the evolutionary perspective.
Fourth, race/ethnicity could matter, too. Hispanic children are least affected and 
non-Hispanic white children are most affected by living outside traditional families. 
Hispanic children living in grandparent families do not fare differently from their peers 
living in other non-parental families. In contrast, for non-Hispanic black children, living 
in grandparent families is associated with higher odds of morbidity than living in other 
non-parental families. Non-Hispanic white children living in grandparent families have 
fewer behavioral problems (for children aged 12-17) than those living with non-parental 
families do.
Fifth, as expected, adding inputs helps reduce the unfavorable effect of living in 
non-traditional families, but it does not eliminate them. Therefore, from a policy-maker’s 
point of view, subsidizing these families, especially single-mother families and 
grandparent families, can assist such less advantaged families, but subsidizing alone may 
not solve the problems fundamentally.
This paper therefore paints a fuller picture of the relationship between family 
structure and child outcomes. The results presented here add to our understanding of the 
least common nontraditional households. In particular, they reveal differences in child 
outcomes associated with more subtle differences across nontraditional families such as 
the gender of the biological parent, stepparent and child, the strength of the presence of 
stepparent (absent, cohabiting or married) and the ability to live with one’s grandparents 
as opposed to some other nonparent caregiver. A worthwhile direction for future
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research is to determine if these differences are causal or due to selection mechanisms 
and other unobservable factors.
Last but not least, our study represents the first effort that investigates a complete 
array of family structures and its association with different aspects of child outcomes. 
The empirical results suggest that some family structures are more similar to each other, 
but others are so distinct from the rest of the non-traditional families that they warrant 
individual investigation. For example, as shown in Figure 2, single-father and single­
mother families are so dissimilar in terms o f their association with child outcomes that 
research ignores single-father families completely, or classifying these two family 
structures as one category when studying single-parent households may be misleading. 
Therefore, the current study may inform future research by helping to simplify the 
classification or aggregation o f diverse family structures in an efficient and meaningful 
way.
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Figure 1. The Diversity o f Family Structures
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Table 1. Prevalence of Different Family Structures
Family Structure ( 10 ) N Percentage
Two parents—married 24120 56.4%
Single mother 9101 19.8%
Stepfather—married 3840 8.7%





Two parents—cohabiting 623 1.3%
Stepmother—cohabiting 215 0.5%
Total 43744 100%
N ote: Percentages are calculated by  usin g  w eights.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample)
Outcome Estimate (Std. Err.)
Current health status 4.285 0.008
Health status getting worse 0.023 0.001
Has health condition that limits activity 0.119 0.002
School engagement 12.893 0.027
Behavioral problems (6-11 years old) 7.962 0.027
Behavioral problems (12-17 years old) 8.091 0.033
Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
Age 11.454 0.032
Girl 0.489 0.005
Non-Hispanic White 0.638 0.004
Non-Hispanic Black 0.158 0.004
Hispanic 0.156 0.003
Any other ethnicity 0.047 0.002
MKA's age 39.455 0.058
Number o f  children under five years old 0.335 0.006





MKA has no High School diploma 0.161 0.004
MKA has High School diploma 0.251 0.005
MKA has somecollege education 0.318 0.004
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree 0.271 0.004
MKA is working 0.726 0.004
Family income below 100% FPL 0.146 0.004
100%=<Family income< 200% 0.213 0.004
Family income above 200% FPL 0.641 0.005
Input
Child has health insurance 0.888 0.003
Number o f  dental visits last year 2.022 0.019
Has usual source for health care 0.926 0.002
Child received well care last year 0.592 0.005
Worried whether food would run out 0.256 0.003
Household doesn't have phone 0.029 0.002
Child in the Same School last year 0.822 0.004
Child took lessons after school last year 0.332 0.004
Child on sports team last year 0.536 0.005
MKA aggravation scale score 6.221 0.020
MKA 100 mental health scale 79.517 0.114
Number o f observations 43744
Population size 93699279
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Current health status 4.391 4.279 4.257 4,063 4.397 4.124 4.109 4.360 3.870 4.149
Health status getting worse 0.018 0,028 0.012 0.032 0.010 0.023 0.048 0.006 0.029 0.024
H as health condition that lim its activity 0.091 0.148 0.122 0.161 0.102 0.079 0.196 0,139 0.175 0.213
School Engagement 13.283 12,532 12.166 12,410 12.590 12.720 12.108 12.150 12.328 11.904
Behavioral Problems (6-11 years old) 7.684 8.199 8,264 8.321 8.092 8.029 8.765 8.398 8.909 8.653
Behavioral Problems (12-17 years old) 7.664 8.433 8.655 8.652 8.395 8.509 8.809 8.844 8.482 8.937
Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
Age 11.344 11.953 12.487 11.446 11.508 9.532 11.286 11.223 11.348 12.516
Girl 0.489 0.471 0.469 0.511 0.413 0.487 0.486 0.478 0.508 0.469
Non-Hispanic White 0.732 0.671 0.709 0.408 0.719 0.427 0.572 0.724 0.365 0.463
Non-Hispanic Black 0.069 0.135 0.140 0.369 0.142 0.194 0.176 0.177 0.465 0.330
Hispanic 0,142 0.160 0.117 0.188 0.101 0.336 0.220 0.084 0.164 0.151
Any odier ethnicity 0.057 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.044 0.033 0.016 0.006 0.056
M KA's age 40.227 36.060 37.734 37.797 42.164 35.894 34.845 37.504 56.814 39.002
N um ber o f  children under five years old 0.318 0.470 0.468 0.314 0.113 0.454 0.401 0.382 0.255 0.480
N um ber o f  children 6-17 years old 2.122 2.151 2.428 2.093 1.839 1.970 2.258 2.394 1.951 2.464
Northeast 0.196 0.128 0.125 0.180 0.170 0.212 0.187 0.090 0.150 0.169
W est 0.238 0.222 0.216 0.217 0.274 0.320 0.264 0.270 0.188 0.221
M idwest 0.255 0.233 0.286 0.199 0.206 0.179 0.258 0.227 0.162 0.245
South 0.311 0.417 0.373 0.404 0.351 0.289 0.291 0.413 0.501 0.365
M KA has no High School diploma 0.116 0.164 0.140 0.230 0.155 0.370 0.311 0.152 0.380 0.183
M KA has High School diploma 0.237 0.267 0.294 0.262 0,267 0.278 0.285 0.257 0.216 0.322
M KA has somecollege education 0.299 0.400 0.296 0.351 0.305 0.263 0.303 0.450 0.252 0.308
M KA has a  bachelor's o r higher degree 0.348 0.170 0,271 0.157 0,273 0.089 0.101 0.140 0.152 0.188
M KA is working 0.727 0.713 0.801 0.745 0.842 0.648 0.670 0.905 0.401 0.699
F amily income below  100% FPL 0.071 0.080 0.075 0.376 0.107 0.216 0.169 0.062 0.323 0.188
100% =<Family income< 200% 0.174 0.213 0.153 0.298 0.211 0.338 0.256 0.258 0.259 0.320
Family income above 200%  FPL 0.756 0.707 0.772 0.326 0.682 0.446 0.575 0.680 0.418 0.492
Input
Child has health insurance 0.907 0.885 0.911 0.863 0.873 0.788 0.824 0.917 0.861 0.819
N um ber o f  dental visits last year 2.109 2.118 2.150 1.829 1.964 1.583 1.988 1.389 1.755 1.848
Has usual source for health care 0.944 0.919 0.918 0.900 0.886 0.896 0.908 0.849 0.912 0.858
Child received well care last year 0.586 0.581 0,533 0.623 0.537 0,608 0.573 0,550 0.637 0.635
W orried whether food would run out 0.159 0.267 0.192 0.494 0.201 0.414 0.442 0,202 0.310 0.334
Household doesn't have phone 0.020 0.035 0.007 0.046 0.037 0.038 0.061 0.011 0.041 0.047
Child in the Same School last year 0.860 0.785 0.780 0.771 0.825 0.811 0.744 0.799 0.756 0.713
Child took lessons after school last year 0.371 0.307 0.295 0.279 0.299 0.251 0.232 0.253 0.286 0.250
Child on sports team last year 0.593 0.526 0.471 0.443 0.524 0.368 0.402 0.564 0.474 0.400
M KA aggravation scale score 5.990 6.189 6.215 6.706 5.922 6.347 6.738 6.286 7.005 6.754
M KA 100 mental health scale 81.540 79.129 81.119 74.828 80.439 77.675 73.665 79.727 77.232 79.359
Number o f observations 24120 3840 986 9101 1554 623 1304 215 1049 952
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Current health status 4.435 4.058 3.924 4.210
Health status getting worse 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.018
Has health condition that limits activity 0.115 0.145 0.116 0.089
School Engagement 13.094 12.496 12.499 12.799
Behavioral Problems (6-11 years old) 7.888 8.226 7.979 7.946
Behavioral Problems (12-17 years old) 7.990 8.435 8.277 7.809
Family Structure
Two parents-married 0.647 0.246 0.514 0.680
Stepfather-married 0.091 0.074 0.089 0.063
Stepmother—married 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.018
Single mother 0.126 0.461 0.239 0.147
Single father 0.036 0.029 0.021 0.026
Two parents—cohabiting 0.009 0.016 0.028 0.012
Stepfather—cohabiting 0.027 0.033 0.042 0.021
Stepmother—cohabiting 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.002
Grandparents 0.012 0.059 0.021 0.003
Others 0.018 0.052 0.024 0.030
Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
Age 11.542 11.333 11.222 11.449
Girl 0.488 0.496 0.486 0.484
MKA's age 39.914 38.870 37.732 40.902
Number of children under five years old 0.287 0.382 0.493 0.308
Number of children 6-17 years old 2.073 2.243 2.273 1.971
Northeast 0.203 0.152 0.137 0.144
West 0.195 0.087 0.466 0.482
Midwest 0.289 0.208 0.082 0.158
South 0.313 0.553 0.314 0.216
MKA has no High School diploma 0.100 0.194 0.396 0.086
MKA has High School diploma 0.259 0.284 0.217 0.138
MKA has some college education 0.322 0.359 0.267 0.295
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree 0.319 0.162 0.119 0.482
MKA is working 0.745 0.710 0.652 0.763
Family income below 100% FPL 0.081 0.301 0.267 0.114
100%=<Family income< 200% 0.174 0.276 0.324 0.161
Family income above 200% FPL 0.746 0.423 0.409 0.725
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Child has health insurance 0.922 0.873 0.760 0.906
Number o f dental visits last year 2.185 1.694 1.646 2.173
Has usual source for health care 0.958 0.894 0.839 0.890
Child received well care last year 0.575 0.700 0.553 0.586
Worried whether food would run out 0.178 0.433 0.404 0.229
Household doesn't have phone 0.023 0.049 0.034 0.032
Child in the Same School last year 0.846 0.752 0.799 0.814
Child took lessons after school last year 0.339 0.331 0.263 0.468
Child on sports team last year 0.590 0.441 0.438 0.453
MKA aggravation scale score 6.054 6.766 6.272 6.485
MKA 100 mental health scale 80.061 78.253 78.388 80.138
Observations 30214 5703 6321 1506
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics by Gender
Girls Boys
Outcome Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Current health status 4.296 0.009 4.273 0.013
Health status getting worse 0.021 0.001 0.024 0.002
Has health condition that limits activity 0.087 0.004 0.149 0.004
School engagement 13.535 0.030 12.279 0.041
Behavioral problems (6-11 years old) 7.738 0.034 8.175 0.039
Behavioral problems (12-17 years old) 7.891 0.037 8.283 0.045
Family Structure
Two parents—married 0.565 0.007 0.563 0.006
Stepfather—married 0.084 0.003 0.090 0.004
Stepmother-married 0.024 0.002 0.026 0.002
Single mother 0.207 0.005 0.189 0.004
Single father 0.027 0.002 0.037 0.002
Two parents—cohabiting 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.001
Stepfahter—cohabiting 0.030 0.002 0.030 0.002
Stepmother—cohabiting 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001
Grandparents 0.021 0.002 0.019 0.001
Others 0.024 0.002 0.026 0.002
Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
Age 11.467 0.042 11.442 0.044
Non-Hispanic White 0.637 0.005 0.639 0.006
Non-Hispanic Black 0.160 0.006 0.156 0.005
Hispanic 0.155 0.004 0.157 0.005
Any other ethnicity 0.047 0.003 0.048 0.003
MKA's age 39.499 0.093 39.413 0.083
Number of children under five years old 0.340 0.009 0.331 0.007
Number of children 6-17 years old 2.139 0.019 2.114 0.016
Northeast 0.180 0.004 0.184 0.003
West 0.236 0.006 0.232 0.005
Midwest 0.238 0.005 0.238 0.006
South 0.346 0.005 0.347 0.006
MICA has no High School diploma 0.163 0.005 0.158 0.005
MKA has High School diploma 0.248 0.005 0.254 0.007
MKA has some college education 0.318 0.006 0.317 0.006
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree 0.271 0.006 0.270 0.005
MKA is working 0.724 0.005 0.727 0.005
Family income below 100% FPL 0.150 0.005 0.142 0.004
100%=<Family income< 200% 0.209 0.005 0.217 0.005
Family income above 200% FPL 0.641 0.007 0.642 0.006
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Table 5. (continued)
Girls Boys
Input Mean Std Err Mean Std Err
Child has health insurance 0.884 0.004 0.892 0.004
Number of dental visits last year 2.060 0.024 1.987 0.025
Has usual source for health care 0.925 0.003 0.927 0.003
Child received well care last year 0.591 0.006 0.593 0.006
Worried whether food would run out 0.253 0.005 0.260 0.005
Household doesn't have phone 0.031 0.003 0.028 0.003
Child in the Same School last year 0.829 0.004 0.816 0.005
Child took lessons after school last year 0.408 0.006 0.259 0.006
Child on sports team last year 0.462 0.006 0.607 0.006
MKA aggravation scale score 6.183 0.026 6.257 0.023
MKA 100 mental health scale 79.585 0.167 79.453 0.168
Observations 21392 22352
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Table 6. Ordered Probit Models Predicting Child's Current Health Status (Age 6-
17)
A B c
Married stepfather -0.12 -0.12 -0.07
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*
Married stepmother -0.16 -0.18 -0.15
(0.08)** (0.08)** (0.09)*
Single mother -0.29 -0.18 -0.06
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)**
Single father -0.02 0.04 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)*
Cohabiting two parents -0.23 -0.11 -0.02
(0.10)** (0.10) (0.10)
Cohabiting stepfather -0.27 -0.19 -0.03
(0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)
Cohabiting stepmother -0.06 -0.04 0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Grandparent -0.49 -0.27 -0.2
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Other non-parental -0.2 -0.16 -0.08
(0.07)*** (0.07)** (0.07)
Child's age -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Child's gender, equals 1 for girls 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.02)* (0.02) (0.02)**
Non-Hispanic black -0.34 -0.31 -0.29
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Hispanic -0.55 -0.41 -0.4
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Other race/ethnicity -0.30 -0.33 -0.27
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
MKA's age 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Number o f children aged 0-5 -0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)
Number o f children aged 6-17 -0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.01)* (0.01 (0.01
West -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Midwest -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
South -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
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Table 6. (continued)
A B C
MKA has a high school diploma 0.26 0.21
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
MKA has some college 0.34 0.26
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree 0.46 0.33
(0.04)*** (0.04)***
MKA is working 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Family income below 100% o f FPL -0.21 -0.08
(0.04)*** (0.04)**
Family income below 200% o f FPL -0.12 -0.05
(0.03)*** (0.03)*
Have health insurance 0.09
(0.03)***
Number o f  dental visits 0.01
(0.00)**
Have a usual place for care 0.01
(0.03)
Number ot well-child care visits during last 12 0.01
(0.03)
Worry food would run out -0.17
(0.02)***
N o phone service at home 0.03
(0.08)
Stay in the same school during last 12 months 0.04
(0.02)*
Take after-school lessons 0.06
(0.02)***
On a sports team 0.2
(0.02)***
MKA aggravation score -0.04
(0.01)***
MKA 100 point mental health score 0.01
(0.00)***
Number o f observations 43744
Note: 1. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. 
2.*** indicates significant at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05 level and * at 0.1 level
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Models Predicting School Engagement (Age 6-17)
A B c
Married stepfather -0.21 -0.21 -0.16
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Married stepmother -0.34 -0.34 -0.30
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)***
Single mother -0.29 -0.23 -0.11
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Single father -0.24 -0.21 -0.18
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Cohabiting two parents -0.22 -0.15 -0.06
(0.07)*** (0.08)* (0.08)
Cohabiting stepfather -0.38 -0.34 -0.19
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Cohabiting stepmother -0.40 -0.38 -0.32
(0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.13)**
Grandparent -0.42 -0.31 -0.21
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)***
Other non-parental -0.41 -0.38 -0.27
(0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Child's age -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Child's gender, equals 1 for girls 0.50 0.51 0.52
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Non-Hispanic black -0.10 -0.07 -0.02
(0.03)*** (0.03)** (0.03)
Hispanic -0.18 -0.12 -0.10
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Other race/ethnicity -0.14 -0.16 -0.08
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)**
MKA's age 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00)**
Number o f  children aged 0-5 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number o f  children aged 6-17 -0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
West -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
(0.03)* (0.03)* (0.02)**
Midwest -0.05 -0.03 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
South -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
(0.03)** (0.03)* (0.03)*
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Table 7. (continued)
A B C
MKA has a high school diploma 0.08 0.02
(0.02)*** (0.03)
MKA has som e college 0.15 0.07
(0.03)*** (0.03)**
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree 0.26 0.14
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
MKA is working -0.02 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02)**
Family income below 100% o f  FPL -0.07 0.03
(0.04)* (0.03)
Family income below 200% o f FPL -0.06 -0.02
(0.03)** (0.03)
Have health insurance -0.03
(0.04)
Number o f  dental visits 0.01
(0.01)**
Have a usual place for care 0.08
(0.04)*
Number otw ell-ch ild  care visits during last 0.05
(0.02)**
Worry food would run out -0.11
(0.03)***
N o phone service at home 0.01
(0.08)
Stay in the same school during last 12 0.05
(0.02)**
Take after-school lessons 0.13
(0.02)***
On a sports team 0.19
(0.02)***
M KA aggravation score -0.11
(0.01)***
MKA 100 point mental health score 0.01
(0.00)***
Number o f  observations 43329
Note: 1. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. 
2.*** indicates significant at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05 level and * at 0.1 level
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Table 8. Ordered Probit M odels Predicting Behavioral Problems (age 6-11 and 12-
17)
| Age 6-11 A ge 12-17
Married stepfather 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.33 0.32 0.25
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)***
Married stepmother 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.37
(0.13)** (0.14)** (0.14)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)***
Single mother 0.32 0.26 0.09 0.47 0.43 0.18
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Single lather 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.37 0.39
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)***
Cohabiting two parents 0.19 0.14 0.03 0.44 0.38 0.18
(0.08)** (0.08)* (0.08) (0.12)*** (0.13)*** (0.17)
Cohabiting stepfather 0.50 0.46 0.16 0.53 0.49 0.28
(0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.08)** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)***
Cohabiting stepmother 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.38
(0.20)** (0.21)* (0.21)** (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)**
Grandparent 0.66 0.56 0.40 0.51 0.39 0.24
(0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)**
Other non-parental 0.48 0.46 0.39 0.56 0.54 0.37
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.10)***
Child's age 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)*
Child's gender,= 1 lor girls -0.23 -0.24 -0.26 -0.18 -0.18 -0.21
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Non-Hispanic black 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 0.04 0.02 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)** (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Hispanic -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03)** (0.04)** (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Other race/ethnicity 0.01 0.01 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.22
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)***
MKA's age 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01)* (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)*** (0.00)** (0.00)*
Number ot children aged 0-5 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Number ol children aged 6-17 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02)** (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)***
West 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12
(0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)***
Midwest 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)**
South 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)* (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
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Table 8. (continued)
A B C A B C
M KA has a high school diploma -0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.12
(0.05)*** (0.04) (0.04)*** (0.05)**
M KA has som e college -0.15 0.00 -0.13 -0.07
(0.04)*** (0.04) (0.04)*** (0.04)*
MKA has a bachelor's or higher -0.18 -0.01 -0.21 -0.12
(0.04)*** (0.04) (0.04)*** (0.04)***
IVLKA is working -0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)* (0.04)
f  amily income below 100% ot 0.12 -0.03 0.07 -0.10
(0.05)** (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)*
fa m ily  incom e below 200%  o f 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Have health insurance 0.01 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Number ot dental visits 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Have a usual place tor care 0.01 0.02
(0.07) (0.04)
Number ot w ell-child  care visits 0.07 0.03
(0.03)** (0.03)
Worry tbod would run out 0.12 0.15
(0.04)** (0.04)***
N o phone service at home 0.09 -0.25
(0.09) (0.15)
Stay in the sam e school during -0.09 -0.18
(0.04)** (0.03)***
Take alter-school lessons -0.01 -0.12
(0.03) (0.02)***
Un a sports team -0.15 -0.27
(0.03)*** (0.02)***
MKA aggravation score 0.20 0.21
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
M KA 100 point mental health -0.02 -0.02
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
Number ot observations 21613 21950
Notes: 1. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.
2 *** indicates significant at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05 level and * at 0.1 level
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Table 9. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional Families (Descriptive Statistics for Full
Sample)
Outcomes
Current health Only single father families are better
Health getting worse
Only married stepmother, single father, and cohabiting stepmother 
families are better
Morbidity Only cohabiting two parent families are better
School None is better than traditional
Behavior 6-11 None is better than traditional
Behavior 12-17 None is better than traditional
Economic Resources
MKA college & above None is better than traditional
MKA working
cohabiting stepmother, single father, married stepmother, single 
mother families are better
Family income below 100% of FPL Only cohabiting stepmother families are better
Family income above 200% of FPL Only married stepmother families are better
Inputs
1.Health insurance cohabiting stepmother, married stepmother are better
2.Dental visit married stepmother, married stepfather are better
3.Usual source of care None is better than traditional
4.Well-child care
grandparent, other non-parental, single mother, cohabiting two- 
parent are better
5.Food insecurity None is better than traditional
6.No phone cohabiting stepmother, married stepmother families are better
7.School stability None is better than traditional
8.After-school lessons None is better than traditional
9. On sports team None is better than traditional
10.MKA aggravation Only single father families are better
1 l .MKA mental health None is better than traditional
Note: "better" means that the non-traditional family structure(s) reported is(are) associated with more desirable 
outcomes or higher level of inputs than the traditional families regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are 
positive or negative. All the relationships reported are statistically significant.
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Current health singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Health getting worse singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Morbidity singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmom coh>stepdadcoh
School singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Behavior 6-11 singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Behavior 12-17 singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
Economic resources
MKA college & above singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
MKA working singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Family income below 
100%ofFPL singledad>singlemom stepmomm ar>stepdadm ar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Family income above 
200% of FPL singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Inputs
1 .Health insurance singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
2.Dental visit singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
3.Usual source o f care singlemom>singledad ' stepdadmar>stepmommar stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
4.Well-child care singlemom>singledad stepdadmar>stepmommar stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
5.Food insecurity singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
6.No phone singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
7.School stability singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
8.After-school lessons singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
9.On sports team singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
10.MKA aggravation singledad>singlemom stepdadmar>stepmommar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
11 .MKA mental health singledad>singlemom stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
Note: ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or 
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are 
positive or negative.
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Table 11. The Presence of a Stepfather (Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample)
Outcom es
Current health stepdadmar>stepdadcoh>singlemom





Econom ic R esources
M KA college & above stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
M KA working singlemom>stepdadmar>stepdadcoh
Family income below 100% o f FPL stepdadmar>stepdadcoh>singlemom
Family income above 200% o f  FPL stepdadmar>stepdadcoh>singlemom
Inputs
1 .Health insurance stepdadmar>stepdadcoh>singlemom
2.Dental visit stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
3.Usual source o f  care stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
4 .W ell-child care singlemom>stepdadmar>stepdadcoh
5.Food insecurity stepdadmar>stepdadcoh>singlemom
6.N o phone stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
7. School stability stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
8.After-school lessons stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
9 .On sports team stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
10.MKA aggravation stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
11 .MKA mental health stepdadmar>singlemom>stepdadcoh
Note: ">" indicates the fam ily structure before the sign is associated with more desirable 
outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f  
whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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Table 12. The Presence o f a Stepmother (Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample)
singledad vs. stepmomcoh vs. stepmommar
Outcomes
Current health singledad>stepmomcoh>stepmommar






MKA college & above singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh
MKA working stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar
Family income below 100% o f FPL stepmomcoh>stepmommar>singledad




3 .Usual source o f  care stepmommar>singlefather>stepmomcoh
4. W ell-child care stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar
5.Food insecurity stepmommar>singlefather=stepmomcoh
6.No phone stepmommar>stepmomcoh>singldad
7. School stability singledad>stepmomcoh>stepmommar
8.After-school lessons singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh
9.On sports team stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar
10.MKA aggravation singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh
11 .MKA mental health stepmommar>singlefather>stepmomcoh
Note: ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable 
outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f 
whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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MKA college & above other>grandparent
MKA working other>grandparent
Family income below 100% o f FPL other>grandparent
Family income above 200% o f FPL other>grandparent
Inputs
1 .Health insurance grandparent>other
2.Dental visit oth er>gran dpar ent






9.On sports team grandparent>other
10.MKA aggravation other>grandparent
11 .MKA mental health other>grandparent
Note: ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable 
outcomes or higher level o f  inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f 
whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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N ote:(l) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated 
with more desirable outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family 
structure after the sign, regardless o f  whether the outcomes/inputs are 
positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA 
and family characteristics, "b" indicates that economic resources are added, 
and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 15. The Gender of the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent 
Families (Regression Results for Full Sample)
singledad vs. singlemom stepmommar vs. stepdadmar stepdadcoh vs. stepmomcoh
Outcomes
Current health singledad>singlemoma'b'c






1 .Health insurance singlemom>singledada,b stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha
2.Dental visit singlemom>singledadb stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b
3.Usual source of care singlemom>singledada'b stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b
4.Well-child care singlemom>singledada'b
5.Food insecurity singledad>singlemoma’b stepmommar>stepdadmarI,b
» bstepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
6.No phone singlemom>singledadb stepmommar>stepdadmara’b
7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team stepmommar>stepdadmarab stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha'b
10.MKA aggravation singledad>singlemom“’b stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha





Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher 
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or 
negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, “b” indicates 
that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 16. The Presence of a Stepfather (Regression Results for Full Sample)
stepdadcoh vs. singlemom stepdadmar vs. singlemom stepdadcoh vs stepdadmar
Outcomes




Behavior 6-11 singlemom>stepdadcohb stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
Behavior 12-17 stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha'b
Inputs
1.Health insurance singlemom>stepdadcoha,b stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
2.Dental visit stepdadmar>singlemoma
3.Usual source of care
4. Well-child care
5.Food insecurity stepdadcoh>singlemoma stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
6.No phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>stepdadcohab
9.On sports team singlemom>stepdadcoha,b stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
10.MKA aggravation stepdadmar>singlcmoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,lj
1 l.MKA mental health stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher 
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or 
negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, “b” 
indicates that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that both economic resources and inputs are 
added.
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Table 17. The Presence of a Stepmother (Regression Results for Full Sample)









1.Health insurance stepmomcoh>singledada,b stepmommar>singledada,b
2.Dental visit singledad>stepmomcoha,b stepmommar>singledada stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b






9.On sports team singledad>stepmommarb stepmomcoh>stepmommarb
10.MKA aggravation singledad>stepmomcohb singledad>stepmommarb
11 .MKA mental health
Note: (1J
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or 
negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, “b” indicates 
that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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9.On sports team grand>othersb
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health others>granda
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more 
desirable outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, 
regardless o f  whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family 
characteristics, “b” indicates that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that 
both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 19. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional Families (Regression Results Stratified by
Race)
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Table 19. (continued)
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Table 19. (Continued)


































































(1)">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher 
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are 
positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" 
indicates that economic resources are added and, "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are 
added.
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Table 20. The Gender of the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent 
Families (Regression Results Stratified by Race)
Single-mother vs. single-father families
Outcomes Hispanic Black W hite
Current health singledad>singlemomb,c singledad>singlemomb,c singledad>singlemom




Behavior 12-17 singledad>singlemomb singlemom>singledadc
Inputs
1 .Health insurance singlemom>singledada,b
2.Dental visit singlemom>singledadb
3.Usual source o f care smglemom>singledada’b singlemom>singledada’b
4. Well-child care singlemom>sxngledad
5.Food insecurity singledad>singlemoma’b singledad>singlemoma'b singledad>singlemoma’b
6.No phone singledad>singlemoma,b singlemom>singledad
7.School stability singledad>singlemoma,b
8.After-school lessons singledad>singlemoma
9.On sports team singlemom>singledada,b
10.MKA aggravation singledad>singlemoma’b singledad>singlemoma’b singledad>singlemoma,b
11 .MKA mental health singledad>singlemoma’b singledad>singlemoma’b singledad>singlemoma’l:>
Married stepfather vs. married stepmother families
Outcomes Hispanic Black W hite
Current health stepmommar>stepdadmarb












7. School stability stepdadmar>stepmommar
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team stepdadmar>stepmotnmarb
10.MKA aggravation
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Table 20.(continued)
Cohabiting stepfather vs. cohabiting stepmother families
Outcomes Hispanic Black White
Current health
Health getting worse stepmomcoh>stepdadcohb,c
Morbidity stepmomcoh>stepdadcohbc stepmomcoh>stepdadcohbl:
School




2.Dental visit stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b






9.On sports team stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh“’b
10.MKA aggravation stepmomcoh>stepdadcohab
1 l.MKA mental health stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,D
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher 
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or 
negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" indicates 
that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 21. The Presence of a Stepfather (Regression Results Stratified by Race)
Cohabiting stepfather vs. single-m other fam ilies
Outcomes Hispanic Black White
Current health







2. Dental visit stepdadcoh>singlemoma
3. Usual source of care singlemom>stepdadcohb stepdadcoh>singlemoma
4.Well-child care singlemom>stepdadcoha,b




9,On sports team stepdadcoh>singlemom"singlemom>stepdadcohb singlemom>stepdadcohb
10.MKA aggravation singlemom>stepdadcohb
11 .MKA mental health
M arried stepfather vs. single-m other fam ilies










3. Usual source of care
4.Well-child care singlemom>stepdadmarb
5.Food insecurity stepdadmar>singlemoma’ stepdadmar>singlemoma’b stepdadmar>singlemoma,b
6,No phone stepdadmar>singlemoma
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>singlemoma
9.On sports team stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>singlemoma
10.MKA aggravation stepdadmar>singlemoma’b stepdadmar>singlemoma,b
11 .MKA mental health stepdadmar>singlemom“b stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>singlemom1'b
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Table 22. The Presence of a Stepmother (Regression Results Stratified by Race)
Cohabiting stepmother ws. single-father families








1 Health insurance stepmomcoh>singledada,b
2.Dental visit singledad>stepmomcohab singledad>stepmomcohab






9. On sports team stepmomcoh>singledadJb
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health singledad>stepmomcoha
Married stepmother vs. single-father families
Outcomes Hispanic Black White
Current health stepmommar>singledadc








1 Health insurance stepmommar>singledada,b
2.Dental visit stepmommar>singledadJ,b






9.0n sports team singledad>stepmommarb
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health stepmommar>singledada
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Table 22. (continued)
Cohabiting stepmother vs. married stepmother families











2.Dental visit stepmommar>stepmomcoha stepmommar>stepmomcohiLb stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b





8. After-school lessons stepmommar>stepmomcohab
9 On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher level 
of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative. 
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" indicates 
that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 23. Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families (Regression Results 
Stratified by Race)







Inputs Hispanic Black White
1.Health insurance
2,Dental visit





8. After-school lessons other s>granda
9.On sports team grand>othersb
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health others>grand“
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or 
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f  whether the outcomes/inputs are 
positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" 
indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are 
added.
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Table 24. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional (Regression Results Stratified by Child
Gender)
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Table24. (continued)
Input G irls Boys
































































































































Note: ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or 
higher level o f  inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the 
outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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Table 25. The Gender of the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent 
Families (Regression Results Stratified by Child Gender)
Single-father vs. single-mother fam ilies
Outcomes Girls Boys
Current health singledad>singlemombc






1 .Health insurance singlemom>singledadb singlemom>singledadb
2.Dental visit singlemom>singledada,b
3.Usual source o f care singlemom>singledadb singlemom>singledada'b
4.Well-child care singlemom>singledada,b




9 .On sports team
10.MKA aggravation singledad>singlemoma,b singledad>singlemoma,b
11.MKA mental health singl edad>singl emoma,b singledad>singlemoma,b
Married stepfather vs. married stepmother families
stepmommar vs. stepdadmar stepmommar vs. stepdadmar
Outcomes Girls Boys
Current health stepdadmar>stepmommarc














9.On sports team stepdadmar>stepmommara’b
10.MKA aggravation
1 l.M KA mental health stepmommar>stepdadmara’b
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Table 25. (continued)
C ohabiting  step fa ther  vs. cohabiting  stepm other fa m ilie s
stepdadcoh vs. stepmomcoh stepdadcoh vs. stepmomcoh
Outcomes G irls Boys
Current health






1 .Health insurance stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b
2.Dental visit stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha’b a.bstepdadcoh>stepmomcoh




7 .School stability stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b
8.After-school lessons
9 .On sports team stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b
10.MKA aggravation stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b
11 .MKA mental health stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha’b
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable 
outcomes or higher level o f  inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether 
the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family 
characteristics, "b" indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both 
economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 26. The Presence of a Stepfather (Regression Results Stratified by Child
Gender)
Cohabiting stepfather vs. single-mother fam ilies








1.Health insurance sin glemom>stepdadcoh3,13
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f  care





9.On sports team stepdadcoh>singlemomb
10.MKA aggravation singlemom>stepdadcoha,b
11 .MKA mental health











3.Usual source o f care stepdadmar>singlemoma singlemom>stepdadmarb
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity stepdadmar>singlemoma’b stepdadm ar>singlemom3,13
6.No phone
7 .School stability
8.After-school lessons stepdadm ar>sin gl em oma stepdadmar>singlemoma,b
9.On sports team stepdadm ar>singlemoma stepdadm ar>singlemoma
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health stepdadmar>singletnoma'b stepdadmar>singlemoma’b
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Table 26. (continued)







Behavior 12-17 stepdadm ar>stepdadcohb
Inputs
1 .Health insurance stepdadmar>stepdadcoh3’b
2.Dental visit
3 .Usual source o f care
4.Well-child care stepdadmar>stepdadcoh3,b
5.Food insecurity stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3,11 stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3,b
6.No phone
7 .School stability
8.After-school lessons stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3,b stcpdadmar>stepdadcoh3’3
9.On sports team stepdadm a^stepdadcoh3,11 stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3’b
10.MKA aggravation stepdadcoh>stepdadmar3’b
11 .MKA mental health stepdadmar>stepdadcoh3,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha’3
Note: (1)">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or 
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs 
are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" 
indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs 
are added.
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Table 27. The Presence o f a Stepmother (Regression Results Stratified by Child
Gender)









1 .Health insurance stepmomcoh>singledada,b
2.Dental visit singledad>stepmomcoha,b singledad>stepmomcohb






9.On sports team stepmomcoh>singledada’b
10.MKA aggravation singledad>stepmomcoha,b
11 .MKA mental health stepmomcoh>singledadb









1 .Health insurance stepmommar>singledada’t stepmommar>singledada
2.Dental visit







10.MKA aggravation stepmommar>singledada'b stepmomma^singledad3,11
11 .MKA mental health
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Table 27. (continued)










2.Dental visit stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b






9.On sports team stepmomcoh>stepmommara,b
10.MKA aggravation stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b
11 .MKA mental health stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or 
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs 
are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" 
indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs 
are added.
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Table 28. Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families (Regression Results 

















9.On sports team grand>othersb grand>othersb
10.MKA aggravation others>granda,b
11 .MKA mental health others>granda,b
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes 
or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the 
outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, 
"b" indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and 
inputs are added.
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PART II: SC HI P. MEDICAL CARE UTILIZATION AND CHILD 
HEALTH OUTCOMES
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent economic research has indicated that childhood health not only affects 
early human capital acquisition, but also has a lasting impact on adulthood health and 
economic status (Case et al. 2002, Case et al. 2003). A life-course developmental model 
further broadens the perspective; it suggests that a complex interplay o f factors such as 
socioeconomic status and health care contributes to health outcomes during a person’s 
lifetime. Disparities in adult health outcomes begin early in life and are displayed and 
compounded across the span of a person’s life (Bartley et al. 1997, Keating and Hertzman 
1999, Wadsworth 1999, Halfon and Hochstein 2002, Forrest and Riley 2004, Singh- 
Manoux et al. 2004). At the same time, the Census Bureau reported that 11.4 percent of 
children— 8.4 million—had no health insurance in 2003. It has been argued that lack of 
insurance not only compromises the health of the uninsured16, but also has serious 
economic implications for individuals, families and the nation.17
Given the concern over child health outcomes and the potentially detrimental 
effect of being uninsured, the federal government bolstered its commitment to public 
health insurance for children in the past 10 years. The State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) was created through Title XXI of the Social Security Act in 1997 to
16 See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2004), the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2004), 
Institute o f Medicine (2004), Institute o f  Medicine (2002) and the Urban Institute (2004).
17 See Smith (1999), Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2004), Institute o f  M edicine (2002), the Henry 
J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2003) and Institute o f  Medicine (2003).
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further expand public insurance eligibility for children in working poor families beyond 
Medicaid levels. SCHIP has now been in force for eight years, and reauthorization of the 
program in 2007 requires a thorough understanding of the effects of expanded coverage 
on care utilization and health outcomes.
In this paper I examine the impact of SCHIP on health insurance, medical care 
utilization and health outcomes for targeted children using data from the National Survey 
of America’s Families (NSAF). This study represents an advance on a number o f fronts. 
First, the burgeoning literature on SCHIP focuses on eligibility and coverage. Research 
on utilization is relatively sparse, and research on health outcomes is even more limited. 
Despite new published studies investigating the impact of SCHIP on care utilization at 
the state level, these results are hard to generalize to all SCHIP programs given the 
diversity among SCHIP programs across states. However, a complete understanding of 
SCHIP requires knowledge of its effects on coverage, medical care utilization and health 
outcomes for targeted children. This study comprehensively assesses the overall 
effectiveness o f SCHIP by utilizing two waves of NSAF data before and after the 
enactment of the program. When combined with sample weights, the NSAF is designed 
to yield nationally representative estimates of insurance coverage, medical care 
utilization and a wide range of other health-related and socioeconomic characteristics for 
the civilian, non-institutionalized population. Additionally, adopting various estimation 
strategies, I make full use of all sources of variation in eligibility, age, income, state and 
time introduced by the inception of SCHIP to identify the effects on coverage, care 
utilization and health outcomes. Finally with a thorough review and empirical 
investigation of how legislative rules can be translated into coverage, medical care
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utilization and health outcomes in a sequential order, this study attempts to inform policy 
making in terms of where the links are broken if the means (SCHIP legislative rules) and 
various ends are disjointed. Public policies such as SCHIP legislative rules are designed 
to increase the number of children covered by health insurance through public health 
insurance expansion, and ideally such an expansion can further lead to increase in 
medical care utilization and finally translate into improvement in child health outcomes. 
Therefore, there are several “steps” linking the legislative rules and improvement in child 
outcomes. My empirical results highlight the relationship between coverage, utilization 
and health outcomes as well as the reliance on each step to improve health outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows: after presenting background on the Medicaid 
expansions and initiation of SCHIP (Chapter 2), I review previous research on each step 
in the path leading to improved health in a sequential order Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 ,1 
describe the conceptual framework, data and empirical strategies used in this study. In 
Chapter 5 ,1 summarize and analyze the empirical results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND —  MEDICAID EXPANSIONS AND SCHIP
In recent years there has been an increase in public commitment to promote 
public health insurance coverage for children, mainly through the expansion of the 
Medicaid program. Medicaid has been the primary means of financing health care 
services for poor and near poor children in the United States since its inception in 1965. 
At first, Medicaid covered only children in families meeting the eligibility requirements 
o f the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Beginning in the mid- 
1980’s, a series of federal laws began to delink Medicaid eligibility from eligibility for 
the AFDC program. (Table 29 summarizes the legislation enacted since 1986.) The 
expansions substantially increased children’s eligibility for Medicaid. Following the 
federal expansions, many states expanded their Medicaid programs further to include 
children not covered by the federal mandates.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) completely severed the link between welfare and Medicaid. Under the new 
law, regardless o f their welfare status, eligible families have to apply for Medicaid 
separately. For those families that still received public assistance, a great number of 
families failed to enroll their children in Medicaid due to the separate and complex 
application procedure. Therefore, as an unintended consequence o f breaking the link of
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Medicaid and welfare, many families and children lost their Medicaid coverage. 
Additionally, many parents have to accept low-paid jobs in order to satisfy the work 
requirement under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. As a 
result their family incomes were too high to qualify for Medicaid benefits but too low to 
obtain private insurance for their children. All these factors contributed to the decline in 
Medicaid enrollment and the increase in the number of uninsured children between 1996 
and 1997.18
In response to declining Medicaid enrollment and the increasing number of 
uninsured children in working poor families, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 
was signed into law in August 1997. The BBA of 1997, as part of title XXI of the Social 
Security Act, provided states with $40 billion over ten years in block grant funding to 
further expand public-provided health insurance for children. The BBA of 1997 gives 
states a great deal of flexibility in how far and how fast they expand coverage. For 
example, states can use the new grant money to expand Medicaid, develop a new 
program or expand an existing state program that provides health insurance for children, 
or use a combination of the two approaches as long as the funds are used to serve 
children below age nineteen who are living in families with incomes at or below 200 
percent of the federal poverty level or 50 percentage points above the Medicaid income 
eligibility in effect in March 1997. Consequently, there exists wide variation in states’ 
responses to the changes enacted by the BBA of 1997 both in terms of magnitude, timing 
and form.
18 For example, Joyce and Racine (2005) find some evidence that TANF resulted in a loss o f  Medicaid 
coverage for women and children whose cash assistance ended.
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Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia had an approved SCHIP plan in 
place by 2000. Eleven states enacted their program in 1997, the majority (33 states and 
the District of Columbia) did so in 1998, and the remaining 6 states implemented it in 
1999 or 2000. States also vary in the implementation of their SCHIP programs. Sixteen 
states expanded Medicaid, 14 states and the District o f Columbia created a separate 
SCHIP program, and 20 states developed a combination program in 2002. Table 30 
summarizes the timing of SCHIP implementation, types of SCHIP programs, and income 
eligibility variation across states and age groups.
As shown in Table 31 and Figure 3, eligibility levels for children have increased 
through SCHIP for every age group since 1997. In many states, prior to SCHIP income 
eligibility limits were substantially higher for younger children than for older children. 
Given the fact that the previous series of Medicaid expansions had targeted younger 
children, generally speaking, the magnitude of income eligibility increases under SCHIP 
is much bigger for older children than for younger children. By increasing income limits 
for older children more than for younger children, the SCHIP expansions largely 
eliminated this within-state variation in eligibility. For example, over the period from 
1997 to 2002, the average income eligibility for infants increased by 27 percentage 
points. In contrast, the average income eligibility increases by 115 percentage points for 
children aged 14 or older.
There is an extensive literature suggesting low take-up (i.e. low enrollment among 
eligible population) during the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Cutler and Gruber 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1997, Shore-
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Sheppard 1997, Yazici and Kaestner 2000, Blumberg et al. 2000, Card and Shore- 
Sheppard 2004, Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005, Shore-Sheppard 2005). Transaction 
costs19, stigma, ignorance about the program and eligibility status, and difficulty in 
finding providers willing to accept Medicaid are often cited as significant barriers to 
enrollment among those who are Medicaid eligible (e.g. Currie and Grogger 2002, Currie 
and Gruber 1996b, Aizer 2003a, 2003b, Currie and Fahr 2005).
Concerns about the Medicaid take-up rate can spill over into concerns about 
enrollment in SCHIP. Low take-up might be an even greater problem for SCHIP 
compared to Medicaid as many newly eligible families typically have no experience of 
participating in public programs. As a result, the law creating SCHIP included specific 
provisions that mandated states to include outreach efforts as a part of their expansion. 
States are using a variety of approaches to reduce the stigma associated with SCHIP and 
Medicaid.20
As private insurance coverage increases with family income, and SCHIP income 
eligibility levels are higher than those of Medicaid, crowd-out is potentially a bigger 
problem for SCHIP than for prior Medicaid expansions. In response to previous studies 
suggesting large crowd-out effects for Medicaid, SCHIP programs were specifically 
designed with “anti-crowd-out” provisions to prevent newly eligible families from 
dropping private coverage. The most common requirements across states to reduce
19 Transaction costs refer to the administrative burden o f  establishing and maintaining Medicaid coverage 
include requirements to document residency, income, and citizenship, several meetings with a caseworker, 
and requirements that Medicaid eligibility be re-established at least yearly.
20 For example, Arkansas decided to name its Medicaid-SCHIP program ARKids Plus to take advantage o f  
the outreach efforts and positive name recognition associated with its ARKids First 1115 demonstration. In 
Vermont and several other states, families that apply only for health care benefits mail their applications to 
a centralized processing unit, which has no overt connection to the state’s welfare department.
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crowd-out was that children must be without insurance for some period (typically 3-6 
months) prior to enrollment. In addition, a few states used sliding-scale premium 
contributions for families with incomes above 150% of the FPL and subsidies to 
encourage parents to take-up employer-based coverage when available. Title XXI 
specifically states that any already-insured children, including those insured under 
Medicaid, are not eligible to enroll in SCHIP.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are some essential issues researchers must address before they study the 
effects of public health insurance on coverage, medical care utilization and health 
outcomes. Most importantly, expanded health insurance eligibility does not guarantee 
improved health outcomes. Several studies trace through the channels by which the 
legislative rules of public insurance expansion are translated into actual improved health 
outcomes (Eisenberg and Power 2000, Gruber 2002, Chung and Schuster 2004). These 
studies either review the literature or explain the rationale, but none of them provide 
empirical evidence. A growing literature documents the effects of SCHIP on eligibility, 
take-up and crowd out, but relatively few studies examine its impact on medical care 
utilization, and even less research investigates its effects on health outcomes. I am going 
to address each channel individually so that the link between SCHIP legislative rules and 
health outcomes can be tracked incrementally, from the transformative means to the 
ultimate ends.
3.1 Eligibility
The starting point is to examine the effects of SCHIP on eligibility. How 
legislative rules affect eligibility is a function o f child age, family income, parents’ 
marital status, family structure, and state of residence. Studies using data from various
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sources all indicate that SCHIP legislative rules have effectively increased the proportion 
of children who are eligible for public insurance (Cunningham 2003, Selden et al. 2004, 
Bansak and Raphael 2004). These studies track changes in the eligibility of children over 
the 1996-2002 period and find that the percentage of U.S. children eligible for public 
health insurance has increased roughly from 30 percent to 50 percent.
3.2 Coverage
The next step is to translate eligibility into actual Medicaid or SCHIP coverage. 
Low take-up is one big problem. As a matter of fact, low take-up is not a problem unique 
to SCHIP programs, but is common among many public programs (see Remler et al. 
2003). Low take-up might be an even greater problem for SCHIP as many newly eligible 
families typically have no experience of participating in public programs and, therefore, 
may lack good information about the program (LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, Selden et 
al. 2004). Moreover, evidence from the Medicaid expansions suggests that take-up falls 
as coverage is extended to relatively higher income families (Currie and Gruber 1996b, 
Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004). This could also lead to a lower take-up rate of SCHIP 
since SCHIP extends eligibility to relatively higher income families. Furthermore, lower 
SCHIP enrollment rates may be due to the fact that enrollment rates decline with age and 
SCHIP-eligible children are older on average than Medicaid-eligible children.
A large number of studies have examined the impact o f SCHIP on public health 
insurance coverage (Guendelman and Pearl 2004, Selden, Hudson and Banthin 2004, 
LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, Zuckerman et al. 2001, Cunningham et al. 2002, Bansak 
and Raphael 2004, Davidoff et al. 2005, Cullen et al. 2005). The estimated marginal take- 
up rate among newly eligible children ranges from 5 percent to 11 percent among studies
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calculating take-up rate (i.e. Rosenbach et al. 2001, LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, 
Bansak and Raphael 2004, Cullen et al. 2005).
Rosenbach et al. (2001) create a measure of the effect of the SCHIP program by 
dividing the number of children enrolled in SCHIP by the number of children enrolled in 
the traditional Medicaid program for a state. Their approach tends to underestimate the 
effect of SCHIP, since outreach efforts for SCHIP may have spill-over effects on 
Medicaid enrollment.21 They find that for fiscal year 1999 SCHIP extended federally 
financed child health insurance coverage beyond traditional Medicaid by 10 percent 
nationally. Using March CPS data from 1997 to 2001, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) 
first compute a child’s public insurance eligibility based on the child’s age, family 
income and the income eligibility standards effective in the child’s state of residence at 
that time, a similar approach to the one used by Cutler and Gruber (1996). Then they 
regress the child public health insurance status on this computed eligibility indicator 
while controlling for demographic characteristics, a full set o f year dummies, state 
dummies and health care market characteristics. For their baseline model, they find the 
take-up rate (the estimates of coefficient on public insurance eligibility) is 7.8 percent for 
whole sample, and 7.3 percent for the lower family income group (family income below 
300% of FPL subsample). Also using data from the CPS (1998 and 2002), Bansak and 
Raphael (2004) first identify children that are income eligible for SCHIP benefits in 2001 
as well as children that would have been eligible in 1997 (under 2001 income criteria)
21 In order to prevent states from shifting enrollees from Medicaid to SCHIP to take advantage o f  more 
generous Federal matching rates, the legislation requires that children who apply for SCHIP be screened for 
Medicaid eligibility, and those found eligible can enroll only in Medicaid. Because o f  this rule, it is 
possible that SCHIP “marketing” may have indirectly increased the Medicaid enrollment o f  children who 
were already eligible for but not covered by that program (US GAO, 2000, Selden et al. 2004, Kenney and 
Chang 2004.)
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assuming the program had been in existence. The effect of SCHIP on public insurance is 
estimated by calculating the change over time in the proportion of eligible children 
receiving public health insurance benefits. In doing so, they find that the program 
marginal take up rates range from 10.1 to 10.5 percent.
Using panel data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten 
Cohort (ECLSK), Cullen et al. (2005) adopt several different approaches. Their first 
method is a first-difference model regressing changes in coverage on changes in a child’s 
eligibility status between any two years. In the second approach, the primary independent 
variable of interest is defined as the share of months eligible for the program since the 
beginning of either the kindergarten academic year (July 1998) or the pre-kindergarten 
academic year (July 1997). Due to the endogeneity of eligibility they also simulate 
eligibility which is similar to the one used by Cutler and Gruber (1996) and LoSasso and 
Buchmueller (2004). Depending on what specification and what methods are used, their 
estimation varies. But the authors emphasize the estimates for transitions between first 
and third grades, since for these grades they can analyze transitions by type o f insurance. 
The coefficient on changes of eligibility is 0.114 for Medicaid/CHIP coverage, which 
implies a marginal take-up rate of 11.4 percent.
Furthermore, previously uninsured persons are not the only group taking up the 
new available benefits; substitution from private to public coverage may occur, which is 
known as the crowding out of public insurance on private insurance. This results in less 
net increase in coverage. Considerable research has been carried out assessing the effect 
of public coverage on private coverage. Cutler and Gruber (1996) demonstrate that 
although the expansions increased the fraction o f low-income children enrolled in
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Medicaid, they also led to significant reductions in the fraction covered by private health 
insurance, compounding the effect of low take-up rates. Subsequent research finds less 
consistent evidence of crowd-out (Dubay and Kenney 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1997, 
Shore-Sheppard 2000, Yazici and Kaestner 2000, Blumberg et al. 2000, Kenney, 
Genevieve and Holahan 2003, Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004, Ham and Shore-Sheppard 
2005, Shore-Sheppard 2005).
Research based on different national surveys and different estimation strategies 
has produced a broad range of estimates of crowd-out under SCHIP from essentially no 
crowd-out to 30-50 percent crowd-out (Cunningham et al. 2002, Bansak and Raphael 2004, 
Cullen et al. 2005). However, Kenney and Chang (2004) review several state surveys of 
SCHIP enrollees and find little evidence that enrollees transfer directly from employer 
coverage to SCHIP. Although there is no clear consensus about the precise amount of 
substitution between private and public coverage among researchers, various sources 
indicate that SCHIP is crowding out private coverage to a certain degree. Even when low 
income families substitute SCHIP coverage for private coverage, children and their 
families may enjoy a number o f benefits such as more comprehensive coverage, reduced 
disparity in access to care and lower financial burdens (Kenney, Genevieve and Holahan 
2003, Kenney and Chang 2004).
Given the flexibility of SCHIP programs, wide variations exist across states in 
terms of how the program is implemented, its ease of enrollment, outreach efforts and 
anti-crowd-out provisions. Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) find that such variations have an 
impact on both take-up and crowd-out. For example, they find that outreach efforts such
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as having a phone line and websites providing information on SCHIP are significantly 
associated with lower possibility of a child being uninsured and higher take-up among 
eligible children.
3.3 Utilization
Once covered by public insurance, coverage will not automatically increase 
children’s utilization of medical care due to both financial and non-financial barriers to 
care. Since most research examining SCHIP has concentrated on its impact on eligibility, 
take-up and crowd-out, there is a scant but growing literature examining SCHIP’s impact 
on medical care utilization. As many states implemented SCHIP through expanding their 
existing Medicaid program, studies on Medicaid are also reviewed when appropriate. 
Generally speaking, research that investigates the impact of public insurance expansions 
on medical care utilization for children falls into three distinct groups. The first strand of 
the literature approaches the problem by examining the connection between eligibility 
expansions and utilization. It either investigates one single measure of utilization, such as 
immunization (Joyce and Racine 2005), or examines one group o f children (e.g. children 
with special needs such as in Davidoff et al. 2005; elementary school students in Cullen 
et al. 2005). There are no consistent findings among this group o f research. A major 
shortcoming of this approach is that investigating the link between eligibility expansions 
and utilization might overestimate the program’s effect. Public insurance expansions 
avail only those who enroll. Children who are eligible but fail to participate in these 
programs will not benefit.
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The second body of research compares utilization measures for publicly insured 
children to those for uninsured or privately insured children. This method could be more 
informative about measuring the efficiency of public health insurance expansions. 
Guendelman and Pearl (2004) conclude that insurance coverage increases access to and 
use of care by insured children o f the working poor families in comparison to children 
without health insurance.22 More specifically, Currie and Thomas (1995) find that 
Medicaid children are significantly more likely to have preventative care than either those 
with private insurance or no coverage at all. The methods used in these studies, however, 
suffer from several drawbacks. First, inferences drawn from the difference observed 
between insured and uninsured children and/or between publicly insured and privately 
insurance children may be subject to adverse selection bias, i.e., families with sick 
children are more likely to seek coverage. Second, parents who secure health insurance 
for their children may be fundamentally different from parents who do not make an effort 
or are unable to obtain coverage.
The third group of research focuses on the experience of enrollees and compares 
their utilization before and after enrollment in SCHIP programs. These studies adopt a 
pre-post design in which a single cohort of SCHIP enrollees is surveyed at two points in 
time, one carried out soon after SCHIP enrollment, the other usually one year after the 
first survey.23 This thread of research generally indicates that children who enroll in
22 Since under new regulations for Medicaid and the SCHIP programs, states have the discretion to extend 
coverage to enrollees’ uninsured parents, Guendelman and Pearl (2004) evaluate the potential impact o f  
such extension on health care utilization. They find extending insurance to enrollees’ uninsured parents 
seems to have little marginal effect in terms o f  promoting children's access and use o f  care.
23 These studies are Dick et al. (2004) for Florida, Kansas, and N ew  York., Szilagyi et al. (2004) for New  
York, Eisert and Gabow (2002) and Kempe et al. (2005) for Colorado, Damiano et al. (2001), Damiano et 
al. (2002) a, b, Damiano et al. 2003, Damiano et al. (2005) and McBroome et al. (2005) for Iowa, Slifkin et 
al. (2002) and Mofidi et al. (2002) for North Carolina, Fox et al. (2003) for Kansas, Hughes et al. (2005)
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SCHIP have improved access to care. The obvious drawback with this approach is that it 
is difficult to differentiate the effect of other coexisting policies or secular trends from the 
impact of SCHIP.24 In addition, this strand of literature surveys SCHIP impact on health 
care utilization for only a relatively small number o f children in one or several states. 
Given the diversity o f the SCHIP programs, it is difficult to generalize the results to 
national estimates.
3.4 Outcomes
Finally, increases in medical care utilization do not guarantee improved health 
outcomes. There are a number o f studies suggesting that much o f the medical care 
received by both adults and children is inappropriate and may have little beneficial effect 
on health.25 In line with this argument, Kaestner, Joyce and Racine (1999) insist that 
effectiveness of Medicaid should be evaluated not only by its effect on utilization, but 
also by its effect on children’s health. However, research investigating the impact of 
public insurance on child heath outcomes, including earlier Medicaid expansions, is 
limited relative to the literature on coverage.26 Studies focusing on eligibility either adopt 
a difference-in-difference approach (Kaestner, Joyce and Racine 1999) or use simulated 
eligibility as an instrument for actual eligibility (Currie and Gruber 1996a, Cullen et al. 
2005). But Lykens and Jargowsky (2002) directly use estimated actual eligibility which 
fails to take into account the endogenous nature of eligibility.
for Indiana, Lave et al. (2002) for Pennsylvania. Two exceptions are Brach et al. (2003) and Shenkman et 
al. (2003) which study the experience o f  enrollees only before enrollment so that their needs can be better 
addressed. Brach et al. (2003) survey SCHIP programs in Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Indiana, and N ew  
York; Shenkman et al. (2003) survey SCHIP in Florida for adolescents.
24 Szilagyi et al. (2004) do use a comparison group to detect secular trends but do not find any.
25 See Chung and Schuster (2004) for a recent review.
26 These studies are Currie and Gruber (1996a), Kaestner, Joyce and Racine (1999) and Lykens and 
Jargowsky (2002) for Medicaid, Damiano et al. (2003), and Cullen et. al (2005) for SCHIP.
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Damiano et al. (2003) focus on children enrolled in Iowa’s S-SCHIP program and 
find that overall health status was rated significantly better (i.e. excellent: 37 percent 
before, 42 percent after) and worry about the ability to pay for a child's health care was 
substantially reduced (92 percent before, 57 percent after). In addition, ninety-five 
percent of families reported a reduction in family stress. Therefore, evidence indicates 
that Iowa’s S-SCHIP program not only improved health status but also improved the 
family environment for children enrolled during the first year.
In sum, the answer to whether or not an increase in eligibility would lead to 
improved health outcomes is inconclusive. While SCHIP represents a significant and 
dramatic change to child public insurance programs, to date, to my best knowledge, there 
is no research focusing on the effect of SCHIP on health outcomes for children o f all ages 
at the national level. The current study contributes to the literature on several fronts. First, 
this analysis not only investigates the effect of SCHIP on coverage related issues such as 
crowd-out, but also addresses its impact on medical care utilization and health outcomes 
individually. It therefore contributes to our knowledge of why SCHIP expansions may or 
may not achieve the ultimate goal of improving child health outcomes, and the results can 
inform policy making. Second, with its unique survey design and ideal time span, NSAF 
data enables the current analysis to measure the policy impact at the national level for 
children of all ages. Third, given that no single technique can perfectly address these 
issues of interest, I make full use of exogenous variation of the SCHIP programs and 
develop various empirical strategies to tackle these problems so that crisp and robust 
results can be obtained.
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The theoretical framework follows Currie and Grogger (2000)’s model of 
Medicaid participation and the demand for health. The health production function relates 
health inputs and health output:
This suggests that health (H) as a special commodity can be produced by using 
inputs such as medical care M but can not be purchased directly from the market. In 
particular, H is a “stock” that takes time to change with medical care M. In case of 
children, child health outcomes are determined mainly by the decisions of their parents. 
Given market price p  for medical care, family utility, which is a function of market 
purchased numeraire commodity (C) and child health (H), is maximized subject to the 
income constraint:
H  = f  (M)




C + M. p  = I (2)
(3)
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where I is family income, X is a set o f exogenous demographic characteristics that 
influence family tastes.
Solving for this maximum problem yields the optimal demands for medical care
and consumption goods: M*  = M * ( p ,  I; X )  (4)
C* -  C * ( p , I ; X )  (5)
The associated optimal parental demand for H is given by:
H* = f ' ( p , I ; X )  (6)
Plugging the demands into the utility function yields the family maximized utility 
before SCHIP was introduced:
V* = V(p,  / ;  X )  = U(C * (p , / ;  X),  M  * (p,  / ;  X))  (7)
Upon the introduction of SCHIP, participation in this program can reduce the 
price of medical care by s, which is equivalent to a subsidy to medical care. But 
participation in a public insurance program also involves transaction costs and stigma, 
which decrease total utility by O . Conditional on participating in this public insurance 
program, now the family utility becomes
max USCHIP = U(C, H;X)-<S> (8)
C ,M
subject to
C + M. (p  - s )  = I  (9)
H  = f ( M )  / '>  0 , /" <  0 (10)
Again, solving for this maximizing problem yields demands for C and M and 
associated demands function for H:
M* = M * ( p , s , I ; X ,  O) (11)
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C* = C*(p ,  s, ( 12)
(13)
The corresponding indirect utility becomes:
SCHIP
The family would enroll the child into the SCHIP program only when utility 
shown in equation (14) exceeds that shown in equation (7). This model about 
participation and demand for medical care and child health yields several implications. 
Theoretically speaking, health insurance coverage under SCHIP can have an income 
effect by shifting the budget constraint outward for previously uninsured families. 
Families that have already been covered by private health insurance may take advantage 
of the availability o f public insurance and drop their private health insurance. In this case 
public health insurance crowds out private health insurance. It can also have a 
substitution effect on the demand for medical care and demand for child health by 
reducing the relative cost of medical care if the child used to be uninsured before the 
enactment of SCHIP. In line with this argument, Medicaid/SCHIP coverage is expected 
to be positively associated with increase in medical care utilization and improvement in 
child health outcomes for uninsured children. However, this may not be the case if 
transaction costs or stigma associated with participating in SCHIP programs are taken 
into account. The disutility caused by transaction costs and stigma may be sufficiently 
high to offset the marginal benefit. Therefore families may not enroll their children in 
SCHIP despite becoming newly eligible. This possibility might in part explain low take- 
up rates and reduced crowd-out for SCHIP programs. Furthermore, among SCHIP 
enrollees, increase in medical care utilization and improvement in health outcomes may
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not happen either because of crowd-out or because o f the delivery of service under 
Medicaid/SCHIP. For example, the opportunity cost o f seeing a participating physician, 
again, may be sufficiently high to countervail the marginal benefit. Even if there is an 
increase in utilization of medical care (M), the quality of the received service may be too 
low to have any positive effect on health outcome, or it may take longer for medical care 
to be translated into an improvement of health outcome, which is a stock.
4.2 Data
The primary sources of data are the 1997, 1999 and 2002 National Survey of 
America's Families, which provide detailed information on health insurance coverage, 
health status and medical care utilization for children under 18 years old, as well as 
information relating to their family settings and the adults who care for them. The survey 
was carried out from February to October/November in 1997, 1999 and 2002, and the full 
sample for children is composed of 34,399, 35,897 and 34,292 observations for each 
round, respectively. Round 1997 and 2002 correspond roughly to the pre- and post-year 
of the implementation of SCHIP programs for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. 
Although SCHIP funding became available on October 1, 1997, as mentioned previously, 
only eleven states started their program in 1997; the majority (39 states and the District of 
Columbia) did so between 1998 and 2000. There is a partial overlap between 1997 and 
1999 samples of NSAF, so that the data is neither a panel nor completely independent 
cross-sectional. According to Abi-Habib et al. (2004), the correlation between 1997 and 
1999 data is so small that it can be ignored and used as cross-sectional data. Therefore, 
although I am using three waves of NSAF data, the analysis is cross-sectional and not a
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panel study. Adding data from the 1999 NSAF allows for examining the phase-in of
97SCHIP programs across states over time.
Although the survey focuses on a target group of states28as well as the 
experiences of low-income families (about $33,000 annually in 1998 currency for a 
family of two parents and two children), it strives to provide reliable estimates for the 
nation as a whole with appropriate sample design. Some questions cover the family's 
circumstances at the time of the survey; others are about the previous 12 months or about 
that calendar year. The weights are used to adjust for design features of the survey, 
including oversampling, nonresponse and undercoverage to yield national estimates.29 
Child and family demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as family 
structure and the Most Knowledgeable Adult’s (MKA) education, are included to 
measure parental human capital and family income, when appropriate, to isolate the 
impact o f health insurance from income. In addition, the state level control variables 
include state TANF participation rate (i.e. ratio of state TANF recipients to state 
estimated population), TANF maximum benefit for a family of three, unemployment rate, 
monthly CCDF expenditure per child served and SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility as a 
percentage of FPL. Sources for the state level data are summarized in Appendix A.
The primary outcomes studied are health insurance coverage, medical care 
utilization, and health outcomes. Since SCHIP can improve medical care utilization only
27 The results from including all 3 waves o f  data are very similar to those obtained from using only the 
1997 and 2002 waves.
28 These target states include three eastern states (Massachusetts, N ew  Jersey, and N ew  York), four 
southern states (Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas), three western states (California, Colorado, and 
Washington) and three mid-western states (Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin). The 13 target states 
represent 51% o f the U.S population. Without weights, the 13 states from NSAF data represent 87% o f the 
whole sample. There is substantial variation in Medicaid and SCHIP income eligibility within the 13 states 
(please refer to Table 30).
2 See Brick et al. (1999) for a detailed description o f  NSAF weights.
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for those who are enrolled, coverage measures are examined which can shed light on 
issues of low take-up and crowd-out o f public health insurance programs before 
estimating medical care utilization and health outcomes. Three measures of coverage are 
included: covered by public insurance30, covered by private insurance, and covered by 
any health insurance.
As for measures of health services utilization, I include number of doctor visits 
(not including dental, emergency or mental health visits) during the last 12 months, 
number of dentist or dental hygienist visits during the last 12 months (for children age 3 
and up), number of well-child care visits during the past 12 months, and number of 
mental health visits during the past 12 months including mental health services received 
from a doctor, mental health counselor, or therapist (for children age 3 and up).
Well-child care is defined as visits for shots or immunizations, annual and other 
periodic check ups, hearing exams, physical and other visits for preventive care. It is 
delivered mostly through pediatricians and family practitioners and is considered the 
foundation o f child health services. National guidelines recommend at least twenty-six 
well-child visits by age twenty one (Green and Palfrey 2002, Committee on Practice and 
Ambulatory Medicine 2000). Having health insurance should encourage more utilization 
of preventive care, such as well-child care, and protect children from many preventive 
diseases and hospitalization. Children without access to well-child care often seek care in 
emergency departments. Although emergency departments serve as a safety net for 
vulnerable populations, they do so inefficiently (Luo et al. 2003). Therefore, both dental
30 I examine overall public insurance coverage instead o f SCHIP coverage status for three reasons. First 
some states take the option to expand Medicaid as a way to implement their SCHIP programs. Second, for 
those states initiating a stand-alone SCHIP program or choosing the combination approach, SCHIP may 
have a spillover effect on Medicaid. Third, NSAF does not differentiate between Medicaid and SCHIP 
participation status, but classifies both as being publicly insured.
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and well-child care visits are considered as active utilization of preventive health care 
which can lead to more efficient allocation of medical care resources. A doctor visit, on 
the other hand, could be either due to preventative care needs or due to the fact that sick 
children have to be seen by the doctor more often.
Mental health is also an integral and critical component of children’s learning and 
general health. A report by U.S. Public Health Service (2000) states that the nation is 
facing a public crisis in mental health for infants, children and adolescents: in the United 
States, one in ten children and adolescents suffer from mental illness severe enough to 
interfere with normal development and functioning. Estimates indicate about one in five 
children receive mental health services in.any given year. Yet, unmet need for mental 
health services remains as high now as it was 20 years ago (Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2000). In addition, poor children are found to have more mental health 
problems than other children (Costello et al. 2003, Howell 2004). Since more low-income 
children are now eligible for public health insurance through the new SCHIP programs, 
consequently, such programs play a critical role in ensuring access to child mental health 
services.31
A key difficulty in evaluating the effect of Medicaid on health outcomes for 
children as opposed to utilization of medical care, is the challenge of measuring health 
outcomes for children. The ideal instruments should be the objective physician 
assessment of child physical health status. Yet, social science, health, and 
epidemiological surveys have asked people to describe their health for decades.
Although self-reported physical health might be subject to reporting bias, it has
31 See Lowell and Buck (2000) for a review o f  mental health benefits under SCHIP in the United States.
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nonetheless been shown to be predictive of both mortality and the onset o f several serious 
health conditions, even after controlling for various socio-demographic conditions (Hurd 
and McGarry 1995, Idler and Benyamini 1997, Knauper andTurner 2000). In many of the 
studies, subjective health was found to be a better predictor of survival than objective 
health measures.
The primary health outcomes measure adopted in this study is the focal child’s 
current health status, reported by the MKA on a 5-point scale (1 = poor, 5 = excellent). 
The scale is dichotomized to excellent/very good versus good/fair/poor health; the latter 
category is used as the reference group. This variable concerns MKA’s perception about 
the current health status of the children. Although it is potentially subject to the whims of 
all subjective measures, it is attractive as a global measure of health status and widely 
used in social science and health literature. Two other MKA reported measures are also 
included to supplement the analysis. One is the focal child’s health status compared to 12 
months ago (for children age 1 and up), reported by the MKA on a 5-point scale (1 = 
much worse, 2=worse, 3= the same, 4=better, 5 = much better). The scale is also 
dichotomized to a dummy variable (1 = worse, much worse; 0 = the same, better, much 
better). The other is the physical and mental functionality of the focal child (i.e. whether 
or not the child has a physical, learning, or mental health condition that limits his/her 
participation in the usual kinds of activity done by most children).32 These three variables 
are the most suitable measures available from the NSAF data for health outcomes.
32 A disability, especially one that meets the criteria for SSI benefits, virtually guarantees access to 
Medicaid for the individual with disability.
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4.3 Empirical Strategies
Different estimation strategies might lead to quite different results. Remler et al. 
(2004) review the common estimation methods in modeling health insurance expansions 
and explain the relationship between different approaches. I am trying to use various 
approaches in order to demonstrate the robustness of my empirical results.
4.3.1 Accounting for Difference Across Income/Ase Groups and Over Time — 
Difference-In-Difference Approach. It is obvious from Table 31 that within each state the 
pre-SCHIP income eligibility cutoff was more generous for younger children than for 
older children. As discussed earlier, prior to SCHIP, states were mandated to cover 
children under 6 years old up to 133 percent of the FPL. States had the option to expand 
coverage up to 185 percent and still receive federal matching funds. As of 1997, several 
states had used their own funds to expand eligibility beyond 185 percent of the FPL. 
Consequently income eligibility limits pre-SCHIP were substantially higher for younger 
children than for older children in many states.
Therefore, the marginal expansions induced by SCHIP programs are much bigger 
for older children than for younger children. To explore the expansion variation across 
age groups over time, the following difference-in-difference (DID) reduced form demand 
function is specified:
Yol = p a + /?, filderkid, + p n * >^99, + /?13 * yrQ2, + /?14 * (olderkid*yr99t ) + fil5 * (olderkidi*yr02l ) + P2 * X i + e
(15)
where the dependent variables Yoi represents the three categories o f outcomes for the 
child (o=health insurance coverage, medical care utilization, or child health outcomes).
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The estimates of J3U and J3l5 will yield the bigger marginal expansion effect of
SCHIP/Medicaid on coverage, medical care utilization and health outcomes for older 
children in comparison to younger children. It is a difference-in-difference estimator to 
obtain the effect of the bigger increase of SCHIP/Medicaid income eligibility for older 
children than for younger children. An important empirical issue arises regarding the 
selection of control group and treatment group. Since Medicaid eligibility increased much 
more for older children (age 6-17) than it did for younger children (age 0-5), children 
aged 0-5 are selected as the control group and children aged 6-17 as treatment group for 
studying the effect of SCHIP eligibility differentiated expansions across age groups. 
Therefore, the control group is also “treated”, i.e. experienced an increase in benefits, but 
the increase is much smaller compared to the treatment group. In this sense, this is a 
pseudo difference-in-difference approach which should bias my results downward.
One approach to further refine the estimates is to stratify the whole sample into 
two sub-samples according to family income, one of which consists of children who are 
believed not to be affected by the SCHIP expansions and using their age-income- 
eligibility patterns as a baseline to which the effects on the other targeted group can be 
compared. Since most states set their income eligibility below 300% of the FPL33, 
children in families with income above or equal to 300% of the FPL are proposed as a 
reference group to which children from income below 300% of the FPL are compared. 
Each model therefore is estimated for the whole sample, for children with family income
33 As o f  2002, only 5 states set their income eligibility above or equal to 300 percent o f  FPL. These states 
are CT, MD, MS, NE, NH. A more accurate way to classify treatment and control groups is to use actual 
state cutoffs, i.e. define children whose family income is between the 1997 and 2002 cutoffs as the 
treatment group and children whose family income is below the 1997 SCHIP cutoff as the control group. 
However, again, NSAF does not contain such detailed information on family income.
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below 300% of the FPL, and for children with family income above or equal to 300% of 
the FPL, respectively.
Given the fact that older children may use medical care differently from younger 
children, especially regarding dental or mental care visits, this method may not capture 
the policy impact as it is designed to. Therefore it is necessary to look for other testing 
strategies to which we now turn.
As just discussed, SCHIP is projected to provide health insurance coverage to 
targeted low-income children, namely children who reside in families with income below 
200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) or whose families have an income 50 percent 
higher than the state's Medicaid eligibility threshold. However, many states have chosen 
to expand SCHIP eligibility beyond 200% of the FPL limit. Therefore a similar DID 
approach can be employed to explore differences in eligibility status across income 
groups. As many states increased insurance eligibility up to 300% of the FPL (some even 
increased eligibility up to 350 percent of the FPL), ideally the upper limit of SCHIP 
income eligibility rules is used to classify treatment and control groups. However, NSAF 
data includes income levels above or equal to 300% of the FPL as one single category. It 
is therefore impossible to distinguish income groups beyond 300% of the FPL in NSAF 
data. Consequently, the treatment group is defined as children with family income 
between 150% and 300% of the FPL (including 150%), and the control group consists of 
children in families with income below 150% of the FPL (dubbed the “near poor” and 
“poor” families respectively hereafter34). In parallel: the equation to be estimated is:
Yoi = y0 + y u * nearpoor,+yn *yr99  + yn *yr02  + yl4 *(nearpoorj * yr99i) + y i5 * {nearpoo^* yr02t)  + y2 * X t + u oi
34 These are different from the standard definitions used by the Census, and are employed only for brevity.
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While children with family incomes above or equal to 300% of the FPL (i.e. 
“non-poor” families) can also be included in the control group, poor and near poor 
families are known to access the health coverage and delivery system differently from 
more affluent families. Given the heterogeneous nature o f the two control group 
candidates, I feel it is more appropriate to separate these two groups instead of lumping 
them together. Therefore when applying the income DID approach, I drop the high 
income group from the control group, and the following equation is proposed to obtain 
the difference-in-difference estimate of SCHIP on health care utilization.
In doing so, this analysis is confined to the sub-sample of children in families 
with income below 300% of the FPL only.35 Within the low income sub-sample, parallel 
to the practice o f the age DID approach, I first estimate this income DID model using the 
complete sub sample. Then I stratify this sub-sample into preschool children (age 0-5) 
and school aged children (age 6-17), with the preschool group serving as a baseline to 
which the school aged can be contrasted.
The DID approach is appropriate as long as time-varying factors affecting health 
outcome/utilizations have the same effect on treatment and control group members. If 
there is other ongoing policy variation affecting the treatment and control group 
unequally, then DID estimates are biased. When SCHIP was first implemented, the 
economy experienced considerable expansion as well, and there were fundamental 
changes to the welfare program (the TANF program replaced the AFDC program), both 
of which would affect low income families more significantly as opposed to relatively 
high income families. For example, the unemployment rate for a given state and year
35 Regression results with high family income children serving as the control group confirm results 
obtained from using low-income children as the control group.
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could affect the availability of private insurance coverage and would further impact child 
Medicaid eligibility and utilization of care independently.36 In particular, this presents a 
problem if treatment and control groups are categorized according to family income.
Furthermore, employment growth increases the demand for preschool-aged child 
care. There has been a significant increase in federal and state funds for child care since 
the 1996 welfare reform legislation was enacted. Child Care and Development Block 
Grant (CCDBG) / Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), created in 1990 and 
amended in PRWORA in 1996, is the primary federal child care program. It is aimed to 
assist low-income families, families receiving temporary public assistance, and those 
transitioning from public assistance with obtaining child care for children up to 13 years 
old so parents can work or train. All age groups of needy children below age 13 are aided 
by this program but younger children benefit more than older ones. But as far as I am 
aware, no study in the literature has controlled for this policy variable yet. However, this 
policy can directly affect utilization of health care, especially well child visits, because 
many states require that children be up to date for numerous vaccines before enrollment 
in child care. Hence, without controlling for these trends the results are likely to be 
biased. Thus, instead of estimating the basic function specified in equation (15), I 
estimate the following equations to purge such trends by controlling for the 
unemployment rate (UNEM), TANF maximum benefits for a family of three 
(TANFMAX), TANF participation rate (TANFRATE), i.e. TANF caseload divided by 
population, and child care expenditure per recipient (CCDF). All are state level data (s is 
an index for each of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia):
36 Cawley and Simon (2005) find that macroeconomy, measured by state unemployment rate and real gross 
state product affects men’s health insurance coverage but has little impact on the health insurance coverage 
o f women and children due to Medicaid and SCHIP.
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Y„i = Pa +  P\\ * olderkid, +  p n * y r9 9  + p n * y r 02 +  /?14 * {olderkid i * y r9 9 )  +  /?15 * {olderkidi * y r0 2 )  +  P2* X f +
P 2 * U N E M S,+ P 4 * T A N F M A X si+ P 5 * T A N F R A T E „ + P 6 * C C D F SI + P .S T A T E  + e ol
(16)
Y0, = y 0 + / u *  nearpooy + y n * yr99  + y u * y r 02 + y u * (nearpoort * y r 991 ) + y l5* (nearpoort * y rO l , ) + y 2 * X t + 
y2 * UNEMS, + y 4 * TANFMAXsl + y 5 * TANFRATESI + y 6 * CCDFsl + y 7 * STATE + v oi
(17)
where X is the set of control variables used in the estimations including child’s age and 
gender, MKA’s age, MKA’s education level, family structure. When appropriate, family 
income levels are also included. State dummy variables are included in the regressions to 
control for local environmental characteristics and local differences in medical care 
delivery systems. In doing so, the net effect of state level characteristics such as state 
level policies that were unchanged between 1997 and 2002 are also controlled implicitly. 
Time is also controlled in the form of two dummy variables which are assigned a value of 
1 if the observation is from the 1999 or 2002 sample (yr99 and yr02).
4.3.2 Accounting for Differences Across State Programs and Over Time:
Reduced Form Model. SCHIP policy contains arbitrary age-eligibility cutoffs that are 
exogenous to potential beneficiaries. These eligibility thresholds measure changes in the 
relative generosity of the SCHIP program across states. There is a great deal o f variation 
in the magnitude of SCHIP policy treatment across states which the two DID approaches 
do not exploit. In order to make use of the variation in SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility across 
states, SCHIP/Medicaid income eligibility cutoffs (as a percentage of the federal poverty 
line) based on age are used to characterize SCHIP. It varies for the following four age 
groups over the period 1997-2002: infant, age 1-5, age 6-14 and age 15-17. As before, I
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also use dichotomous indicators for all 50 states and the District of Columbia to capture
time-invariant differences between states in medical care utilization and health outcomes
that may be related to SCHIP policies. Again, I include the annual state unemployment
rate, state maximum TANF benefit for a family of three, state TANF participation rate
and annual state CCDF expenditure per recipient to control for business cycle effects on
public assistance participation. Finally, I include an indicator for year 1999 and year 2002
respectively, with 1997 as the reference year to capture national trends in medical care
utilization and health outcomes. The equation to be estimated is:
Yoi = a 0+ a , * CUTOFFstj +  a 2 * X , +  a 3 * UNEM s, +  a 4 * TANFMAX s, + a 5 * TANFS, + 
a 6 * CCDFsl + a 7 * STATE +  a t * y r 9 9  +  a 9 * y r 0 2  +  a>oj
(18)
where CUTOFFj . =income eligibility for a child in age group j  at state s at time t, and
subscript “o” indexes outcome.
I estimate the above equations for the whole sample as well as for age-income 
sub-samples. That is, I stratify the whole sample according to both age (preschool versus 
school aged) and income (poor, near poor and non-poor). As a result I have six groups 
ranging from the most likely treated group, (school aged and near poor children), to the 
most unlikely treated group (preschool and non-poor children).
4.3.3 Accounting for Difference Across State Programs and Over Time: 2SLS 
Model. It is informative to use actual insurance coverage to assess the effectiveness of 
SCHIP programs. However, insurance coverage status is endogenous in the sense that it 
depends on family income, parental preference for health insurance coverage, etc. To 
deal with the endogenous nature of insurance coverage, a 2SLS model is adopted to 
directly estimate the effect of SCHIP/Medicaid participation on medical care
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utilization/health outcomes. Some research has used simulated eligibility (e.g. Currie and
Gruber 1996a, Currie and Gruber 1996b, Lykens and Jargowsky 2002) as a proxy for
enrollment to sidestep the endogeneity problem. It is a clever way to deal with
endogeneity, however, as discussed earlier, for the program to be effective, enrollment
must also increase in response to an increase in eligibility. Therefore I use eligibility
cutoffs as the instrument for insurance coverage 37and estimate the following equation:
Yoi = X „ + X t * insured , + X 1 * X i + X ,* U N E M  s, + X t * TAN F  M A X  s, + X 5 * T A N F  t, + X 6 * C C D F  st ( 19) 
+ X 1 * ST A T E  + X s * y r 99 + X 9 * yr  02 +  r ol
Therefore, this study uses various approaches to tackle each issue with a view to 
obtain robust results.
37 Since considerable evidence exists regarding the crowd-out o f  public insurance for private insurance, I 
use overall insurance coverage status as opposed to public insurance coverage status.
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Table 32 presents means and standard deviations for variables used in the 
analysis. There was a statistically significant increase in the number of publicly insured 
children and a large and statistically significant decrease in the number of privately 
insured children between 1997 and 2002, although there is a slight decrease in the 
percentage of publicly insured children in 1999. Consequently there is a modest increase 
in the overall percentage of insured children over the 1997-2002 period. The results are 
mixed for medical care utilization. For example, the average number of doctor and dentist 
visits decreased, but the average mental visits and well child visits increased. For all three 
measures of health outcome, the simple descriptive statistics show that child health 
outcomes deteriorated over this period. By and large, the table indicates similarity of 
child, MKA and family characteristics between 1997 and 2002. Substantial differences 
for state level variables such as unemployment rate, TANF participation rate and CCDF 
over this period confirm the necessity of including these state level data in all 
specifications.
Descriptive DID estimates, which are equivalent to regression DID estimates 
without control variables, are presented in Table 33. The fraction o f children with public
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insurance increased both for school aged children (age 6-17) and preschool children (age 
0-5) between 1997 and 2002. However, the descriptive DID estimate for public insurance 
is a statistically significant 3.1 percentage point increase for older children over this 
period. Therefore, the simple DID descriptive analysis shows the positive effect of 
SCHIP on increasing eligible children’s enrollment into public health insurance. 
However, in order to get an incisive assessment o f the overall effectiveness of SCHIP on 
coverage, as well as on medical care utilization and health outcomes, more rigorous 
estimations that isolate the effects of demographic and economic factors as well as the 
impact of other concurrent policies are warranted.
5.2 Regression Results
5.2.1 Effects o f  SCHIP/Medicaid on Children’s Insurance Coverage. Table 34 
presents the estimated impact of the SCHIP expansions on insurance coverage for 
children with all estimates obtained via the Linear Probability model.38 The first panel of 
Table 34 shows estimates of/?14 and /?l5 in equation (16), which are the coefficients on
the interaction terms of time and age-based treatment group dummy variables.39 The 
likelihood of being publicly insured increased and the likelihood of being privately 
insured decreased significantly more for older children than for younger children over 
this period for children of family income below 300% of FPL. For example, over the 
1997-2002 period, a school aged child will be more likely to have gained public 
insurance compared to a preschool aged child by 4 percentage points, but at the same 
time will be less likely to have private insurance by 4 percentage points. In contrast, for
38 Results from the Logit model are generally even stronger. Marginal effects from the Logit model are 
reported in Appendix C.
39 Results for the control variables are reported in Appendix B.
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children whose family income is above 300% of FPL, most should not be eligible for this 
program. The likelihood of a child in the 6-17 age group having public insurance is lower 
by 1 percentage point than that of a child in the 0-5 age group. This further strengthens 
the results for the children with family incomes below 300% of FPL. The results also 
suggest that the impact of SCHIP programs started since 1999 and become stronger in 
2002: both coefficient estimates of the interaction terms with year dummies usually have 
the same sign but the coefficient estimate of the interaction term with the later year is 
bigger. This generally applies to other outcomes such as care utilization and health 
outcomes as well as to the results obtained from income DID approaches.
Estimates o f yl4 and y l5 in equation (17), which are the coefficients on the
interaction terms o f time and income-based treatment group dummy variables, are 
summarized in the second panel of Table 34. Results from the income DID approach 
reinforce those from the age DID approach regarding private insurance coverage. The 
likelihood of being covered by any insurance decreased for all children with family 
incomes below 300% of FPL as well for school aged children within this sub-sample. But 
given the treatment and control group, it can be interpreted literally as “near poor 
children (the treatment group) are less likely to be insured than poor children (the control 
group)” for these groups of children. This confounding result could result from the anti- 
crowd-out provisions requiring a waiting period, which could lead privately insured 
children to drop their health insurance plans and become temporarily uninsured in order 
to enroll in SCHIP. Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) find evidence that longer waiting
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periods40 are related to the possibility o f a child being uninsured. In addition, given the 
possible spill-over effect of the SCHIP expansions on Medicaid, this result also makes 
sense. Poor families may become aware of this program due to SCHIP outreach efforts 
and, therefore, enroll their children into Medicaid. Consequently there is a greater 
increase in the number of insured children from poor families (with more previously 
uninsured children than near-poor and non-poor families) than from near poor families 
(many with children who already have coverage and are just switching from private to 
public insurance). In addition, within the income below 300% of FPL sub-sample, near­
poor children in the 0-5 age group are 7 percent more likely than poor children to have 
public insurance over the study period compared to, but this finding does not apply to 
children in the 6-17 age group. These results are not surprising given the difference in 
health insurance rates between older and younger children.41
These findings together suggest significant crowd-out of private insurance despite 
the explicit provisions of the SCHIP programs to prevent the substitution of public 
insurance for private insurance. However, this may not be viewed as evidence that the 
anti-crowd-out provisions are ineffective. As private insurance coverage increases with 
family income, crowd-out is a potentially bigger problem for SCHIP than for earlier 
Medicaid. Hence, it is plausible that the magnitude o f crowd-out could be larger in the 
absence of the anti-crowd-out provisions.
The last panel of Table 34 reports the estimates for a x in equation (18), which is 
the coefficient on state income eligibility level as a percentage o f FPL. Results for the 
whole sample show that SCHIP eligibility expansions effectively increased the
40 “Waiting period” refers to SCHIP regulations that require that a child must have been uninsured for a 
certain period, usually 6 months, before they are eligible for SCHIP.
41 W olfe and Scrivner (2005) also find older children are less likely to have insurance coverage.
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probability of having public insurance as well as being insured. Additionally, there is no 
evidence of crowd-out. Once the sample is stratified, results for school aged children in 
near poor families, i.e. the most likely targeted population of SCHIP programs, follow the 
same pattern as results obtained from the whole sample. As hypothesized, they are most 
likely to be affected and, by contrast, preschool children from non-poor families were 
least likely to be affected. It is also worth noting that the likelihood o f having private 
insurance is only negatively associated with SCHIP eligibility expansions for children in 
families with income below 300% of FPL. This suggests that substitution of public 
insurance for private insurance occurs for this particular income group.
5.2.2 Effects o f  SCHIP/Medicaid on Medical Care Utilization. Corresponding 
results for medical care utilization are summarized in Table 35. All except 2SLS 
estimates are obtained by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. Overall, they suggest 
that SCHIP does seem to increase utilization in general. However, morbidity may 
confound access and utilization. For example, an increase in the number of doctor visits 
may suggest deterioration in health status, although it could also reflect proper utilization 
of medical care due to improved access. Nevertheless, utilization o f preventative care is a 
strong indicator for improved access. With respect to well-child care, younger children 
are in general more likely to be taken to receive well-child care such as shots, 
immunizations and periodic check-ups for preventive care, while older children may need 
only annual check-ups as long as they stay healthy.
The age DID estimate of /3n in equation (16), reported in the first panel of Table
35, indicates that the introduction of SCHIP led to a 0.18-visit increase in the number of 
well-child care visits in 2002 for school aged children in poor and near poor families
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which therefore presents some evidence that SCHIP improved medical care utilization. 
The average well-child care visits for all children in 1997 are 1.197 visits per year as 
reported in Table 32. But the average is 0.78 visits per year for a school aged child. An 
increase of 0.18 visits per year is a 23% increase. The income DID estimates (i.e. 
estimates for yu in equation (17) reported in the second panel of Table 35 ) fails to find
such an impact for well-child care visits, which may not be unexpected once the spill­
over effect of SCHIP on Medicaid enrollment is taken into account.
Estimates from reduced form equations (estimates for a x in equation (18) 
summarized in the third panel of Table 35) suggest that income eligibility thresholds are 
positively associated with the number of well-child care visits, doctor visits and dental 
visits for the whole sample. In addition, it is noticeable that increased income eligibility 
was positively associated with the number of dental visits for school-aged children in 
near poor families as well as with well-child visits for school aged children in poor 
families. For example, increasing the income eligibility by 100 percent would increase 
the number of dental visits for a school-aged child in near poor families by 0.28 visits per 
year, which represents a 15% increase compared to the average 1.85 visits per year for 
this group of children in 1997.
Results obtained from 2SLS models (shown as \  in equation (19) in the last 
panel of Table 35) are similar to those found from the reduced form equation models: 
being insured is significantly associated with the increase in number o f doctor visits and 
well-child care visits.
5.2.2 Effects o f  SCHIP/Medicaid on Child health outcomes. Estimates for health 
outcomes are shown in Table 36. By and large, the results present mixed evidence
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regarding the effect of SCHIP expansions on child health outcomes. For example, 
estimates from the age DID model seem to suggest that SCHIP has a detrimental effect 
on children’s current health status, but estimates from income DID indicate that SCHIP 
improves children’s current health status. With respect to the reduced form models, it is 
noticeable that SCHIP is positively associated with the likelihood of having 
excellent/very good health status for school aged children in non poor families (i.e. 
treatment 3). In addition, the SCHIP expansions are significantly associated with lower 
possibility of health status getting worse for school aged children in near poor families.
A somewhat counterintuitive but common finding in the literature is that there is 
no clear link between public insurance expansions and improved health outcomes 
(Kaestner, Joyce and Racine 1999, Lykens and Jargowsky 2002, Cullen et. al 2005). Of 
course, there is always the possibility that other factors not accounted for by the empirical 
approaches obscure the effects of policy on health reporting. In sum, the findings from 
this study provide weak evidence that SCHIP expansions improve health outcomes for 
those children that had not been reached by earlier Medicaid expansions.
Finally, the appendix tables present results for other concurrent state policy 
control variables. Generally speaking, the results show that the unemployment rate tends 
to be significantly and positively associated with number of well-child visits and current 
health status. Unemployment rates are found to be negatively associated with the 
likelihood o f being privately insured or having any health insurance for low income 
children as well as for school aged children. Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) 
expenditure per child is found to be positively associated with current health status. By 
contrast, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) participation rate seems
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to have little or no impact. Thus, these findings suggest that studies without controlling 
for these policies, especially unemployment rate and CCDF, which has been overlooked 
by the literature, might yield biased estimates.
5.3 Sensitivity Check
For coverage and other outcome measures which are dummy variables, logit 
models are also used. The results are similar and slightly stronger than those obtained 
from OLS models. Marginal effects from logit models are reported in Appendix C. For 
current health status and compared health status, since the original values have a 5-point 
scale, estimates from the ordered logit model are generally consistent with OLS and logit 
estimates, which are reported in Appendix D.
In regard to the income-based DID approach, I use the experience of children 
from families with income below or equal to 150% of the FPL (i.e. the poor families) as a 
counterfactual for the experience of children in families with income between 150% and 
300% of the FPL (i.e. the near poor families). However, the near poor, defined as families 
with income between 150% and 300% of the FPL, may include too many children who 
were already enrolled in public insurance before SCHIP to serve as an appropriate 
comparison group. As an alternative, I redefine the poor families as those whose family 
income is below or equal to 200% of the FPL, and non poor families as those with 
income between 200% and 300% of the FPL. The results are similar. In addition, I use 
the experience of children from non poor families (income above 300% of the FPL) as a 
counterfactual instead o f using the experience of children from poor families. The results 
support previous findings.
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Moreover, Cullen et al. (2005) find evidence that eligible families in states that 
enacted their program via Medicaid expansions appear to be less likely to participate in 
SCHIP programs, possibly because of stigma associated with participation in the pre­
existing public insurance program. Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) also find that a separate 
SCHIP seems to be more successful in reducing the probability of being uninsured. They 
suggest that this could be due to parents’ preference, physician and providers acceptance 
or difference in administration. In contrast, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) find no 
differences between expanding eligibility through Medicaid or through a separate 
program. I explore whether expanded eligibility has different effects depending on how 
states implemented SCHIP by including a set of dummies indicating the type of SCHIP 
programs. I find no difference between different types of SCHIP programs. As an 
alternative, I add the interaction terms of SCHIP type dummy variables with key SCHIP 
variables. I do not find evidence of differentiated effects of SCHIP depending on the 
state’s option of implementing SCHIP, either.
Finally, since there are three dimensions of classifying treatment and control 
groups: near poor children vs. poor children, older children (6-17 years old) vs. younger 
children (0-5 years old), and before (1997) vs. after SCHIP implementation (1999 and 
2002), I adopt the triple Difference-in-Difference approach using OLS models. The 
results are reported in Appendix E. They suggest that SCHIP eligibility expansions lead 
to a decrease in public health insurance which is contrary to general findings in the 
literature. Almost every study examining SCHIP and its impact on take-up finds public 
health insurance coverage increased due to the implementation of SCHIP programs.
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Therefore, the results from triple DID should be interpreted with caution. I also use logit 
models, and the results there are similar.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To my knowledge, this is the first national study investigating the impact of 
SCHIP on health outcomes for children of all ages. I examine (1) SCHIP’s impact on 
child health outcomes and (2) each step in the pathway to improved health outcomes 
individually and incrementally. The results can inform policy makers about the potential 
broken link(s) in the chain connecting the SCHIP eligibility expansions and the ultimate 
objective of improved health. With any link broken, this objective of improving child 
health outcomes can not be fully achieved.
Nonetheless, I do not find consistent evidence that SCHIP programs increased 
health outcomes for eligible children. However, the programs were successful in 
increasing enrollment in public health insurance, and this increased enrollment did lead to 
higher utilization of preventive care. Taken together, the “broken link” in this case 
appears to be between utilization of care and health outcomes. I can offer several possible 
explanations for such findings. First, the medical care utilization received may be 
inappropriate or the quality of care may not be high enough to have any observable 
positive effect on health. Second, coverage and care utilization are more like flow 
variables which can be changed instantaneously compared to health, which is more like a 
stock variable and needs a much longer period to adjust. Hence, more time may be
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needed for the health outcome measures to reflect the health benefits of increased 
medical care utilization. Finally, all measures are self-reported by the MKA (Most 
Knowledgeable Adult) of the focal child, and measures of health outcome are more likely 
to contain reporting errors compared to measures of coverage and care utilization.
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Figure 3. Medicaid/SCHIP Income Eligibility (as Percentage o f Federal Poverty






Infant age 1-5 age 6-14 age>14
Source: MCH Update Jan 20, 2000 and MCH Update, 2002. "Data 
collected by the NGA Center for Best Practices”
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Table 29. Children's Medicaid (SCHIP) Eligibility Changes (1986-1997)
OBRA 1986 (Effective April 1987)
Option to states to raise the income eligibility thresholds up to 100 percent of the 
federal poverty level for children up to age 5.
OBRA 1987 (Effective July 1988)
Option to states to raise the income eligibility thresholds up to 185 percent of the 
federal poverty level for pregnant women and infants up to age one.
Option to states to extend the income eligibility thresholds up to 100 percent of 
the federal poverty level for children up to age 8.
Medicare Catastrophic Care Amendments of 1988
Mandated states to extend the income eligibility thresholds for pregnant women 
and infants up to age 1 to 75 percent of the federal poverty level by July , 1989 
and to 100 percent of the federal poverty level by July 1990.
OBRA 1989 (Effective April 1990)
Mandated states to extend the income eligibility threshold up to 133 percent of the 
federal poverty level for pregnant women and children up to age 6.
OBRA 1990 (Effective July 1991)
Mandated states to extend the income eligibility threshold up to 133 percent of the 
federal level for pregnant women and children up to age 8 and adding 1 year to 
the age cap, per year, up to 2002 when all such children up to age 18 will be 
covered. (Note that the options still exist for states to cover pregnant women and 
children up to 185 percent of the federal poverty level.)
Balanced Budget Act (BBA) 1997 (Effective October 1997)
Option to state to extend the income eligibility thresholds up to 200 percent o f the 
federal poverty level for children up to age 19.
Source: Hill 1990 and MCH Update 2000 from NGA
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Table 30. Summary o f SCHIP Program by State for 1997 and 2002
State
Expansion  




% FPL Eligibility  
C utoff (age 1-5) 
1997 2002
% FPL eligibility  
cutoff, (age 15 and  
older)
1997 2002
AK COMB Mar-99 133 200% 15 200%
AL M Feb-98 133 200 76 200
AR S Oct-98 133 200 32 200
AZ M Oct-97 200 200 200 200
CA COMB Mar-98 133 250 82 250
CO S Apr-98 133 185 39 185
CT COMB Jul-97 185 300 185 300
DC S Oct-98 133 200 100 200
DE M Oct-98 133 200 50 200
FL COMB Apr-98 133 200 28 200
GA S Sep-98 133 235 0 235
HI M Jan-00 133 200 100 200
IA M Sep-98 133 150 29 150
ID COMB Oct-97 133 185 46 185
IL COMB Jan-98 133 200 100 200
IN COMB Oct-97 133 200 39 200
KS S Jul-98 133 200 100 200
KY M Jul-98 133 200 30 200
LA COMB N ov-98 133 200 100 200
MA COMB Oct-97 133 200 125 200
MD COMB Jul-98 185 300 34 300
ME COMB Aug-98 133 200 133 200
MI COMB May-98 150 200 150 200
MN M Sep-98 275 280 275 275
MO COMB Oct-97 133 200 34 200
MS M Mar-97 133 300 100 300
MT S Jan-98 133 150 41 150
NC M Oct-98 133 185 34 185
ND S Oct-98 133 200 45 200
NE COMB May-98 185 300 185 300
NH COMB May-98 133 350 41 350
NJ M Feb-98 185 235 185 235
NM COMB Mar-99 133 250 87 250
NV S Oct-98 133 200 100 200
NY COMB Apr-98 133 140 100 140
OH M Jan-98 133 200 32 200
OK M Dec-97 133 185 48 185
OR S Sep-98 133 170 100 170
PA S Jun-98 133 235 100 235
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ented % FPL eligibility 
cutoff, 1-5 year 
olds
% FPL eligibility 
cutoff, 15 year olds
1997 2002 1997 2002
RI M Oct-97 250 250 250 250
SC M Aug-97 150 150 150 150
SD COMB Jul-98 133 200 100 200
TN M Oct-97 400 200 400 200
TX COMB Jul-98 133 200 17 200
UT S Aug-98 133 200 100 200
VA S Oct-98 225 300 225 300
VT COMB Oct-98 133 200 100 200
WA S Jan-00 200 250 200 250
WI S Apr-99 133 200 100 200
WV M Jul-98 185 200 62 200
WY S Apr-99 133 133 55 133
*Note: M = Medicaid expansion only, S = separate new insurance 
program, COMB = combination program.
Source: http://www.cins.hhs.gov/, http://wwvv.nga.org/portal/site/nga
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Infant 174 177 221 3 47
age[l,51 154 150 212 -4 58
age \6, 14] 129 123 213 -6 84
age>14 99 115 213 16 114
Source: MCH Update Jan 20, 2000 and MCH Update, 2002. "Data collected by the NGA 
Center for Best Practices”
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Table 32. Descriptive Statistics o f Key Variables for 1997 and 2002
Variables M eaning Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
H ealth Insurance Coverage
public Has public insurance 0.174 0.006 0.168 0.005 0.232 0.005
private Has private insurance 0.709 0.007 0.709 0.007 0.674 0.006
insured Has health insurance coverage 0.882 0.004 0.877 0.005 0.906 0.004
M edical C are Utilization
fdoct
Number of doctor visits last year (excluding any dental, 
emergency room, or mental health visits) 2.561 0.040 2.412 0.028 2.438 0.028
fdent No. of dental visits last year (for children aged 3 and up) 1.802 0.028 1.831 0.024 1.748 0.019
fment
Number of mental health visits last year (for children aged 3 
and up) 0.478 0.042 0.536 0.027 0.647 0.036
uwellchd No. of well child visits past 12 months 1.197 0.021 1.228 0.019 1.249 0.014
H ealth Outcome
disbl
Whether has health conditions that limit activity. Dummy 
variable. =1 if yes; =0 if no 0.082 0.003 0.089 0.003 0.101 0.003
health
Current health status: l=very good/excellent; 0=poor, fair, 
good 0.954 0.002 0.876 0.003 0.868 0.003
worse
Current health compared to 12 months ago: l=much worse, 
somewhat worse; 0=about the same, somewhat better, much 0.020 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.023 0.001
Child C haracteristics
girl Dummy variable. 0.488 0.006 0.488 0.005 0.488 0.004
uage child's age 8.444 0.062 8.522 0.056 8.603 0.049
black Black 0.156 0.005 0.153 0.005 0.159 0.005
hispanic Hispanic 0.148 0.004 0.158 0.004 0.178 0.004
other Other race/ethnicity 0.047 0.003 0.048 0.003 0.052 0.002
age617 child between 6-17 years old 0.664 0.005 0.671 0.004 0.678 0.004
MKA and Household Characteristics
mkafem MKA is female 0.808 0.004 0.799 0.005 0.820 0.004
umkaage MKA's age 36.295 0.106 36.600 0.084 37.213 0.091
mkahs MKA has high school diploma 0.278 0.007 0.254 0.005 0.244 0.004
mkasc MKA has some college education 0.316 0.006 0.315 0.005 0.303 0,004
mkabd MKA has bachelor or higher degree 0.248 0.006 0.262 0.005 0.287 0.005
working MKA is working 0.684 0.006 0.697 0.005 0.667 0.005
parent 1 Living in single parent family 0.267 0.006 0.247 0.005 0.250 0.004
pov300b Family income below 300% FPL 0.616 0.007 0.594 0.006 0.560 0.005
chldO 5 Number of children aged 0-5 years old in the household 0.765 0.013 0.751 0.012 0.752 0.011
chld6 17 Number of children aged 6-17 years old in the household 1.658 0.018 1.679 0.023 1.670 0.017
west West 0.224 0.006 0.239 0.005 0.236 0.004
midwest Midwest 0.237 0.005 0.241 0.005 0.229 0.005
south South 0.352 0.006 0.337 0.005 0.356 0.005
Policy and T rend  Variables
cutoff SCHIP income eligibility cutoff 1.247 0.007 2.111 0.006 2.199 0.003
tanfmax Maximum TANF benefit for family of 3 4.015 0.018 4.069 0.015 4.221 0.014
tanf TANF caseload 0.042 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.018 0.000
unem Unemployment rate 4.979 0.014 4.250 0.009 5.808 0.009
ccdf CCDF average expenditure per recipient 3.564 0.016 4.208 0.021 5.200 0.013
Sample size 34,399 35,897 34,292
W eighted sample size 71,121,695 71,890,999 72,543,589
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Table 33. Descriptive Income DID Analysis for SCHIP’s Impact on the Probability 
of Being SCHIP/Medicaid Insured
Before Expansion of 
SCHIP/Medicaid 
Eligibility (1997)




Treatment Group (age 6-17) 
(any family income)
14.1% (0.006) 21.0% (0.004) 7.0% (0.007)*
Control Group (age 0-5) 
(any family income)
23.8% 27.7% (0.008) 3.9% (0.014)*
Difference in Differences 3.1% (0.012)*
Notes:
1. Numbers are Means and standard errors (in paratheses); 
2 “ *” indicates significance at 0.05 [test of last column].
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Table 34. The Impact o f the SCHIP Expansions on Insurance Coverage
Approach I: Age DID
| P u b lic  | P rivate | In sured
W h o le  S am p le
a g e 6 1 7 * y r 9 9 0 .0 2 -0 .0 2 0
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )* (0 .0 1 )
a g e 6 1 7 * y r 0 2 0 .0 2 -0 .0 2 0
( 0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )* (0 .0 1 )
In co m e  <  3 0 0 %  F PL
a g e 6 1 7 * y r 9 9 0 .0 3 -0 .0 4 -0 .0 1
( 0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 )* * (0 .0 1 )
a g e 6 1 7 * y r 0 2 0 .0 4 -0 .0 4 0
(0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 1 )* * (0 .0 1 )
In co m e  > =  3 0 0 %  F PL
a g e 6 1 7 * y r 9 9 -0 .0 1 0 .01 0
(0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )
a g e 6 1 7 * y r 0 2 -0 .0 1 0 .01 -0 .0 1
(0 .0 1 )* (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )
Approach II: Income DID(for incom e < 300% FPL sub-sample)
|  P u b lic  | P rivate | In su red
In co m e  <  30 0 %  F P L  su b -sam p le
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9 0 .0 3 -0 .0 6 -0 .0 3
(0 .0 2 )* (0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 2 )*
p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2 0 .0 2 -0 .0 7 -0 .0 5
(0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 1 )* *
A g e  grou p  6 -1 7
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9 0 .0 2 -0 .0 5 -0 .0 3
(0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 2 )*
p o v !5 0 p * y r 0 2 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 7 -0 .0 8
(0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 2 )* *
A g e  gro u p  0 -5
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9 0 .0 5 -0 .0 7 -0 .0 2
(0 .0 2 )* (0 .0 3 )* * (0 .0 2 )
p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2 0 .0 7 -0 .0 8 -0 .0 1
(0 .0 3 )* * (0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 2 )
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Table 34. (Continued)
Approach III: Reduced form equations
Public Private Insured
Whole sample 0.03 -0.01 0.02
(0.01)** (0.01) (0.00)**
Treatmentl: Income 150%-299% FPL. aae 6-17 0.04 0 0.04
(0.01)** (0.02 (0.01)**
Treatment2: Income <150% FPL. aae 6-17 0.05 -0.03 0.02
(0.02)* (0.02 (0.02
Treatment3: Income >=300% FPL. aae 6-17 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01 (0.01 (0.01)*
Treatment4:Income 150%-299% FPL. aae 0-5 0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03 (0.03 (0.02
Treatment5:Income < 150% FPL. aae 0-5 0.05 -0.03 0.03
(0.03)* -0.03 -0.03
Control aroup:Income >=300% FPL. aae 0-5 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01 (0.01 (0.01















1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, * at 0.1 level.
2. Coefficients of/?14 ,/? ]5 in Eq. ( 1 6 ) , in Eq. (17),a ] in Eq. (18) are reported.
3. Estimates are obtained from OLS models, marginal effect o f  logit models are reported in 
Appendix C.
4. All regressions include control variables such as child and family characteristics, state dummies 
and state level variables listed in Table 32.
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Table 35. The Impact o f the SCHIP Expansions on Medical Care Utilization
Approach I: Aee DID
1 Doctor | Dental I Mental 1 Well-child
Whole Sample
age617*yr99 0.19 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
CO.10)* (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
age617*yr02 0.22 0.26 0.11 0.06
10.12)* (0.06)** (0.08) (0.06)
Income < 300% "PL
age617*vr99 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.07
(0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
age617*yr02 0.27 0.23 0.2 0.18
10.14)* (0.09)** (0.11)* (0.09)*
Income >= 300% FPL
age617*yr99 0.37 -0.03 0.05 -0.03
(0.15)** (0.09) (0.1) (0.08)
age617*yr02 0.2 0.25 0.06 -0.12
(0.16 (0.08)** (0.09) (0.09)
Approach H: Income DIDIfor income< 300% FPL sub-sample)
I Doctor | Dental I Mental I Well-child
Income < 300% FPL sub-sample
povl50p*yr99 0.07 -0.13 -0.13 0.08
(0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08)
povl50p*yr02 0.10 -0.13 0.01 0.06
(0.12) (0.08)* (0.12) (0.08)
Age group 6-17
povl50p*yr99 0.08 -0.08 -0.13 0.07
(0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09)
povl50p*yr02 0.08 -0.09 0.05 -0.01
(0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07)
Age group 0-5
povl50p*yr99 0.05 -0.31 -0.15 0.13
(0.22 (0.11)** (0.14 (0.14
povl50p*yr02 0.12 -0.21 -0.17 0.19
(0.22) (0.09)* (0.12) (0.15)
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Table 35. (Continued)
Approach III: Reduced form equations
Doctor Dental Mental Well-child
Whole sample 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.15
10.06')** (0.04)* (0.07 (0.03)**
Treatment 1:
Income 150% - 299% FPL. Age 6-17
(0.02 0.28 0.07 0.05
(0.09) (0.10)** (0.11) (0.03)
Treatment2:
Income <150% FPL, Age 6-17
0.34 0.03 0.37 0.23
(0.15)* (0.07) (0.23) (0.08)**
Treatment3:
income >=300% FPL, Age 6-17
0.04 0.05 -0.16 0.04
(0.1) (0.07) (0.11) (0.03)
Treatments
Income 150%-299% FPL, Age 0-5
0.01 0.1 0.05 0.21
(0.27) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12)*
Treatment5:
Income < 150% FPL, Age 0-5
-0.32 -0.01 0.23 -0.08
(0.23) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18)
Control group:
Income >=300% FPL, Age 0-5
-0.08 0.02 -0.12 0.00
(0.19) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Stratifying whole sample by income
Income below 300% FPL
0.23 0.09 0.18 0.23
(0.08)** (0.06)* (0.11)* (0.04)**
Income above 300% FPL
0.14 0.01 -0.15 0.06
(0.08)* (0.06) (0.10) (0.03)*
Stratifying whole sample by age
Age group 6-17
0.11 0.12 0.06 0.09
(0.07) (0.05)** (0.09) (0.03)**
Age group 0-5
-0.14 0.04 0.05 0.02
(0.14) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
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Table 35. (Continued)
Approach IV: 2SLS
Doctor Dental Mental Well-child
Whole sample 11.86 3.84 2.42 9.45
(4.72)* (2.43) (4.31) (2.99)**
Treatmentl: Income 150%-299% FPL, A ge 6-17 (2.50) (3.70)* (3.20) (1.10)
(13.70) (3.48) (17.99) (9.74)
Treatment3: Income >=300% FPL, Age 6-17 3.61 5.26 -15.95 4.1
(10.24) (7.83) (15.08) (4.23)
Treatment4: Income 150%-299% FPL, Age 0-5 -2.04 -16.58 -5.02 -36.78
(51.13) (75.18) (15.66) (128.76)
Treatment5:Income < 150% FPL, Age 0-5 -12.4 0.2 -14.01 -3.01
(17.24) (4.30) (38.63) (8.08)
Control group:Income >=300% FPL, Age 0-5 -475.93 1.65 -12.83 -2.66
(20912.63) (6.71) (20.35) (671.14)
Stratifying whole sample by income
Income below 300%
9.95 4.24 7.7 9.93
(4.05)* (2.77) (5.87) (3.40)**
Income above 300%
20.59 1.33 -14.32 8.82
(19.16) (5.99) (12.21) (7.58)
Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group
4.85 5.44 2.75 3.98
(3.62) (2.45)* (4.31) (1.79)*
0-5 age group
-33.81 -4.21 -8.09 5.17
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, * at 0.1 level.
2. Coefficients o f  /?14 and/?15 in Eq. (16), y l4 and y l5 in Eq. (17), a { in Eq. (18) and \  in Eq.(19) are 
reported.
3. Except for the two-stage least squares models, estimates are obtained from OLS models. Marginal effect 
o f logit models are reported in Appendix C.
4. All regression included control variables such as child and family characteristics, state dummies and state 
level variables listed in Table 32.
5. The instruments for the two-stage least squares models include all dependent variables listed in Table 32.
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Table 36. The Impact of the SCHIP Expansions on Health Outcomes
Approach I: Age DID
Morbidity Good health Worse Health
Whole Sample
age617*yr99 r 0.01 [  -0.03 -0.01
r (0.01) 1 (0.01)** (0.00)
age617*yr02 '  0.01 | -0.04 -0.01
k ro.on 1 ro.oiv* ro.oo)
Income< 300% FPL
age617*yr99 0.02 -0.04 -0.01
(0.01)* (0.01)** (0.01)
age617*yr02 0.02 -0.06 -0.01
(0.01)* (0.01)** (0.01)
Income >=300% FPL
age617*yr99 -0.01 -0.03 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)
age617*yr02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)
Approach II: Income DID(for income < 300% FPL sub-sample)
Morbidity Good health Worse Health
Income <300% FPL sub-sampie
povl50p*yr99 -0.01 0.10 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)** (0.01)
povl50p*yr02 0.02 0.07 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)
Age group 6-17
povl50p*yr99 -0.02 0.11 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)** (0.01)
povl50p*yr02 0.02 0.08 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)** (0.01)
Age group 0-5
povl50p*yr99 0.01 0.07 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)** (0.01)
povl50p*yr02 0.00 0.05 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)
- 22 8 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 36. (continued)
Approach HI: Reduced form equations
Cohort Morbidity Good health Worse Health
Whole sample r 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 (o-oi) (0.01) (0.00)
Treatment 1 income 150%-299% FPL, Age 6-17 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)*
Treatment2: Income <150% FPL. Age 6-17 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)








Treatment5: Income < 150% FPL, Age 0-5 -0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Control group: Income >=300% FPL, Age 0-5 -0.01 0.00 0.00*o© (0.01) (0.01)
Stratifying whole sample by income
Income below 300% 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Income above 300% 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group 0.00 [ 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
0-5 age group -0.01 [ 0.00 0.00
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Table 36. (continued)
Approach IV: 2SLS
Cohort Morbidity Good Health Worse Health
Whole sample -0.18 -0.10 -0.10
(0.36) (0.31) (0.18)
Treatmentl: Income 150%-299% FPL, A ge 6-17 -0.44 -0.00 -0.36
(0.40) (0.27) (0.22)
Treatment2: Income <150%  FPL, A ge 6-17 1.12 0.51 0.69
(1.12) (1.23) (0.64)
Treatment3: Income >=300%  FPL,Age 6-17 0.50 0.92 -0.04
(1.26) (0.73) (0.55)
Treatment4: Income 150%-299% FPL, A ge 0-5 -1.37 3.02 0.57
14.94) (11.23) (2.11)
Treatment5: Income < 150% FPL, A ge 0-5 -0.49 0.72 0.04
(1.05) (1.30) (0.19)
Control group: Income >=300%  FPL, A ge 0-5 -72.53 -27.86 6.37
(3210.45) (1233.80) (284.86)
Stratifying whole sample by income
Income below  300% o f  FPL -0.11 -0.33 -0.10
(0.34) (0.34) (0.17)
Income above 300% o f  FPL -0.49 0.28 -0.16
(1.04) (0.68) (0.58)
Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group 0.21 0.35 -0.01
(0.38) (0.33) (0.18)
0-5 age group -1.38 -0.02 -0.10
(4.12) (2.42) (0.89)
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, * at 0.1 level.
2. Coefficients o f[5U ,f3l5 inEq. in Eq. (17), Oj in Eq.(18), \  in Eq. (19) are 
reported.
3. Except for the two-stage least squares models, estimates are obtained from OLS models, 
marginal effect of logit models are reported in Appendix C.
4. All regressions include control variables such as child and family characteristics, state 
dummies and state level variables listed in Table 32.
5. The instruments for the two-stage least squares models include all dependent variables listed 
in Table 32.
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APPENDIX A. Data Source for the State Level Variables
Data of TANF caseloads for each state come from Department of Health and 
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. Data on estimated population 
of each state is obtained from the U.S. Bureau o f the Census. Data on TANF maximum 
benefit for a family o f three is taken from table prepared by the Congressional Research 
Service on the basis of CRS surveys of state benefit levels. Ratios of state TANF 
recipients to state estimated population in 1997 and 2002 are derived and included in all 
regressions. Unemployment rates for each state come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), U.S. Department of Labor. Data on overall CCDF expenditure and the average 
monthly number o f children served by CCDF in each state in 1997 and 2002 are obtained 
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child Care Bureau. Data on 
SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility rules come from Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Update 
Jan 20, 2000 and Update 2002 collected by the National Governor’s Association (NGA)
Center for Best Practices. Sources for the state level data are summarized as follows:
State level data Source
TANF caseloads
Department o f Health and Human Services, 
Administration for Children and Families
Estimated population U.S. Bureau of the Census
TANF maximum benefit
From table prepared by the Congressional 
Research Service on the basis of CRS surveys 
o f state benefit levels.
Unemployment rate Bureau o f Labor Statistics
CCDF expenditure and number o f recipients
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Child Care Bureau
SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility rules
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Update 
Jan 20, 2000 and Update 2002 collected by 
the National Governor’s Association (NGA) 
Center for Best Practices.
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APPENDIX B. SCHIP Eligibility and Health Insurance Coverage, Medical Care
Utilization and Health Outcomes (Age DID for Whole Sample with All Independent
Variables Reportet )





age617 -0.06 0.07 0.00 -1.63 0.75 0.24 -1.02 0.06 0.02 0.01
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01) (0.12)** (0.05)** (0.11)* (0.06)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)
yr99 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.21 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.11)* (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.00)
yr02 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.23 0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.06 0.00
(0.02)** (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.10)* (0.13) (0.07)* (0.01) (0.01)** (0.00)
age617yr99 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.19 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)* (0.01) (0.10)* (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.00)
age617yr02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.22 0.26 0.11 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)* (0.01) (0.12)* (0.06)** (0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.00)
girl 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0,00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)** (0.04)** (0.02) (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00)
black 0.15 -0.16 -0.01 -0.49 -0.27 -0.26 0.32 0.00 -0.05 0.00
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)* (0.06)** (0.04)** (0.07)** (0.04)** (0.01) (0.01)** (0.00)
hispanic 0.08 -0.17 -0.09 -0.46 -0.27 -0.20 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.00
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.05)** (0.04)** (0.05)** (0.03) (0,01)** (0.01)** (0.00)
other 0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.35 -0.03 -0.19 0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.00
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.11)** (0.07) (0.07)** (0.08)* (0.01) (0.01)* (0.00)
parent 1 0.18 -0.18 0.00 0.18 -0.02 0.51 0.10 0.04 -0.05 0.01
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.00) (0.05)** (0.03) (0.05)** (0.03)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
mka female 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.51 -0.08 0.21 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01
(0.00)** (0.01)** (0.00) (0.04)** (0.04)* (0.04)** (0.02)* (0.00)** (0,00)** (0.00)**
mkaage 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)*
mka HS -0.16 0.27 0.11 0.09 0.14 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.00
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0,06) (0.05)** (005) (0.04)* (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.00)*
mka SC -0.21 0,34 0.13 0.25 0.25 O il -0.07 -0.05 0.13 0.00
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.06)** (0.04)** (0.06)* (0.04)* (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.00)
mka college -0.27 0.44 0.17 0.45 0.41 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.17 0.00
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.06)** (0.05)** (0.06) (0.04) (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.00)
chi 1 dO 5 0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.17 -0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01)** (0.00)** (0.00) (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
chlld6 17 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.02)** (0.01) (0.02)* (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00)
west 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0,78 0.10 -0.83 -0.27 -0.05 0.10 -0.03
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.72) (0.93) (0.82) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05)* (0.02)
midwest -0.05 0,00 -0.05 -0.23 -0.79 -1.14 -0.57 -0.14 0.12 -0.01
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.39) (0.42)* (0.74) (0.19)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.02)
south -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.92 -0.34 -1.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.42)* (0.53) (0.75) (0.24) (0.04)** (0.07) (0.03)
TANF max -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
TANFrate -0.21 -0.33 -0.54 4.79 -3.85 -3.32 3.23 -0.18 0.86 -0.07
(0.55) (0.64) (0.48) (4.10) (3.54) (4.59) (2.37) (0.34) (0.45)* (0.16)
Unem rate 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)** (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)* (0.00) (0.00)* (0.00)
CCDF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)** (0.00)
age617ccdf 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)* (0.00)** (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)* (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 103860 103860 103860 103860 89069 86978 103860 103860 103860 103860
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicate significance at 0.01 level, * at 0.05 level.
2. All coefficients in Eq. (16), Eq. (17) and Eq. (18) except those on State dummies are reported.
3. Estimates are obtained from OLS models.
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APPENDIX C. SCHIP Eligibility, Health Insurance Coverage and Health Outcomes
Marginal Effects from Logit Models
Approach I: Age D ifference-In-D ifference






age617*yr99 0.013 -0.024* -0.003 0.004 -0.022** -0.005
age617*yr02 0.029** -0.028* -0.005 -0.007 -0.026** -0.006*
Income below 300% PFL
age617*yr99 0.025 -0.043** -0.009 0.012 -0.023 -0.007*
age617*yr02 0.049** -0.043** -0.004 0.006 -0.033 -0.006
Income above 300% FPL
age617*yr99 -0.005 0.014 0.006 -0.011 -0.029* 0.001
age617*yr02 -0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.028* -0.019 -0.002
Approach II: Incom e D ifference-In-D ifference (for incom e <  300%  FPL sub-sam 3le)





povl50p*yr99 0.066** -0.090** -0.032* -0.001 0.007 0.004
povl50p*yr02 0.139** -0.105** -0.042** 0.021* -0.017 0.003
Age6-17
povl50p*yr99 0.067** -0.085** -0.041* -0.007 0.012 0.001
povl50p*yr02 0.142** -0.107** -0.067** 0.025 -0.015 0.005
Age0-5
povl50p*yr99 0.067* -0.099** -0.019 0.008 -0.001 0.002
povl50p*yr02 0.144** -0.105** 0.002 0.005 -0.012 -0.003
A pproach III: Reduced Form Equations





Whole sample 0.027** -0.013 0.014** -0.004 0.006 -0.002
Treatmentl:
Income 150%-299% FPL, Age 6-17 0.040** 0.001 0.035** -0.014 0.012 -0.004
Treatment2:
Income <150% FPL, A ge 6-17 0.051 -0.035 0.014 0.0197 0.0118 0.003
Treatment3:
Income >300% FPL, A ge 6-17 -0.0012 0.017 0.018** 0.004 0.017** -0.000
Treatments
Income 150%-299% FPL, Age 0-5 0.017 -0.027 0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.003
Treatment5:
Income < 150% FPL, A ge 0-5 0.062* -0.039 0.025 -0.007 0.028 -0.000
Control group:
Income >300% FPL, A ge 0-5 -0.006 0.01 0 -0.011* -0.001 0.000
Stratifying whole sample by income
Below 300% FPL 0.050** -0.032** -0.019** -0.004 0.004 -0.002
Above 300% FPL 0 0.015 0.012* -0.003 0.008* -0.001
Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group 0.023** 0.001 0.029** 0.004 0.012* -0.000
0-5 age group 0.013 -0.014 0.006 -0.004 -0.009 0.001
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APPENDIX D. The Impact of the SCHIP Expansions on Health Outcomes: Ordered 
Logit Model
Approach I: Age Difference-In-Difference
Current Health  
Status
C om pared H ealth  
Status
W ho e Sam ple
age617*yr99 -0 .15 -0 .09
(0 .06 )* (0 .0 8 )
age617*yr02 -0 .25 0.01
(0 .05 )** (0.07)
Incom e <  300%  FPL
age617*yr99 -0 .05 -0 .15
( 0 .0 8 ) (0.09)*
age617*yr02 -0 .27 0 .02
(0 .07 )** (0.10)
Incom e > =  300%  FPL
age617*yr99 -0 .35 0.03
(0 .10 )** (0.14)
age617*yr02 -0 .22 -0 .02
(0 .11 )** (0.13)
Approach II: Income Difference-In-Difference (for income < 300% FPL
sub-sample)
Current H ealth  
Status
Com pared H ealth  
Status
Incom e <  300%  FPL sub-sam ple
p o v l5 0 p * y r9 9 -0 .15 0.03
(0 .08 )* (0.12)
p o v l5 0 p * y r0 2 -0 .17 0 .10
, (0 .08 )* (0.09)
A g e  group 6 -1 7
p o v l5 0 p * y r9 9 -0 .20
0.03
(0 .10)* (0.16)
p o v l5 0 p * y r0 2 -0 .21 0.12
(0 .10)* (0.13)
A g e group 0-5
p o v l5 0 p * y r9 9 -0 .04 0.07
(0 .1 3 ) (0.13)
p o v l5 0 p * y r0 2 -0 .08 0.09
(0 .1 2 ) (0.13)
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APPENDIX E. The Impact of the SCHIP Expansions on Coverage, Medical Care
Utilization and Health Outcomes: Triple Difference-in-Difference from OLS Model




povl50p_age617_yr9902 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.13 0.09 -0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)* (0.23) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02)** (0.01)
p o v l5 0 p -0 .3 4 0 .39 0 .0 5 -0 .0 8 -0.01 -0 .02 -0 .18 -0 .02 0 .0 0 0 .01
(0 .0 2 )* * (0 .02)** (0 .0 1 )* * (0 .1 8 ) (0 .0 8 ) (0 .0 8 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .01 )* (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 0 )
y r9 9 0 2 -0 .0 2 0.01 -0 .01 -0 .13 0 .03 0 .06 -0 .08 0 .0 0 -0 .0 9 0.01
(0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .1 8 ) (0 .0 8 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .02 )** (0 .0 0 )
a g e 6 17 -0 .1 4 0 .1 0 -0 .0 4 -1 .53 0 .4 3 0 .2 4 -1 .0 2 0 .0 7 0 .03 0.01
(0 .0 2 )* * (0 .02)** (0 .0 2 )* (0 .18 )** (0 .0 9 )* * (0 .1 5 ) (0 .10 )** (0 .02 )** (0 .0 1 )* (0 .0 1 )
p o v l5 0 p  y r9 9 0 2 0 .0 6 -0 .08 -0 .01 0 .0 9 -0 .23 -0 .14 0 .1 6 0 .01 0 .0 6 0 .0 0
(0 .0 2 )* * (0 .02 )** (0 .0 2 ) (0 .2 2 ) (0 .0 9 )* * (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )* * (0 .0 0 )
p o v l5 0 p _ a g e 0 .1 0 -0.03 0 .0 6 -0 .03 0 .3 0 -0 .0 6 0 .0 2 -0.01 0 .0 2 -0 .02
(0 .0 2 )* * (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 )* * (0 .2 0 ) (0 .1 0 )* * (0 .1 2 ) (0 .1 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )*
ag e y r9 9 0 2 0 .0 6 -0 .04 0 .0 2 0.15 0.01 0 .0 0 0.18 0 .0 2 -0 .08 -0.01
(0 .0 2 )* * (0 .02)** (0 .0 2 ) (0 .1 9 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .01 )** (0 .0 1 )
O b serv atio n s 1 0 3 8 6 0 103860 1 0 3 8 6 0 1038 6 0 8 9 0 6 9 8 6 9 7 8 1 0 3 8 6 0 103860 1 0 3860 1 0 3 8 6 0
N ote:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.01 level, * at 0.05 level.
2. Estimates are obtained from OLS models.
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PART III: GRANDPARENTS RAISING GRANDCHILDREN: 
THEORY, REALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The most recent estimate by the U.S. Census Bureau (2004) shows that nationally 
there are 5.76 million children under the age of 18 living in households with a 
grandparent present (7.8 percent of all children).42 This represents a 50 percent increase 
since 1990. The Census estimates that the percentage of children under 18 living in a 
grandparent-headed home was 6.3 percent in 2000, compared with 5.5 percent in 1990, 
3.6 percent in 1980 and 3.2 percent in 1970.
About 1.5 million of these children nationwide are living in grandparent headed 
households with neither parent present, which represents 2.05 percent of all children.
This family form occurs in all racial groups: 40% of these grandparents are white, 39 % 
are African American, 16% are Hispanic and 1% are Asian. However, this living 
arrangement is least common among Asian Americans and most common among African 
Americans: only 0.5% of all Asian American children were living in grandparent 
households with neither parent present, while 5.1 percent of African American children 
are living in such households. The corresponding estimates are 1.5 percent for non- 
Hispanic white and 1.8 percent for Hispanics. In addition, children living in grandparent
42 Data are retrieved online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2004.html. 
The percentage is calculated by the author.
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households with neither parent present are more likely to live in poverty compared to all 
US children (61 percent vs. 40 percent) (2004 U.S. Census Bureau).43
The public policy significance of the rapid growth in grandparent households can 
be fully understood in the context of underlying factors contributing to the ongoing trend. 
Substance abuse is one of the most common reasons for the increased number of children 
living with grandparents. A number of studies have shown that the crack-cocaine 
epidemic has increased the number of African-American grandparents caring for their 
grandchildren (Minkler et al. 1992, Minkler et al. 1993, Minkler et al. 1994, Roe et al. 
1994). An increase in the incarceration rate of women over the past three decades has 
also contributed to this trend (Acoca 1998, Barnhill 1996, Dressel and Barnhill 1994, 
Kurshan 1999, Ruiz 2002). In addition, the AIDS epidemic also plays a role in this 
increasing shift of responsibility for child rearing to grandparents (Levine 1995, Joslin 
and Brouard 1995).
Finally, divorce and abuse or neglect of children are also among the most cited 
reasons for grandparents to become primary caregivers for grandchildren (Minkler and 
Roe 1993, Chalfie 1994, Dressel and Barnhill 1994, Minkler and Roe 1996, Minkler and 
Fuller-Thomson 1999, Pebley and Rudkin 1999). Given the risk factors associated with 
these social issues and the vulnerability of those families, a number of public policies 
may target these households or might have consequential implications for them.
A pragmatic and philosophical shift in public policy is also likely to have 
contributed to the increase in the number o f grandparent caregivers (Ingram 1996, 
Berrick et al. 1998). Child welfare policy makers began to view grandparents as a safety
43 Again, raw data are retrieved online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh- 
fam/cps2Q04.html and all percentages are calculated by the author.
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net for grandchildren in the early 1980s. Consequently, several policy changes during the 
1990s, including welfare reform, led the government to shift the burden o f family 
problems to family members, mainly to grandparents (Mullen 1996, Bonecutter and 
Gleeson 1997, Pebley and Rudkinl999). These federal policies influence both state 
policies and the practice of local welfare agencies. They also create specific incentives 
for grandparent household formation.
In sum, concurrent demographic changes and public policy shifts have lead to an 
increase in the number of grandparent headed households in the United States. However, 
a careful examination of the literature reveals that there are no economic studies that 
investigate how public policies have influenced the number o f grandparents caring for 
their grandchildren. This study specifically examines the impact of welfare reform on 
grandparent household formation. I use data from the 1997, 1999 and 2002 waves of the 
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF), in conjunction with other state level 
data, to empirically investigate how state TANF choices have influenced the formation of 
grandparent headed households while controlling for other related contemporary public 
policies, such as state kinship care policies and the State Children Health Insurance 
Programs (SCHIP).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
To my knowledge, although there are many existing studies on grandparent 
households, none are designed to examine effects of welfare reform and other public 
policies on grandparent household formation. Thus, to a large extent I must look at more 
general studies of grandparent households and examine what gaps remain in the 
literature.
Most of the existing research on grandparent households focuses on documenting 
the socio-demographic characteristics of grandparents raising grandchildren in the United 
States (Chalfie 1994, Fuller-Thomson et al. 1997, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler, 2000) 
and problems faced by grandparent caregivers (Minkler and Roe 1996, Minkler, Berrick 
and Needell 1999, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler, 2000). For example, Chalfie (1994) 
finds that the vast majority (68%) of grandparent caregivers are white, but grandparent 
caregivers are disproportionally represented by African Americans (29%); grandmothers 
are more likely than grandfathers to be parenting their grandchildren (60% are 
grandmothers and 40% are grandfathers). Even when both grandparents are present, 
grandmothers usually assume the lion's share of caregiving duties. Grandparent 
caregivers are heavily (57%) concentrated in the South. According to Fuller-Thomson et 
al. (1997) custodial grandparents in the 1990s were less likely to be married, to be non-
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Hispanic whites, to be male, and to have completed high school than noncaregiving 
grandparents.
Health problems, economic hardships, lack of government support, social 
isolation and problems of raising children with special needs are among the problems 
faced by grandparents who are parenting their grandchildren (Burton 1992, Minkler and 
Roe 1996, Casper and Bryson 1998, Scarcella et al. 2003, Fuller-Thomson et al.1997, 
Dressel and Barnhill 1994). It is possible that grandparents in these households already 
faced these problems before caring for their grandchildren. But taking in and caring for a 
dependent child (or many dependent children) exacerbates the hardship. These findings 
reinforce the significance of public policies addressing the needs of these most vulnerable 
families.
Relatively fewer studies focus on the child outcomes when investigating 
grandparent caregiving. Dubowitz et al. (1994) is the first comprehensive assessment of 
the physical and mental health and educational status of children in kinship care; it also 
compares children in informal kinship care44 with children in foster care45, children in 
poverty and children from the general population. The study finds that children in kinship 
care have substantial health care needs relative to children living with their parents. Many 
of the children’s health problems had not been identified by their caregivers, and even 
when they had been, follow-up care was often lacking; many children also had substantial 
school-related problems. However, this study consists of a sample of 524 kinship care
44 Kinship care generally refers to the provision o f  full-time nurturing and protection o f  children by persons 
who have a family relationship bond with the children (other than their own parents).
45 Foster care involves services from child welfare agencies where the child is placed in the custody o f  the 
state by a court. Foster care refers to the care o f  children on a full-time, temporary basis by persons other 
than their own parents. Foster care is intended to offer a supportive family environment to children whose 
natural parents cannot raise them because o f  the parents' physical or mental illness, the child's behavioral 
difficulties, or problems within the family environment, e.g., child abuse, alcoholism, extreme poverty, or 
crime.
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giving households under the supervision of the Baltimore City Department of Social 
Services in 1989, where 47 percent of caregivers are grandmothers. Therefore their 
results cannot be generalized to all grandparent caregiving. In addition, this study is a 
simple descriptive analysis and is not a multivariate study.
Casper and Bryson (1998) conduct a multivariate analysis which focuses on 
comparing different family structures within grandparent maintained families. Using 
1997 Current Population Survey (CPS) data, they find that children living in grandparent 
households without either parent present do not fare as well economically as their 
counterparts living in their parents’ homes. In particular, they find that grandchildren in 
both-grandparents, no-parents-present families are much more likely to be lack health 
insurance than grandchildren living in grandmother only, no parent present households or 
grandchildren living in grandfather only, no parent present households. Casper and 
Bryson also find that grandchildren in grandmother only, no parents present families are 
more likely to be poor and receive public assistance. Their analysis is the only 
multivariate analysis on this topic to the best of my knowledge.
As noted by Scarcella et al. (2003), children cared for by grandparents may 
already have a variety of behavioral and emotional problems due to the trauma o f being 
separated from a parent as well as the experience of abuse or neglect. This study reports 
that about one-fifth of children cared for by their grandparents and other relatives have 
either a health condition that limited their activities or are in fair or poor health. Roughly 
one-tenth of 6-17 year-old children living with grandparents or other relatives have 
elevated levels of behavioral or emotional problems. Twenty-six percent of children 
living with their grandparents have low levels of school engagement. This study also uses
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data from NSAF, but only from the 1999 round. In addition, the study presents only 
bivariate comparisons of characteristics of grandparent households with no parent present 
versus households headed by other relatives, as well as the characteristics of children 
living in them. Lack of multivariate analysis limits our ability to assess the relative 
importance of various factors contributing to the disadvantage of different groups of 
grandchildren.
No studies in the literature have empirically investigated why and how 
grandparent households form. By using 1997, 1999, 2002 data from the National Survey 
of America’s Families, this preliminary study represents the first effort in the literature 
that investigates the factors influencing grandparent household formation, with a focus on 
TANF related policies. Next I am going to discuss these policies, with a focus on their 
implications for grandparent household formation.
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CHAPTER 3
PUBLIC POLICY RELATED TO GRANDPARENT HOUSEHOLDS
Public policies usually target relative caregivers as one group instead of aiming 
specifically at grandparent caregivers. This is despite the fact that many studies have 
found that a majority of kin caregivers are grandparents (Berrick et al. 1994, Burnette 
1997, Chalfie 1994, Harden et al. 1997, LeProhn 1994, Macomber and Geen, 2002, Jones 
2003). In this section I will discuss the primary public assistance programs available to 
kinship care families. Then I will explain the major policy implications in the context of 
grandparent caregiving, depending on the type of kinship care arrangements. For the 
purpose of this study, I will focus on the impact of the 1996 welfare reform on 
grandparent household formation while at the same time discussing other relevant 
policies, such as state kinship care policies and SCHIP programs.
There are many different ways to categorize kinship care. One common way is to 
divide it roughly into informal kinship care and formal kinship care. Most kinship care is 
private and informal: the decision that a child lives with a relative is made within a family 
and no child welfare agency is involved. In contrast, when a child is placed in the 
custody of a child welfare agency by a court, and then the child is arranged to be cared 
for by a relative by the child welfare agency—this is foster care. Such an arrangement is 
public and formal. Hence, the decision to become a grandparent caregiver and therefore
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to form a grandparent household is indeed a multinomial choice model, i.e. to choose 
between informal versus formal kinship care. In this essay, empirically, I am primarily 
interested in examining whether or not a grandparent household is formed, instead of 
investigating what type of grandparent household is formed. The relatively small sample 
size of grandparent households limits the feasibility of further classifying grandparent 
households into different family structures.
Although I will not empirically differentiate various types o f grandparent 
households, it is important to distinguish between formal and informal kinship care since 
public assistance eligibility and receipt vary for the different kinship arrangements (refer 
to Figure 4). Generally, income assistance from Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) is the most common and important public assistance received by 
informal kinship care families. All kin who are not receiving foster care payment or 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)46 for the child in care are eligible to receive TANF 
cash assistance. In contrast, only kin caring for a child who is in state custody (foster 
kinship care or formal kinship care) are eligible to receive child welfare services 
including foster care payments. Foster care payments are generally more generous than 
TANF cash assistance. I will discuss the details later.47
46 If the relative child in their care meets disability guidelines such as blindness, relative families are 
eligible to receive supplemental security payments, unless they are already receiving foster care payments 
or AFDC payments.
47 Children in kinship care may receive Food Stamps ( if  the family is income-eligible) and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), which will not be discussed here given the focus o f  the current study.
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3.1 Informal Kinship Care, TANF and Its Implication for Grandparent Household 
Formation
Now I will discuss TANF and its implications for informal kinship care. Between 
195 048 and 1996, Title IV of the Social Security Act and its regulations authorized 
relative caregivers to receive the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
grants for taking care of dependent children in their extended families. Eligible relative 
caregivers could apply and receive payment as a family unit if they themselves met 
income and assets eligibility guidelines, or they could apply to receive welfare benefits 
for only the related child regardless of their own income (i.e. an AFDC child-only grant). 
The 1996 welfare reform act officially encouraged states to give relatives first priority in 
providing care for foster children. Under the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, states are required to “consider 
giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver when determining a 
placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant state child 
protection standards” (Leos-Urbel et al. 2000). After the TANF program replaced the 
AFDC program in 1996, states were given the option to continue providing child-only 
grants to non-needy relatives.49
Although welfare reform was expected to primarily impact the lives o f children 
living in single-parent households, a growing number of children residing with relatives
48 A 1950 Social Security Act amendment offered eligible relative caregivers financial assistance for 
children in their care through the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which was renamed the Aid 
to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) program in the 1960s.
49 All states except W isconsin have continued this benefit. In Wisconsin, the child must be at risk o f  harm if  
living with biological parents in order for the relative caregivers to be eligible for a TANF child-only 
payment.
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were also likely to have been affected due to the new features of the welfare program 
such as time limits and work requirements. For example, Berrick, Needle and Minkler
(1999) offer an overview of welfare reform legislation in California and its implications 
for elder caregivers; Mullen and Einhom (2000) elaborate the policy implications of 
welfare reform on grandparent headed households specifically. Like Mullen and Einhom
(2000), my study also focuses exclusively on grandparent-headed households where 
neither parent is present. This is an important definition of grandparent household with 
regards to TANF. The presence of a parent in the grandparent household (whether the 
parent is a teenager or an adult) triggers different eligibility standards under TANF, and 
thus presents different policy implications (Mullen and Einhorn 2000).
In households with parents present, it is the parents’ circumstances that determine 
eligibility, not the circumstances of the grandparents. A grandparent can, and may wish 
to, decline to be part of the assistance unit, or may even be ineligible to be part of it, and 
still obtain benefits on behalf of a grandchild. That option—to obtain a grant on behalf of 
the child only— is not available to parents. For example, grandparent-headed households 
can have income and resources that exceed eligibility standards and still receive TANF 
on behalf of a grandchild, while parent-headed households with identical income and 
resources would not quality for TANF.50
TANF is different from the previous AFDC program due to several features 
including time limits on aid and work requirements. These changes may create incentives
50 The limited circumstances where a parent receives a child-only grant on behalf o f  a child include families 
where the parent is disabled and receives SSI benefits, families where the parent is an ineligible immigrant, 
and families where a parent has been removed from the grant due to a sanction. In such cases, the time 
limits do not apply either. What distinguishes parents who receive the child-only grant from grandparents is 
that parents cannot elect to be removed from the grant.
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for forming grandparent households. For example, a grandparent may have an incentive 
to apply for a TANF child-only grant even if she/he is eligible due to two important 
conditions of program participation: time limits and work requirements. The PRWORA 
prohibits the use of any federal TANF dollars in a household where an adult has received 
benefits for more than 60 months, and allows states to impose even shorter time limits. 
States may exempt up to 20 percent of their TANF recipients from this time limit on the 
basis of hardship.51 In every state, grandparents who are part of the assistance unit can 
avoid the lifetime loss of benefits for their grandchildren by removing themselves from 
the TANF grant anytime up to receiving 59 months of benefits. Parents do not have this 
option. Once grandparents exhausted their 60-month lifetime limits, nine states explicitly 
do not allow them to convert to a child-only grant. Another 33 states permit grandparents 
to withdraw from the assistance unit and continue to receive benefits on behalf of their 
grandchildren even after reaching 60-month time limits. Some of those states choose to 
provide benefits for the grandchildren using state dollars or funds available under a pre- 
TANF AFDC waiver (Mullen and Einhom 2000).
In addition, absent an exemption for good cause, PRWORA requires any 
grandparent who receives TANF assistance for him/herself to participate in work 
programs. However, work requirements do not apply when grandparents are not part of 
the assistance unit. More specifically, states are allowed to exempt grandparents who 
receive child-only grants from the work requirements and to exclude those cases in 
calculating their work participation rates. All states that offer child-only grants take 
advantage of this exemption.
51 Some states exempt caretakers who are over age 60.
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Therefore, both time limits and work requirements do not apply to grandparents 
who elect not to be part of the TANF assistance unit. In every state, a grandchild who 
receives aid for 60 months at a parent’s home and then goes to live with a grandparent is 
able to obtain additional benefits. Grandparents in the assistance unit who leave the 
TANF grant before the 60th month themselves, can continue to receive benefits for their 
grandchildren until the grandchildren reach age 18 or 19, depending on state law. This 
policy creates an incentive for grandparents to care for their grandchildren due to the 
TANF child-only grant.52
3.2 Formal Kinship Care, State Kinship Care Policy and Its Implication for 
Grandparent Household Formation
Formal kinship care is also called foster kinship care. Foster care payments are 
usually available to kin who are caring for children in state custody and who become 
licensed by the state. In general the requirements o f licensed foster homes include parent 
training, medical exams and background checks, standards for physical space in the 
house, caregiver age, family income, length of marriage and total number of children in 
home. With limited federal guidance, the licensing requirements for kin differ from state 
to state. But most states either modify or waive certain licensing requirements for kin.53 
According to Boots and Geen (1999), kinship families in most states (40 plus the District
52 However, the child support enforcements by states may substantially reduce the possibility o f  such fraud. 
States are required to try to recover the costs associated with their cash assistance programs by collecting 
child support from non-custodial parents. All states imposed cooperation requirements on grandparents 
who are part o f  the assistance unit. With regard to a grandparent receiving child-only grant, 3 states do not 
impose a cooperation requirement, and 13 states impose one but did not sanction the child for the 
grandparents’ failure to cooperate. Cooperation meant providing information about the identity and location 
o f the absent parent or parents, making the child available for blood tests, and appearing at interviews and 
court hearings (Mullen and Einhom 2000).
53 See Leos-Urbel, Bess and Geen (2000) for a detailed discussion o f  state licensing requirements for kin.
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of Columbia) are held to a less stringent standard54 for foster family eligibility than non- 
relative foster families.55
As welfare reform takes shape in states across the U.S., state kinship care policies 
continue evolving in terms of identifying, licensing, and financially supporting kinship 
care families as well as moving kinship care families to permanency. Federal policies 
allow states great discretion in determining how to license and support kinship foster 
parents. When the Adoption and Child Welfare Act of 1980 was passed, forming the 
basis of U.S. federal foster care law, it was rare for a child’s relative to act as a foster 
parent. Available evidence suggests that rates of formal kinship care increased 
substantially during the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, approximately 200,000 children 
were in formal kinship care (foster kinship care), which represent 29 percent of all foster 
children and about 10 percent of all children living in kinship care arrangements (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).
As mentioned earlier, the average foster care payment is notably higher than the 
average TANF payment, especially if there are multiple children in care. This is because 
the marginal foster care payment rate does not decline as the number of children in care 
increases, and foster care payment rates also depend on the age of the child. For example, 
although foster care payments differ from state to state, foster care payments averaged 
$356 per month for a 2-year-old, $373 per month for a 9-year-old, and $431 per month 
for a 16-year-old child in 1996. In contrast, in 1996, TANF payment amounts averaged
54 The least stringent states have few or no requirements for kin caregivers. In contrast, the most stringent 
states require full standards for licensing-the same as non-kin. In between the two extremes there are states 
that have a separate approval process for kin or waive some o f  the full standards’ requirements.
55 However, about half o f  these states do not provide foster care payments to the kinship families meeting a 
lower standard. Those families, if  seeking financial help, have to apply for welfare or other government 
assistance, which typically provides lower payments.
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$207 per month, with a range from $60 to $452 for one child per month. Moreover,
TANF payment amounts increase at a declining rate for each additional child and do not 
vary depending on the age of the child. These payment differences result in sharp 
differences in the assistance provided to kinship care families within and across states.56 
All else equal, the higher foster care payments compared with TANF provide an 
incentive for informal kinship care givers to become part of the child welfare system.
In sum, variations in TANF programs and state kinship care policies may create 
certain incentives for grandparents or other relatives to care for dependent children, either 
by encouraging them to enter the formal kinship care system (i.e. child welfare system in 
the form o f foster care arrangement) or choosing an informal kinship care arrangement. 
As welfare reform continues, parents are increasingly likely to exceed time limits, be 
subjected to sanctions and suffer welfare income loss, creating an incentive to shift their 
children to the grandparents’ homes. State kinship care policies are also continuing to 
evolve. Using data from the NSAF in conjunction with other state level data, the goal of 
this paper is to empirically examine how welfare reform affects grandparent household 
formation. Next I will analyze grandparent households’ decisions in an economic 
theoretical framework, with a view to gaining insights into motivations underlying 
grandparent caregiving behaviors.
56 See Boots and Geen (1999) for a detailed discussion.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCEPTUAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, I set up a theoretical framework for analyzing grandparent caregiving 
behaviors. I consider a society in which a grandparent57 is confronted with the decision of 
whether or not to take in a grandchild. The discussion will start with analyzing different 
motives of grandparent caregivers. This is because the primary goal of the current study is to 
investigate whether public programs, such as TANF, may influence grandparent household 
formation. The decision to form a grandparent household may indeed depend on the 
motivation underlying grandparent caregiving behaviors.58
4.1 Grandparent Caregiving Motivations
In the studies of both inter-vivos transfers and bequests, altruism and exchange are 
the two commonly explored competing hypotheses for private intergenerational transfers 
(Bemheim, Shleifer and Summers 1985, Wilhelm 1996, McGarry 1999, Cox 1987, Cox and 
Rank 1992, Cox and Jakubson 1995). This study applies the theories explaining private 
intergenerational transfers to discuss motivations of grandparent caregiving behaviors. In 
addition to altruism and exchange, there may be another distinctive motive that sets
57 It is likely that many households have both grandparents. But I w ill assume only one grandparent in my 
model in order to simplify the analysis.
58 Thomas (2000) discusses theories contributing to understanding o f  the grandparenting role from other 
disciplines.
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grandparents apart from other non-parental caregivers: the legacy effect.59 A grandparent 
chooses to take care of the grandchild so that the “family values” or heritage can be carried 
on. This motive is more similar to the altruism motive than to the exchange motive because 
the older the grandparent, the higher the likelihood that the grandparent may pass away in 
the near future and, therefore, the stronger his/her motive of helping the grandchild out so 
that family values can be preserved.60 Thus, next I will elaborate the altruism and exchange 
motives without discussing the legacy effect separately. In addition, even for a grandparent 
who cares for the grandchild because she/he mainly expects future service from the child 
(the exchange motive), she/he may still have some altruism towards the grandchild. But for 
the sake o f simplicity, I just consider two extreme cases: one is pure altruism and the other is 
pure exchange motive.
While evolutionary biology can explain the altruistic behavior of grandparents, 
there are no specific economic theories tailored to explain the reasons why grandparents 
take care of their grandchildren. Since different methods and focuses of different fields 
lead to different perspectives on altruism which can arise from using narrow or broad 
definitions of self-interest (at one extreme, self-interest is limited to material benefits for 
the altruist, while at the other extreme, self-interest includes only psychological rewards), 
it is imperative to define altruism in this analysis.
"Imagine a world where people give of themselves simply 
because they want to. Not out of a sense of debt. Or because they want 
something in return. No ulterior motives. No guilt feelings. Just a desire 
to give for the sake of giving. Now instead of imagining this kind of
591 would like to thank David Mitch for suggesting this effect and for his other valuable comments.
60 However, the legacy effect may be different from the altruism motives. Altruism might lead to a different 
distribution o f  resources across grandchildren (to maximize the sum o f  the individual grandchild utilities so 
that the least successful grandchild gets most) whereas the legacy effect might encourage investment in the 
grandchild most likely to succeed in the future). It’s not very relevant for the purpose o f  the current study, 
but with the right data sets, one might be able to empirically differentiate these two motives.
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world, do your part in making it happen. Make a charitable donation.
Volunteer your time to improve your community. Give back to the world 
that gives so much to you. And if it happens to make you feel good, that's 
all right. Feeling good is the one ulterior motive that's acceptable." --Bill 
Daniels61
That is what I mean by referring to altruism in this analysis, which is so-called 
‘real altruism’ or ‘psychological altruism’. In contrast, “if parents anticipate that 
children will help out in old age—perhaps because of guilt or related motivations, —even 
parents who are not very loving toward their children would invest more in the children’s 
human capital, and save less to provide for their old age” (see Becker 1992, p50). The 
parental behaviors Becker described could again apply to grandparent caregiving. The 
reason that a selfish grandparent who purely expects returns from the grandchild is 
willing to care for the grandchild is that the return from investing in the grandchild is 
higher than the returns from her/his other available options.
In fact, no matter what the underlying goal motivating the grandparent to care for the 
grandchild is, the observed behaviors of the grandparent may be similar. This is due to the 
fact that she always wants the grandchild to be better off in order for her/his own utility to 
be maximized. For example, if the grandparent is altruistic, then her/his utility is higher 
when the child fares better. If the grandparent is motivated instead by the exchange motive, 
she/he still wishes that the grandchild accumulates enough human capital so that the 
grandchild can help her/him out later.
61 Bill Daniels (1920-2000) is the "Father o f Cable Television" and a philanthropist who formed the 
“Daniels Fund”, a foundation that supports issues relating to aging, alcoholism and substance abuse, 
amateur sports, disabilities, education (early childhood, K-12 reform, and ethics and integrity) 
homelessness and disadvantaged, and youth development. (Source o f  quote: 
http://www.danielsfund.org/PDFs/2005_Grant_Guidelines.pdf)
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However, there are a few subtle ways that the altruistic grandparent may be different 
from other grandparents. Within the utility maximizing framework of resource allocation, 
the difference between different motivations may originate in at least three distinct ways. 
First, the grandparent may respond differently to the age difference between her/himself and 
the grandchild. For an altruistic grandparent, the greater the age difference between her/him 
and the grandchild, the more resources may be allocated to the grandchild. This is because 
due to altruism, the grandparent realizes that she/he should invest more in the grandchild so 
that the grandchild should be independent in case she/he passes away in the near future 
(although the ability to leave bequests should mitigate this somewhat.) In contrast, for a 
grandparent who expects returns from the grandchild, the opposite may be true; that is, the 
bigger the age difference between her/him and the grandchild, the fewer resources will be 
allocated to the grandchild because she/he anticipates that she/he will receive less return 
from the child before she/he dies, as services do not begin until the child reaches a certain 
age. For instance, an 80-year old grandparent may receive less service from a 1-year-old 
grandchild than she/he could get from a 15-year-old grandchild, all other things being equal. 
In addition, services from young children would be discounted by the amount of time until 
they would be actually provided.
Second, the grandparent may respond to the grandchild’s capacity differently under 
different motives. The initial grandchild quality may be used as an indicator of child 
capacity. For the altruistic grandparent, the lower the initial child quality, the more resources 
may be invested in the grandchild so that the grandchild can catch up to his peers more 
quickly. This also follows the “equalizing” hypothesis of bequests and intergenerational 
transfers (Tomes 1981). But for a grandparent who is selfish in the sense that she/he cares
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about the grandchild mainly because she/he expects to be helped out by the grandchild in the 
future, then the less lower the initial child quality, the less may be invested in the grandchild 
or the less likely the grandparent would be to care for the child in the first place. This 
happens because the child might be viewed as a less promising and profitable investment 
option compared to other available investment alternatives to an exchange oriented 
grandparent.
Third, the grandparent may treat the grandchild quality and her/his adult child 
quality differently if the underlying motives differ. For an altruistic grandparent, she may 
treat the grandchild quality and the adult child quality as complements. In contrast, an 
exchange motivated grandparent may view grandchild quality and the adult child quality 
as substitutes. If  her/his own adult child is a failure, she/he anticipates the grandchild will 
help out in old age instead. Therefore, how grandparents change the resources allocated 
to their grandchildren in response to changes in the age differential, changes in the 
grandchild quality and changes in adult child quality may shed light on the underlying 
motivation of grandparent caregiving behaviors. With the right data, it might be possible 
to identify empirically which motivation the grandparent has when taking the primary 
responsibility of raising their grandchildren.
4.2 Grandparent Household Formation
The decision is a binary choice where a grandparent compares the utilities 
between taking care of the grandchild (U  ) and not stepping forward for such a
commitment ( Us). To become a grandparent caregiver, the grandparent must derive 
greater utility from doing so than from not being a caregiver. This decision is similar to,
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yet different from a parent’s fertility decision. (For economic analyses of fertility, see, for 
example, Becker 1960, Ben-Porath 1973, Schultz 1973, Willis 1973.) For example, for 
both grandparents and parents, they decide to “have” children either because they derive 
utility from doing so (children are compared to durable goods) or because they expect 
services from the children in the future (children are compared to investment goods). 
There are also some differences. For a parent’s fertility decision, the choice is made 
between having the child (bom) vs. not having the child (unborn). In contrast, for a 
grandparent, since the child is already bom and she/he knows the child, the choice is 
either she/he cares for the child, or the child is living in an alternative arrangement such 
as a foster home. Another difference between a grandparent’s decision of caring for a 
grandchild and a parent’s fertility decision is age. For most grandparents, it is unusual for 
them to have the primary responsibility of parenting a child at their age. In contrast, it is 
normal for most parents to raise children at their age. In line with this argument, the age 
differential between the child and grandparent may matter more for a grandparent’s 
decision than for a parent’s decision.
Without taking care of the child, grandparent utility is a function of market 
purchased numeraire commodity (C),62 which is maximized subject to the income 
constraint:
max/75 =U(C)  (1)
subject to
C = Y (2)
where Y is family wealth/endowment.
62 Even without taking care o f  the child, the grandparent can still derive some utility from having a 
grandchild. But this utility is assumed to be exogenous, and I assume it is zero to simplify the analysis.
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Solving this optimization problem yields the optimal demands for consumption
goods:
C* = C*(7)  (3)
Plugging the demand into the utility function yields the grandparent’s maximized 
utility before taking in grandchildren:
VS* = V(Y) = US(C*(Y))64 (4)
Upon the formation of a household with the grandchild, the caregiving 
commitment can reduce resources available to the grandparent and therefore decrease 
her/his total utility. However, it also improves grandparent utility by producing H(x),65 
which is a special commodity that is available only through grandparent caregiving. It 
must be produced by market goods x  purchased at price p.  Public programs can increase 
resources available to the grandparent household with a cash transfer W or by reducing 
the price of some commodities like health care. Conditional on taking care of the child, 
now the grandparent utility maximizing problem becomes
ma x U = U ( C , H ( x ) )  (5)
c  ® 
subject to
C + px = Y + W (6)
Solving this maximizing problem yields demands for C and x:
63 In order to simplify the analysis, I do not include time allocation in the model. This is a reasonable 
assumption as time can also be viewed as an endowment.
64 For the purpose o f  simplicity, and given that the ultimate choice is between two utility levels, this is a 
deterministic model -  C must equal Y  -  and there is no real choice at this level.
65 H(x) represents different things under different motives. For example, for altruistic grandparents it means 
child quality, but for exchange motivated grandparents, it means expected future service from their 
grandchildren.
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C* = C* ( p , W, Y)  (7)
x* = x* (p , W, Y)  (8)
The corresponding indirect utility is:
Vg * = V(p,  W, Y) = Ug(C* (p, W, Y), H* {x *  (p, W,  7))) (9)
The grandparent will take care of the child only when the utility shown in
equation (9) exceeds that shown in equation (4). This can be written as
V=Vg *-Vs * = Ug(C*( p , W, Y ) , H*( x* ( p , W, Y ) ) ) - Us(C*(Y))> 0. (10)
This model regarding grandparent household formation and demand for the 
special commodity H  yields some implications regarding the impact of public policies on 
grandparent household formation. According to Gary Becker, “Parents help determine the 
values of children— including their feelings of obligation, duty, and love—but what 
parents try to do can be greatly affected by public policies and changes in economic and 
social conditions.” (Becker 1992 p. 51) In the case of grandparents serving as surrogate 
parents, grandparents’ behaviors can also be influenced by public policies. Theoretically 
speaking, government programs such as TANF can have an income effect by shifting the 
budget constraint outward. In line with this argument, TANF programs are expected to be 
positively associated with grandparent household formation and child investment x  as 
well.66
66 However, regarding x, some complication may arise i f  the impact o f  public assistance on grandparent 
consumption is taken into account as well. For example, if  the grandparent increases her own consumption 
in response to a receipt o f  public assistance, then the actual child investment by the household may 
decrease instead. In other words, public assistance may have a crowd-out effect on private child 
investment.
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As discussed in the theoretical framework, a grandparent decides whether or not 
to care for the grandchild by comparing utilities in caregiving and non-caregiving 
scenarios. To empirically examine what factors, especially public policies, influence 
grandparent household formation, the following decision equation corresponding to 
equations (4) and (9) is estimated:
FVs=aYlls+pGlis+ YEm + r1NFljs+YWs + vijs (10)
where F  is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the child is living in a grandparent 
maintained household without either parent present. Y represents family income, G 
contains child characteristics such as gender of child and race, E  includes the Most 
Knowledgable Adult’s (MKA) characteristics such as the MKA’s age and education, NF  
denotes household characteristics such as living in the South, and W  includes the vector 
of policy variables. Subscript i indicates for individual i, and j  indicates for outcomes j  
and s for state s.
5.2 Data and Variables
The primary sources of data are the 1997, 1999 and 2002 waves of the National 
Survey of American Families (NSAF). The three rounds of the survey were carried out
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from February to November of 1997, February to October of 1999, and February to 
October of 2002 respectively. The NSAF provides information on the economic, health, 
and social characteristics of children, adults caring for the children, and their families. In 
each round, interviews were conducted with over 40,000 families, yielding a sample size 
of 2241 grandparent households.
There is one caveat about the data. Since the child is the unit of observation, both 
the household and the MKA are linked to the child by a household identification number. 
Therefore, I do not have information on grandparents who are not the MKAs o f the 
children. Or to put it another way, a grandparent’s characteristics are obtained only if the 
grandparent is the Most Knowledgeable Adult (MKA) of the child, so I do not have 
information on grandparents who are not the MKAs. As a result, I have to use the MKA’s 
characteristics to proxy for the grandparent’s information in such a case. This approach 
might not be ideal but could roughly represent grandparent characteristics. In most cases, 
the MKA is the child’s parent. Numerous studies show intergenerational correlation and 
transmission regarding behaviors, parenting, earnings, wealth, labor market status, and 
welfare receipt (Serbin and Karp 2003, Thornberry et al. 2003, Saltaris et al. 2004, Grawe 
and Mulligan 2002, Couch and Dunn 1997, Goldberger 1989, Behrman and Taubman 
1990, Antel 1992 ). In addition, these variables are control variables -  not the variables 
o f interest. Next I will discuss the primary measures used for grandparent household 
status, public policies, and basic demographic characteristics.
5.2.1 Grandparent Households Defined. There is a lack of consensus on how to 
classify grandparent households, and various approaches have been used by previous 
researchers. This study focuses exclusively on grandparent-headed households with
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neither parent present. Although this definition excludes almost two-thirds of the 
grandparent-headed households as defined by the Census Bureau67, it is a crucial 
definition of grandparent household in relationship to TANF. As noted by Mullen and 
Einhom (2000), the presence of a parent in the household triggers different eligibility 
standards under TANF, and thus raises different policy considerations. In the current 
study, grandparent households are identified by two variables jointly: 1) the child is in a 
kinship care arrangement (i.e. neither parent is present in the household) and 2) the 
relationship of the MKA to the focal child is grandparent. If the grandparent is the MKA 
but the child is not in kinship care, then the household where the focal child lives will be 
not classified as a grandparent household by this study because at least one parent is 
present in such a household.
5.2.2 Measures o f  Public Policies and Public Assistance. As suggested by the 
theoretical model, public assistance can influence grandparent household formation by 
increasing family income or by reducing the relative prices of inputs and consumption 
goods. I consider three key public policies/programs that could have a significant impact 
on grandparent households: TANF, kinship care policy and SCFIIP.
As discussed earlier, after the 1996 federal welfare reform law replaced the 
AFDC entitlement program with the TANF block grant program, a distinctive feature of 
TANF is the time limit. Under TANF, families that include an adult are generally limited 
to 60 months of lifetime assistance. States may impose a shorter limit. The 5-year time 
limit on TANF benefits may prompt some parents to turn over custody of their children
67 The Census Bureau defines grandparent households as households headed by a grandparent 
(grandparents) with at least one co-resident grandchild. Therefore, such households may include only the 
child’s mother, only the child’s father, both the child’s parents, or neither parent.
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to grandparents. It is unclear whether there is increase in the number of grandparent­
headed households after parents exhaust their eligibility for benefits. In order to test this 
possibility, it is hypothesized that the closer the family is to approaching the time limit, 
the more likely that a grandparent household might be formed, ceteris paribus.
Because all three rounds of the NSAF survey started in February, I calculate the 
time difference between February and the date that families in each state first could 
exceed the time limit for each survey year for states that impose time limits. The welfare 
reform law also allows states to choose not to impose time limits at all by using state 
funds to pay for assistance beyond 60 months. In such cases I just put in an arbitrary large 
number (1000 months). A difference with a positive value indicates the months left 
before the family would exceed its lifetime limit if it has been continuously on TANF 
since 1996. A difference with a negative value indicates the number of months since 
such a family would have exceeded its lifetime limit.68 The smaller the value, therefore, 
the more potentially binding is the state’s time constraint. Here I am not trying to actually 
calculate whether a family has exceeded its time limit. Instead I am trying to capture 
TANF time limit policy variation across states and the fact that the time limit is likely 
becoming more binding over time.
As discussed earlier, children living with grandparents with neither parent present 
can receive TANF child-only grants, and the grandparents are not subject to work 
requirements and time limits for these child-only grants since they are not in the 
assistance unit. Therefore, this aspect of TANF has an unintended consequence of
68 For example, families from Florida first exceeded their time limit on 10/1/1998. The 1997 NSAF survey 
began as early as February, 1997. Therefore I calculated the month difference for Florida families in the 
1997 NSAF as the difference between 10/1/1998 and 02/01/1997, which is 20.2 months.
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creating a welfare loophole by encouraging children to live with their relatives after their 
families exceed state time limits. In order to test this possibility, it is hypothesized that 
the bigger the TANF cash assistance, the more likely that grandparents may take in their 
children and form grandparent households. The maximum TANF benefit varies 
dramatically from state to state. In addition to the basic choices states make with regard 
to benefit levels, the other factor that determines the maximum benefit amount a 
grandparent can receive is the number of people in the TANF assistance unit. With the 
exception of Idaho, states base the amount of cash assistance on the number of people in 
the assistance unit; the presence of more people in the assistance unit results in more cash 
assistance.
The monthly payment of TANF cash assistance could therefore be an important 
factor when creating such incentives. Here I create a measure of TANF cash assistance 
by taking the difference of the state TANF maximum benefit69 for a family of two 
('Cash2), and state TANF maximum benefits for a family of one (Cashl), divided by the 
sum of the two amounts, i.e.:
. i ,. . „ „  . Cash, -  CashTANF Benefit Ratio=  ---------- -
Cash2 + Cash{
In this case, Cashl represents the maximum benefit for a TANF child-only 
grant70. Intuitively, the bigger the TANF Benefit Ratio, the less the cash assistance a 
grandparent would receive from a TANF child-only grant compared to the amount a 
family assistance unit of two persons would receive. Therefore, this ratio measures the
69 There are some variations over time on TANF maximum benefits.
70A s a sensitivity check, I also use C ashl instead o f  this TANF benefit ratio measure. The results are 
similar.
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financial incentive for a grandparent to care for his/her grandchild and is hypothesized to 
be negatively associated with grandparent household formation decision.
Because families in formal kinship can receive foster care payments, which are 
higher than TANF payments, it is important to control for state foster care payments. 
Foster care basic monthly maintenance payment rates vary by a child’s age in care, so the 
ideal variable would be actual state basic monthly maintenance payment for children at 
their age. As I could not find the foster care payment rates data for all age groups for all 
three years, I use state foster care basic monthly maintenance payment rates for children 
age 2 to proxy for children from 0-5 age group and the average of state foster care basic 
monthly maintenance payment rates for children age 9 and 16 to proxy for the 6-17 age 
group. It is hypothesized that the higher the basic monthly maintenance payment rate, the 
more likely a grandparent is to care for his/her grandchild, all other things being equal.
In addition, kinship care has been viewed more favorably than non-kin placement 
by state child welfare agencies since the 1980s, and state kinship care policies have also 
changed over time. In order to capture state kinship care policies, I adopt the five-point 
scale developed by Jantz, Geen, Bess, Andrews and Russell (2002) to measure states’ 
flexibility in terms of working with kinship foster parents. This index contains one 
variable early in the service process (definition), two in the middle (options and payment) 
and two at the end (long-term foster care and subsidized guardianship). The flexibility 
criteria, reported in this order, are as follows:
(1) Definition of kin is broad — beyond those related by blood, marriage, or
adoption (i.e. to include family friends, neighbors);
(2) Waived or separate assessment standard of licensing is offered for kin;
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(3) Foster care payment is provided to kin who meet a waived or separate
standard;
(4) Children are permitted to remain in long-term foster care with kin;
(5) Subsidized guardianship is offered to kin.
On one extreme, if a state implements all five policies, the index score for that 
state is five; on the other extreme, if a state has none of the above policies, the index 
score for such a state is zero. Therefore, the index score ranges from zero to five, with 
higher scores indicating more generous states in terms of treating kinship care families. It 
is hypothesized the higher the score is for a state, the more likely the residents in that 
state are to form grandparent households. In a secondary specification, I also use the five 
individual measures instead of the index score to better understand the effect of each 
individual kinship care policy on grandparent household formation.
Children in most states are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP if their family income 
is at or below the minimum income eligibility level defined by the state. The eligibility 
process and types of coverage vary among states. Children in formal kinship care are 
categorically eligible to receive Medicaid assistance regardless of family income or 
TANF/SSI receipt. For children in informal kinship care, if the family is receiving a 
child-only TANF payment for that child, then the child is also eligible for 
Medicaid/SCHIP. As for Medicaid/SCHIP programs, I use state minimum income 
eligibility as a percentage of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) for different age groups as a 
measure of Medicaid/SCHIP programs. It is hypothesized that Medicaid/SCHIP income 
eligibility is negatively associated with grandparent household formation by reducing the 
cost of raising a child from the parents’ perspective.
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Moreover, in order to control the business cycle impact on family income and 
earnings, I also include state unemployment rates. Finally, two dummy variables 
indicating year 1999 and 2002 are also included. Details on sources of state level 
variables are discussed in Appendix A.
5.2.3 Other Control Variables. The set of control variables used in the estimations 
include the child’s characteristics such as gender and race, the MKA’s characteristics 
such as age, marital status, education, and labor force status, and household 
characteristics such as family income level compared to the official poverty level, 
number of children under age 6, number of children between age 6 and 17, and region.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The complex sampling design of the NSAF involves clustering, multistage 
sampling, and stratification. All means and regression results presented have been 
adjusted for the complex sampling design of NSAF, as well as adjusted for non-response 
and over-sampling, by using proper weights, Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) and Strata to 
ensure that the estimates are representative of the US population in general and that the 
standard errors are correctly calculated. (See Brick et al. 1999 for a more complete 
discussion of weights in the NSAF.)
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before reporting the regression results, I first present some basic descriptive 
statistics (refer to Table 37). According to the classification discussed earlier, there are 
2,241 children (2.15 percent of the total sample) living in grandparent households, and 
1,530 children (1.46 percent of the total sample) living in other kin households which 
include all other relative caregiver families.
Comparing grandparent-headed households to the whole sample reveals that 
grandparents are much more likely to be non-Hispanic black (47.5% vs. 15.6%), which is 
consistent with the estimates by the Census Bureau; children in their care are relatively 
younger (9.4 vs. 10.6 years old), and grandparents are older than the average MKA of the
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sample (54.9 vs. 36.7 years old), which is not surprising given the fact that most MKAs 
in the NSAF data are children’s parents. Compared to the average MKA of the whole 
sample, grandparent caregivers are also more likely to be female (89.2% vs. 80.9%), are 
less likely to be married (47.3% vs. 71.1%), and are less likely to be working (46% vs. 
68.3%). In addition, grandparent caregivers are less likely to have a degree of Bachelor 
or higher (12.9% vs. 26.6%) and are more likely to live in poverty (61.3% vs. 56.7%). 
Therefore, it is likely that grandparents may apply for a TANF child-only grant to support 
the child. Furthermore, grandparent caregivers are also more likely to concentrate in the 
South (52.6% vs. 34.8%), a finding which is consistent with Chalfie (1994).
Comparing grandparent-headed households and other kin households shows 
similar patterns: grandparents are more likely to be non-Hispanic black (47.5% vs. 
39.0%), children in their care are relatively younger (9.4 vs. 10.6 years old), and 
grandparents are older than other kin caregivers (54.9 vs. 39.2 years old). Compared to 
other relative caregivers, grandparents are less educated, are less likely to work (46% vs. 
61.7%), and are more likely to live in poverty (61.3% vs. 56.7%). In addition, 
grandparent caregivers are also more likely to concentrate in the South (52.6% vs. 37%). 
All the differences discussed are statistically significant.
6.2 Regression Results
The first column in Table 38 presents the results based on estimating the decision 
equation (10) on the entire sample. The dependent variable measures whether the child is 
living in a grandparent maintained household without either parent present. The estimates 
on both TANF related variables (i.e. “number of months before/after the family exceeds 
TANF time limit” and “TANF maximum benefit ratio”) do not yield the expected sign,
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and neither is significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, I do not find evidence that 
welfare reform has influenced grandparent household formation.
As for the kinship care policy index, the estimate of the coefficient on this index 
variable is 0.10 and the associated odds ratio, as reported in Table 38, is 1.109, which is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. That is, if a state increases the kinship care 
generosity index by 1 point, for example, by introducing a new kinship care policy, the 
likelihood of forming a grandparent household is increased by 10.9% on the margin. This 
finding presents some evidence that the generosity of state kinship care policies may 
encourage grandparent kinship household formation. However, the sign of the estimate 
on foster care payment is negative, yielding an odds ratio that is less than one. But it is 
not statistically significant. Likewise, the estimate on state SCHIP income eligibility also 
does not have the expected sign and it is not statistically significant either. Therefore, I do 
not find evidence that policy variables, other than state foster kinship care policies, have 
an influential impact on grandparent household formation.
Turning to the coefficients on control variables, the results are consistent with the 
findings from the descriptive statistics in general. For example, the results from 
regression show that non-Hispanic blacks are more likely than non-Hispanic whites (the 
reference group) to form a grandparent household. Grandmothers, older grandparents and 
grandparents living in the south are more likely to care for their grandchildren 
independently compared to grandfathers, younger grandparents and people living in other 
regions. Grandparents’ education also makes a difference: more educated people are less 
likely to serve as surrogate parents for their grandchildren.
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6.3 Sensitivity Checks
State kinship care policies do not target grandparents but apply to all kin, although 
grandparents are more likely than other kin to take care of those children. Therefore, I 
repeat the estimation for the decision to be a kin caregiver in general, instead of being a 
grandparent caregiver only, for the whole sample. (Results are reported in the third 
column of Table 38.) The results are generally consistent with those obtained from 
predicting the possibility of being a grandparent household. This exercise serves as a 
robust check and provides further evidence that state kinship care policies may encourage 
children to be in kinship care. Although still statistically insignificant, the sign of the 
time limit coefficient estimate now becomes positive.
For kinship care policies, instead of using the index measure, I also include all 
five individual state kinship care policy variables in one specification and each of the five 
individual variables separately in five different specifications. Subsidized guardianship 
kin is found to be positively associated with grandparent household formation in 
particular, regardless of whether this policy variable is used along with the other four 
kinship care policies or is the only kinship care policy in the model. However, the policy 
that permits children to remain in long-term foster care with kin is positively associated 
with the general kinship care arrangement when only this policy variable is used. (Refer 
to Table 39 for a summary of the results.) All other public policy variables, such as 
TANF and SCHIP variables, once again do not have any statistically significant effect.
As I assign an arbitrary large number (1000 months) as the time limit for states 
that do not impose time limits on their TANF cash assistance, I also test the sensitivity of
-280 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
this assumption by using two other arbitrary numbers (800 months and 1200 months).
The results (see the second and the third columns of Table 40) are similar to each other 
and are also similar to those reported in Table 38.
I use the number of months left before a family exceeds the time limit as a 
measure of how binding the time limit is for a family that have not exceeded its time 
limit. A negative value of this variable indicates the number o f months after a family has 
exceeded its TANF time limit. However, it might make no or little difference once a 
family exceeds its lifetime limit. Therefore, I replace negative values of this measure with 
zero. The results are, as reported in the fourth column of Table 40, similar to those 
presented in Table 38.
In order to check the collinearity between the kinship care index and foster care 
payments, I also include only one of these two variables one at time. There is no evidence 
of collinearity between these two policy variables. The results are reported in the last two 
columns of Table 40.
Finally, as another sensitivity check, I also add state dummy variables. This 
exercise renders all of the policy variables insignificant on grandparent household 
formation as well as on general kinship care arrangements. This might be due to the fact 
that the time period examined is short and too few changes took place within states and 
over time to allow for a fixed-effects specification.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
The 1996 welfare reform raised concerns about potential unintended 
consequences of the welfare reform legislation that could influence kinship care. 
Specifically, child welfare advocates pointed out that one particular type of welfare 
payment for which kinship care families were eligible, i.e. TANF child-only grants, 
would not necessarily be subject to the new work requirements and time limits. There is 
an incentive for parents to leave their children with relatives including grandparents to 
avoid the new welfare requirements but still receive assistance in the form of child-only 
grants. There was also concern that kinship care providers, who used to care for children 
informally and receive cash assistance through welfare, would seek assistance from the 
child welfare system due to the generous foster care payment compared to TANF cash 
assistance. Especially if they are forced to meet welfare requirements, kin caregivers may 
switch to the formal kinship care arrangement.
Households made up of grandparents and their grandchildren are just one of the 
new diverse family structures with which welfare administrators learn to work. Welfare 
reform must be understood not only in the context of grandparenthood, but also in the 
context of the interplay between kinship care policies and welfare reform. A cautious 
examination of such interplay on grandparent household formation is warranted as
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welfare reform unfolds and state kinship care policies evolve. This study seeks to 
understand how welfare reform impacts grandparent household formation, and at the 
same time takes into account the interplay of other concurrent public policies such as 
state kinship care policies and SCHIP programs. In contrast to the widespread concerns 
about potential unintended consequences of welfare reform, this study does not find 
convincing evidence that welfare reform leads to more children living with their 
grandparents. Nevertheless, I find that generosity o f state kinship care policies is 
positively related to grandparent household formation specifically and kinship care 
arrangements in general.
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Figure 4. Public Assistance Available to Grandparent Households
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Table 37. Descriptive Statistics for Grandparent Households, Other Kin Households
and the Whole Sample
Grandparent Other kin Whole sample
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Child's gender, equal to 1 i f  the child is a girl 0.492 0.019 0.484 0.025 0.488 0.003
Black 0.475 0.023 0.390 0.026 0.156 0.003
Hispanic 0.150 0.015 0.158 0.020 0.161 0.002
Other race/ethnicity 0.021 0.004 0.056 0.012 0.049 0.002
Child's age 9.413 0.192 10.635 0.299 8.523 0.026
MKA is female 0.892 0.012 0.862 0.015 0.809 0.002
MKA's age 54.920 0.377 39.194 0.581 36.706 0.049
MKA is married 0.473 0.021 0.499 0.027 0.711 0.003
MKA has HS diploma 0.212 0.016 0.296 0.024 0.258 0.004
MKA has some college 0.253 0.015 0.284 0.020 0.311 0.003
MKA has a Bachelor's degree or above 0.129 0.014 0.182 0.022 0.266 0.003
MKA is working 0.460 0.020 0.617 0.024 0.683 0.003
Family is below 200% of FPL 0.613 0.021 0.567 0.028 0.392 0.004
Number of children 0-5 years old 0.640 0.060 0.852 0.080 0.756 0.006
Number of children 6-17 years old 1.676 0.060 2.194 0.098 1.669 0.011
West 0.181 0.016 0.225 0.025 0.233 0.003
Mid-west 0.154 0.015 0.219 0.022 0.235 0.003
South 0.526 0.020 0.370 0.022 0.348 0.003
Year dummy, equals 1 ifyear=1999 0.336 0.020 0.371 0.025 0.334 0.003
Year dummy, equals 1 if  year=2002 0.352 0.023 0.366 0.024 0.337 0.003
Months after/before exceeding TANF time 
limit
0.996 0.108 1.192 0.116 1.309 0.016
TANF monthly maximum benefits o f one and 
two nersons ratio
0.214 0.005 0.210 0.004 0.208 0.001
Foster policy generosity index 3.012 0.032 2.996 0.053 2.931 0.007
Definition of kin is broad 0.396 0.026 0.350 0.028 0.382 0.004
Waived or separate assessment standard is 
offered for kin
0.748 0.021 0.782 0.023 0.729 0.003
Foster care payment is provided to kin who 
meet a waived or separate standard
0.551 0.023 0.571 0.025 0.524 0.004
Children are permitted to remain in long-term 
foster care with kin
0.710 0.021 0.703 0.025 0.678 0.003
Subsidized guardianship is offered to kin 0.540 0.016 0.527 0.021 0.552 0.003
Monthly basic foster payments 4.118 0.032 4.189 0.059 4.074 0.006
SCH1P income eligibility as percentage o f FPL 1.845 0.028 1.894 0.032 1.860 0.004
State unemployment rate 5.078 0.053 5.080 0.057 5.016 0.008
Number of Observations 2241 1530 104588
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Table 38. Logit Model Predicting the Probability of Being in Grandparent Kinship 
Care for the Whole Sample: Using Kinship Care Policy Index
Grandparent All Kin
Number o f  Months before/after Exceeding TANF Time Limit 1.001 0.991
(0.07) (0.72)
TANF Maximum TANF Benefit Ratio 1.214 1.151
(0.33) (0.42)
Kinship Care Policy Index 1.109 1.073
(2.07)* (1.88)*
Monthly Foster Care Payment 0.974 1.011
(0.42) (0.20)
SCHIP Income Eligibility as Percentage o f FPL 1.061 1.018
(0.44) (0.19)
Gender o f The Child, Equals to One for Girls 0.979 0.984
(0.20) (0.25)




Other Race/Ethnicity 0.500 1.210
(2.24)* (0.99)
Child's Age 0.867 0.980
(9.45)** (1.99)*
MKA is Female 4.336 2.170
(7.90)** (7.74)**
MKA's Age 1.286 1.171
(28.68)** (25.91)**
MKA is Married 0.765 0.600
(1.63) (5.61)**
MKA has a High School Diploma 0.516 0.766
(4.24)** (2.03)*
MKA has Some College 0.528 0.631
(3.97)** (3.70)**
MKA has a Bachelor Degree or Above 0.300 0.432
(6.13)** (5.83)**
Family Income is Below 200% o f FPL 1.191 1.183
(0.93) (1.64)
MKA is Working 1.052 0.900
(0.40) (1.34)
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Table 38. (continued)
Number o f  Children Aged 0-5 1.055 1.537
(0.58) (7.15)**












Unemployment Rate 0.991 1.029
(0.10) (0.51)
Number o f Observations 103860 103860
Note:
1. Odds ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
2. * indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level and *** at 0.01 level.
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Table 39. Alternative Specifications of State Kinship Care Policies
All Five Policies together 
in one specification
Each o f the F 
5 individual s
'ive Policies in 
deifications
Grandparent All kin Grandparent Alikin
Broad Definition o f Kin 1.075 0.989 1.075 0.972
(0.48) (0.16) (0.46) (0.24)
Waive/Separate Assessment for Kin 0.848 1.163 0.953 1.120
(0.80) (0.72) (0.35) (1.15)
Foster Payment for Kin 1.224 0.981 1.075 1.213
(1.13) (0.45) (0.59) (1.22)
Long Term Foster Care for Kin 1.143 1.101 1.104 1.140
(0.93) (1.63) (0.70) (1.71)*
Subsidized Guardianship for Kin 1.441 1.054 1.376 1.027
(3.04)** (0.67) (2.84)** (0.37)
Notes:
1. Odds ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
2. * indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level and *** at 0.01 level.
3. These specifications include the same other control variables as regressions in Table 38.
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Table 40. Other Sensitivity Checks
TANF time limit policies Kinship care policies
Key policy variables A B C D E
Number o f Months before/after 
Exceeding TANF Time Limit 1.002 1.001 1.002 1.001 1.010
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.50)
TANF Maximum Benefit Ratio 1.213 1.215 1.215 1.196 1.340
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) (0.50)
Kinship Care Policy Index 1.109 1.108 1.108 1.108 |
(2.08)* (2.07)* (2.06)* (2.04)*
0.979Monthly Foster Care Payment 0.974 0.974 0.974
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) 1 (0.34)
SCHIP Income Eligibility as 
Percentage o f FPL 1.061 1.061 1.061 1.062 1.061
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Notes:
1. Odds ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
2. * indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level and *** at 0.01 level.
3. Specifications A  and B use 800 months and 1200 months respectively as time limits for states 
that do not impost time limits. Specification C replaces negative values o f number o f  months left 
before exceeding TANF time limits (i.e. families have exceeded their lifetime time limits) with 0.
4. Specification D drops the foster care payment variable and E drops the kinship care policy index 
variables to check collinearity o f these two variables.
5. All these specifications include the same other control variables as regressions in Table 38.
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APPENDIX A. Data Source for State Level Variables
Three surveys on state kinship care policies were conducted in 1997, 1999 and 
2001 by the Urban Institute (Janz et al. 2002). It is hard to find data with similar 
information for the year 2002. Therefore, the 2001 index measuring the generosity of 
state kinship care, taken from Jantz et al. (2002), is used directly to proxy data for 2002. 
For 1997 and 1999,1 combined data taken from Jantz et al. (2002) and from Leos-Urbel 
et al. (2000), which summarize state kinship care policy changes between 1999 and 2001, 
and between 1997 and 1999 respectively, to create a similar index for 1997 and 1999.
I was able to find data on foster care basic monthly maintenance payment rates 
only for children ages 2, 9 and 16 for 1996, 1998 and 2000 from the 1996, 1998 and 2000 
Greenbook. Since it may take some time for the targeted population to learn and respond 
to any new policies or changes in public programs, it is reasonable to use the available 
three year data to proxy for 1997, 1999 and 2002.
Likewise, data on TANF maximum benefits as of January 1996, as of January 
1997 and as of January 2000 are therefore used as a proxy for 1997, 1999 and 2002 
respectively, so that data on foster payments and TANF cash assistance will be roughly 
consistent. Data on TANF maximum benefits for a family of one and two persons are 
also taken from 1996, 1998 and 2000 Greenbook.
As various sources of data on time limits reveal discrepancies71, data on time 
limits such as lifetime time limits (months) and dates families first exceeded time-limits
71 For example, data from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database (2002) show there are no life limits 
for N ew  York, Maine and Washington D.C. In contrast, data from Administration o f  Children and 
Families, Department o f  Health and Human Services and data from the State Policy Documentation Project 
show 60-month lifetime limits for all three states. Again data from the SPDP shows families in Texas first 
exceeded time limits in January 1998. However, the date shown by data from Administration o f  Children 
and Families, DHHS, is June 1997.
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are obtained by referring to several data sources from the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Urban Institute's 1999 and 2002 Welfare Rules Database and State 
Policy Documentation Project (SPDP). Since no data on time limits for the year 1997 is 
found and there is little variation in time limits during this time, I use data for 1999 to 
proxy that of 1997.
The unemployment rate for each state comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), U.S. Dept, o f Labor. Data on SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility rules come from 
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Update Jan 20, 2000 and Update 2002 collected by 
the National Governor’s Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation consists of three separate essays. Essay One (Part X) investigates 
broadly how family environment, especially family structure, affects child outcomes, 
with a focus on less typical family structures and the interplay of parent-child gender. 
While extensive research exists about the effects of family structure on child outcomes, 
this study contributes to the literature on several fronts. Foremost, this essay presents a 
more complete picture of the diversity of family structures and its association with child 
outcomes. For example, this study includes single-father households and households 
headed by grandparents, both of which have grown tremendously since 1990, and yet 
relatively little is known about them. Second, with a clear distinction between “inputs,” 
such as well child care visits, and “outputs,” i.e. child outcomes, this study isolates the 
role that critical ‘inputs’ play in producing child well-being after controlling for 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Third, this study examines a wide array 
of child outcomes including both developmental and health outcomes. Fourth, the careful 
examination of gender/race interactions sheds light on the underlying mechanisms that 
lead to disparities in child outcomes.
Although state and federal governments leave the responsibility o f raising 
children primarily to families, they intervene in a variety of ways to ensure favorable 
outcomes for the national future. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 was signed 
into law in August 1997, creating the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
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(SCHIP) to help reduce the number of children without any health insurance. A 
burgeoning literature documents the effect o f SCHIP with respect to eligibility, take-up 
and crowd-out. However, research investigating the impact of SCHIP programs on 
improving medical care utilization and health outcomes o f children is relatively sparse, 
especially at the national level. In Essay Two (Part Two) I rigorously examine how 
SCHIP programs affect insurance coverage, health care utilization and health outcomes 
by employing four different estimation strategies including the difference-in-difference 
approaches, reduced form estimation and 2SLS. This study represents the first effort that 
examines how SCHIP programs affect medical care utilization and child outcomes for 
children in all age groups at the national level.
The TANF program is another government program that may have significant 
impact on many lower income households. Although the welfare reform primarily affects 
single-parent households, it has important implications for grandparent households. The 
Census Bureau (2002) estimates that the percentage of children under 18 living in a 
grandparent-headed home has nearly doubled since 1970. Despite the ongoing trend, no 
economic studies have examined how public policies influence grandparent household 
formation. The third essay contributes to the sparse existing economic literature in three 
different ways. First, this study thoroughly reviews the literature and provides an 
overview of different public policies related to grandparent households. Second, it 
empirically addresses the potential impacts of welfare reform on grandparent household 
formation while at the same time controlling for other contemporary public policies such 
as state kinship care policies and SCHIP. Third, the third essay builds a theoretical
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framework that explores the motivations underlying grandparent household formation 
and caregiving behaviors through the lens of an economist.
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